Showing posts with label ancient Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ancient Greece. Show all posts

‘For the sake of a single Lacedaemonian girl’… or the insults that caused the Greco-Persian wars

In a previous post, I mentioned that the mechanism of revenge is a key concept helping us understand the causes and conduct of the Peloponnesian war and Greek culture generally. Conflicts and enmities often began as a result of perceived insults, affronts to honour, which could only be redeemed or expiated through vengeance.

In fact, if we read Herodotus, we can see how, for the Greek mind, this mechanism of revenge didn’t just apply to recent events, but could stretch far back into history, and even into myth.

Thus, Herodotus begins his Histories by stating his intention to reveal the aetiology of the wars between Greece and Persia in the fifth century BC and suggesting that they were the culmination of a series of insults and reprisals between Europeans and Asiatics going back centuries and, indeed, into the mists of time.

Herodotus says that the ‘feud’ between Greece and Persia, or Europe and Asia, was initiated by the Phoenicians. These quintessential Mediterranean traders had come on their ships to Argos, hawking goods from Egypt and Assyria, and at the end of their mission, having sold most of their wares, they kidnapped a number of Greek women, including Io (daughter of the Argive king, Inachus) who had come to the beach to make purchases.

Responding to this outrage, Greeks sailed to Phoenician Tyre and abducted King Agenor’s daughter, Europa, taking her to Crete with them. Now, whereas Herodotus asserts that this kidnapping of Europa could be regarded as legitimate retaliation for Io’s abduction, the next offense in this cycle – the kidnapping by Greeks of Medea, the daughter of the king of Colchis – amounted to an unjustified and disproportionate escalation of this Greek-Asian vendetta, particularly when Colchian pleas to return Medea or at least compensate the king for his humiliation were rejected by the Greeks (on the grounds that Io had not been returned and no compensation paid for her abduction).

Thus, in the next generation, Paris, the Trojan prince, as revenge for Greek outrages against Tyre and Colchis, seized Helen, queen of Sparta, and carried her off to Asia. When the Greeks demanded her return and the payment of reparations for the insult Paris had committed, the Trojans said that since Medea had not been returned to her native land and no reparations offered for her kidnap, then the Greeks would receive none for the abduction of Helen.

The events that followed Helen’s kidnap and the refusal of the Trojans to give her up, i.e. the Greek invasion and sacking of Troy, informed, according to Herodotus, abiding Persian hostility towards the Greeks. Not only, for the Persians, did Greek ire at the abduction of Helen amount to a gross over-reaction – more often than not, according to the Persians, these ‘abducted’ women willingly went with their ‘kidnappers’ – but by crossing with an army from Europe into Asia, the Greeks had turned a ridiculous dispute over a woman into an unforgivable violation of the symbolic boundary separating the Greek (and European) from the Persian (and Asian) worlds; the Persians regarding Asia as inherently their domain.

Or, as Herodotus puts it:
‘The Asiatics, when the Greeks ran off with their women, never troubled themselves about the matter; but the Greeks, for the sake of a single Lacedaemonian girl, collected a vast armament, invaded Asia, and destroyed the kingdom of Priam. Henceforth they [the Persians] ever looked upon the Greeks as their open enemies. For Asia, with all the various tribes of barbarians that inhabit it, is regarded by the Persians as their own; but Europe and the Greek race they look on as distinct and separate.’

Cartledge and Castoriadis on democracy: politics, philosophy, religion and tragedy


Democracy, in which the biggest blockhead has the same right to vote and the same weight in voting as the genius, is a form of madness... (Thomas Bernhard) 

Democracy is under attack, not just by populism and authoritarianism in the West, not just by those who want to place limits on parrhessia (free speech) – the right and ability to criticise and, ultimately, upend society’s prevailing institutions and ideas and, of course, the right and ability to defend society’s prevailing institutions and ideas; and not just by the West’s more vehement civilisational opponents, who reject the idea of mutable, man and woman-made laws, in favour of laws that were supposedly divinely conceived and revealed; but also by those who want to wrestle the concept and meaning of democracy from the West and claim it wasn’t a Greco-Athenian invention – for this is to commit one of the worst sins in the modern world, to privilege Western civilisation. For opponents of the West’s exclusive claims to democratic creation and custom, democracy existed and was practiced in other, non-European civilisations, in the Middle East, India, and China prior to classical Athens and, during the so-called European Dark Ages, in Islamic societies and in pre-colonial tribal life in Africa, North America and Australia. 

It is this attempt to claim that democracy was not an Athenian (and hence Western) innovation that motivated Paul Cartledge to write Democracy: A Life. What he’s produced is a necessary and scrupulous antidote to those who bandy the term democracy about without understanding its unique history or intricate meaning, the full implications of the demos obtaining and discharging kratos. Refuting arguments that activities like public discussion, deliberative assemblies and responsive government are proof of complex democratic life, Cartledge describes how Athenian democracy originated after the long rule of the Peisistratid tyrants, operated in its various iterations, presents us with its proponents, who equate democracy with political freedom and equality, and its critics, who see it as a license for demagoguery and a recipe for social turmoil (stasis), then guides us through democracy’s travails and demise in the heterogenous grandiose Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine empires, its resuscitation in the Italian medieval communes and city states before its full-blown resurrection in American, French and English politics and political thinking from the 17th century onwards. 

Cartledge identifies three distinctive characteristics and components to Athenian democracy.

1. Following Aristotle, Cartledge asserts that democracy is more than the rule of the masses or the many. It is the rule of the poor, a conscious attempt by one social class to curb the oppressive power and influence of another. (Similarly, oligarchy, is not the rule of the few or the elite. It is the rule of – or, perhaps more correctly, for – the wealthy). 

2. Democracy is the specific and ‘highly codified system of laws and practices/precedents developed over decades’. (Moses Finley’s ‘devices and institutions’). Perhaps surprisingly to moderns, for the Athenians it was not elections that defined their democracy – elections had a whiff of elitism about them with their elevation of, supposedly, the most qualified or the best (the aristoi) and were used sparingly in Athens. Rather, sortition (the random drawing of lots) was the preferred method for choosing archons (magistrates) to run city affairs, officials to sit in the the Boule (Council of 500), with terms restricted to one year and service only possible twice in a man’s lifetime, and the Dikasteria (popular jury-courts). The Ecclesia (Assembly) was open for attendance to all male citizens, while devices such as ostracism – the exile of citizens threatening to become too powerful – and graphe paranomon (accusation of unlawfulness) – the timely revision of a law deemed to have been made in haste or as a result of bad arguments or advice – were designed to keep in check the demagogue or those with tendencies to tyranny.

3. Cartledge also asserts that for the political aspects of democracy to exist and flourish, there must also be an accompanying culture of democracy. This is what Aristotle called the ‘way of life’ and Isocrates called the ‘soul’ or ‘animating spirit’ – the ‘life and soul’– of a polis. 

For Cartledge, following Jean-Pierre Vernant, democracy only becomes possible with the ’desacralisation of knowledge’, when the Greeks make the breakthrough of jettisoning religious (or mythical) ways of thinking about the universe (cosmos), nature (physis) and, ultimately, society, and adopting a more rational approach. 

‘With the Milesians,’ Vernant says, ‘the origin and ordering of the world for the first time took the form of an explicitly posed problem to which an answer must be supplied without mystery, an answer gauged to human intelligence, capable of being aired and publicly debated before the mass of citizens like any question of everyday life.’

One of the most striking expressions of the demise of myth-based explanations of the universe and human affairs was the emergence in Athens of a new art form, tragedy. Rooted in the cult of the god Dionysus and his annual festival, the Dionysia, Cartledge argues tragic drama functioned to question Athens’ most fundamental beliefs about itself. 

According to Cartledge: ‘The slippery, ambiguous, and ambivalent nature of Dionysus (deadly violence alternating with ecstatic release) made his worship an excellent medium and arena for such profound questioning without running the ultimate risk (always lurking in the Assembly) of causing outright revolutionary upheavals.’

Cornelius Castoriadis: democracy and Chaos
For another theorist of Athenian democracy, Cornelius Castoriadis, the Ionian intellectual revolution had its origins in Hesiod’s Theogony – the narrative that sought to explain to Greeks the genesis of the gods and the universe.

For Hesiod, Castoriadis points out in The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, in the beginning there is Chaos and it is out of this total void that the cosmos is created. However, this cosmos is impermanent, subject to corruption, decay and death, with Chaos always lurking ready to reassert itself.

The fact that the world is neither fully chaos nor fully ordered creates the conditions for politics and philosophy.

‘If the human world were fully ordered,’ Castoriadis says, ‘either externally or through its own “spontaneous operation”, if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the “nature of society” or by the “laws of history”, then there would be no room for political thinking and no field for political action… no sense in asking what the proper law is or what justice is.’ 

Similarly, in terms of philosophy, if the world were sheer chaos, ‘there would be no possibility of thinking at all’, while if it were fully ordered, as it is in religious or totalitarian societies, ‘there would not be any philosophy, but only one, final system of knowledge’.

Since men and women, unlike God, are flawed and since they are not coerced or chained by any ‘laws of history’, the responsibility for instituting society falls on their weak shoulders in the full knowledge that this process is precarious, never complete, always contested and subject to rupture and change.

Politics, then, is not court intrigues or factional rivalries but the explicit questioning of the established institution of society – and the positing of alternative ways of instituting society; while philosophy is not the musings of the sage or the religious expositions of the priest-mullah-rabbi-shaman, but the explicit questioning of the instituted collective representation of the world – and the positing of alternatives.

Politics and philosophy, or judging and choosing, were created in Greece. Good and evil, just and unjust, true and false, thinkable and unthinkable were not determined by sacred books or prophets – Greece had no Moses, no Bible and certainly no Mohammed and no Koran; it had poets, philosophers, legislators and politai (citizens), The laws of a city were not miraculously revealed, they emerged as a result of society’s deliberations.

Religion and democracy
While it would be specious to characterise Greek cities – even the most radical ones, like Athens – as irreligious or indifferent to the sacred, religion was, as Moses Finley says, ‘pervasively in the background’ and as such provided the intellectual space for doubt and interrogation regarding the role of the divine in human affairs.

This questioning of the role of religion and the gods in society is demonstrated by Hecataeus of Miletus – ‘The tales (muthoi) told by the Greeks are many – and ridiculous’; and by Plato, particularly in the Timaeus but also in the Republic, wherein the philosopher sought to establish a new creation myth for the Greeks that would supplant Hesiod’s Theogony, which Plato objected to on the grounds that it wasn’t sufficiently edifying – he was outraged by Hesiod’s depiction of the gods as unjust, malicious, envious and resentful of humans. 

Furthermore, in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the poet makes clear that the Olympian gods – whose rule is depicted as arbitrary and spiteful, characterised by ‘eternal anger and an inflexible mind’ – the epitome of that most loathsome of regimes to the Athenians, tyranny – took power by overthrowing the previous government of the Titans, led by Kronos – who himself had brutally usurped power from his cruel father, Ouranos – and that the Olympian gods will perish in the same ruthless way.

Burning with resentment at his treatment at the hands of Zeus, Prometheus revels in the knowledge that the king of the gods will soon be dethroned, that he will go from being a ruler to a slave, who ‘will suffer even greater pains than those I am suffering now’.

If the gods can be called ridiculous, condemned for their dubious morality and oppressive rule, considered vulnerable to being deposed, then it’s not such a big step to claim that the gods don’t exist at all.

‘As for the gods’, Protagoras says, ‘I can know nothing; neither how they are, nor if they are, nor if they are not, nor about how they might look.’ 

Indeed, Protagoras places man, not the gods at the centre of the universe. ‘Man is the measure of all things’, the Sophist says; while in Sophocles’ Antigone, this extolment of man is suggested by the chorus’ famous observation that: ‘Πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει.’ (’Wonders abound in this world yet no wonder is greater than man’).

Man’s deina – his awesomeness, power, wondrousness, which the chorus then proceeds to characterise in detail – ingenuity, hard work, mastery of speech and thought, skills in adjusting to nature, propensity for good government – don’t make man better or superior to the gods, but distinguish him in that he has the ability to change, learn and create. 

The gods, Castoriadis says, cannot change – ‘they are what they have been since they first existed and what they will be for ever’ – but man, and only man among all beings, has the power to alter himself, to transform his relations not only with nature, but also with his own nature.

In terms of politics and philosophy, this uncertainty towards the gods and their benevolent predisposition allows – or rather impels – the Greeks to decide for themselves what sort of society they want to live in, what laws they should and shouldn’t have, how they should live their lives without the gods holding their hand, guiding them through the morass of ethics and morality, politics and philosophy.

At its best, this break with the gods can tend to democracy and freedom, at its worst, to tyranny or social breakdown. (In the modern era, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche and Camus have all wrestled with the problem of morality in a godless world).

Democracy and tragedy
How then do democracies resist the temptation to permit everything? If democracy is necessarily unwilling to constrain what can and cannot be questioned, if, theoretically, nothing is off-limits, if there are no boundaries and no taboos as to what can be said and thought, how do democracies gain legitimacy and allegiance, establish a common identity and interest among citizens, and prevent a slide towards fragmentation, nihilism and self-destruction? 

For Castoriadis, elaborating on Cartledge’s view of tragedy as a means to critique society, tragedy’s role in Athens was, primarily, ontological, to remind the audience that Being is Chaos – there is no order or meaning attributable to the world, what we intend and desire and what life offers us are at odds, mortality is inescapable, hope for a just and happy afterlife under the regime of a benign god are vain. If there is an afterlife, it is far worse than life in the material world – as attested by Achilles in The Odyssey, when he admits to Odysseus he’d rather be a slave condemned to an existence of back-breaking humiliation than Lord of the Dead: 

‘No winning words about death to me, shining Odysseus!
By god, I’d rather slave on earth for another man –
some dirt-poor tenant farmer who scrapes to keep alive –
than rule down here over all the breathless dead.’

Democracy is only possible on this tragic ontological foundation – freed from hope for a blissful afterlife, man is ready for thought and action in this world – which was why Plato, the ferocious anti-democrat, rejected it, asserting the ‘philosophical monstrosity’ (according to Castoriadis) that Being is good, that there is an underlying harmony and rationality in the world, that God’s motive in creating the universe is to advance goodness. (Nietzsche noted that ‘Christianity is Platonism for the masses’).

If tragedy was democratic, Castoriadis says, because it was a conspicuous reminder of mortality, that is, ‘of the radical limitation on human beings’, then democracy is a ‘tragic regime’ because the demos has to consider where its power stops and to set its own limits. Just as man is circumscribed by death, so the demos is circumscribed by awareness of its own temporality.

Tragedy’s political dimension, Castoriadis argues, its inextricable association with democracy, is that it presents to the demos the question of hubris, warning of the consequences of going too far, of exceeding boundaries and of the necessity of self-limitation, i.e. limitation not set by extra-social admonitions or precepts – the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount – but by the commonwealth of citizens in constant discussion.

This is the lesson of Sophocles’ Antigone, not its modern interpretation of standing up to power, of rebellion against the state, but that being the sole one to think right (monos phronein) – which both Antigone and Creon are guilty of – is an act of hubris and makes you apolis – beyond the political community of men.

Antigone, Castoriadis says, demonstrates that ‘contrary reasons can coexist and that it is not in obstinately persisting in one’s own reasons that it becomes possible to solve the grave problems that may be encountered in collective life.’

Democracy today
Both Castoriadis and Cartledge agree that the challenge for modern societies is to become more democratic – to continue with the project begun by the Greeks 2500 years ago. Both agree that what exists in modern Western societies would not be recognisable to Athenians as a democracy. Rather, the Greeks would identify our political system of representative democracy as oligarchic – rule of/for the few or the wealthy – even if Castoriadis would term them ‘liberal’ oligarchies. Democracy, Castoriadis says, does not mean human rights, lack of censorship or elections. It means direct democracy. ‘There is no democracy but direct democracy. A representative democracy is not a democracy.’

Indeed, Cartledge reminds us that those we are led to believe played a major role in reviving democracy in the modern world, setting the standards the West has followed for the last 250 years, i.e. the Founding Founders of the American republic, were in fact vehement anti-democrats, fearing that Athenian direct democracy amounted to mob rule and devising a system to avoid such an unpalatable outcome.

Castoriadis and Cartledge also agree that the prospects for making liberal oligarchy or representative democracy more democratic – or enhancing the elements of it that tend towards democracy – are not good.

This pessimism stems from the emergence of human (individual) rights and their superseding of political (collective) rights – the right to be involved in civic life, the making and unmaking of laws – and is reflective of Benjamin Constant’s belief that modern men and women are not interested in public affairs but only in the protection of their ‘delights’ from the state. 

For Castoriadis, democracy is in crisis. The fetishisation of these ‘delights’ has been followed by a descent into apathy, privatisation and individualism, the erosion of the democratic ethos – ‘responsibility, shame, frankness (parrhessia), checking up on one another, and an acute awareness of the fact that the public stakes are also personal stakes for each one of us’. This state of affairs is best described by two words: conformism and insignificance – conformism expressing the waning of social and political conflict and insignificance the sterility and banality of contemporary culture.

Meanwhile, Cartledge points to the growing hostility both outside of and within Western societies of religiously-minded actors who contemptuously reject the democratic imperative of parrhessia and of man-and-woman made laws in favour of the inviolability of divinely-inspired speech and laws that brook no questioning let alone offer themselves to variation.

For Castoriadis, a religious structuring of the world that posits a deity who has miraculously transmitted his strictures and laws to humanity via a chosen messenger, strictures and laws that are immaculate – for god is immaculate – and must be upheld and obeyed for all time, is the antithesis of democracy and democratic life. The philosophical foundation of democracy is secularism – a recognition that religion must be detached from the state and curtailed in public life – the defence of which used to be the preserve of the radical left, though a significant part of the left has now, in the name of anti-imperialism, found alliance with religious believers in a shared resentment and hostility to Western political values and history and entertains anti-democratic religious discourse and practices as an affirmation of cultural egalitarianism, a conviction that all cultures have the same intrinsic value and worth. 

Bibliography
Cartledge, Paul: Democracy: A Life (2016)
Castoriadis, Cornelius: The Greek and the Modern Political Imaginary, in The World in Fragments (1997)
The Retreat from Autonomy: Postmodernism as Generalised Conformism, in The World in Fragments (1997)
Castoriadis, Cornelius: The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy (1991)
Power, Politics, Autonomy, in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy (1991)
Castoriadis, Cornelius: Aeschylean Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation of Man (1991), in Figures of the Thinkable (2005)
Heritage and Revolution 1996), in Figures of the Thinkable (2005)
What Democracy? (1990), in Figures of the Thinkable (2005)
Castoriadis, Cornelius: Postscript on Insignificance: Dialogues with Cornelius Castoriadis (2011)
Castoriadis, Cornelius: The Problem of Democracy Today (1989) http://www.athene.antenna.nl/ARCHIEF/NR01-Athene/02-Probl.-e.html
Finley, Moses: Politics in the Ancient World (1983)
Pender, E.E.: Chaos Corrected: Hesiod in Plato’s Creation Myth, in Boys-Stones, G.R. & Haubold J.H. (eds) Plato and Hesiod (2009)
Theodoridis, George: Translations of Prometheus Bound and Antigone at https://bacchicstage.wordpress.com
Vernant, Jean-Pierre: The Origins of Greek Thought (1984)
Whitmarsh, Tim: Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (2017)


Strategy, the Byzantine Empire, Socrates and Thucydides



In this interesting video Edward Luttwak discusses his book, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire.

Luttwak makes some fascinating insights into the nature of Byzantium; the many reasons for its longevity – which, for him, comes down to a culture of strategy; and the policy lessons contemporary strategists could learn from the Eastern Roman Empire, asserting, for example, that America should become more like Byzantium.


Coincidentally, I've been thinking quite a bit about 'strategy' recently, how the philosophy of strategy is far more effective in describing and navigating the intricacies of human affairs than traditional moral and ethical philosophy.


These thoughts have come to me as I've been reading Pierre Hadot's book,
What is Ancient Philosophy? which asserts that philosophy is no more and no less than a way of life, a means, through permanent struggle, criticism and self-criticism, to find some kind of spiritual peace, involving a pursuit of 'wisdom without ever achieving it'.

Hadot's book is interesting and focuses a great deal on the figure of Socrates.


Now, Socrates, and his methodology, is someone I've always had trouble with: I've never been convinced, for example, that you can cure ignorance by merely pointing out to an ignorant person that they are, in fact, deluded, deranged, ill-informed or misguided. Ignorant people have a habit of insisting on their ignorance, otherwise they would not be ignorant in the first place. Anyway, my point is really this: reading Hadot's book has confirmed my feeling that when it comes to describing and navigating the intricacies of human affairs, I find Thucydides – the greatest theorist of Grand Strategy – far more illuminating than Socrates.

Thoughts on Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War

Some points emerging from reading Donald Kagan's Thucydides: The Reinvention of History, particularly in relation to the war between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesians as it transpired in Sicily.

I’m sure I’m not the first one to point out that the disastrous Sicilian expedition, which significantly contributed to the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, evokes striking similarities to the Asia Minor catastrophe: an enthusiastic and capable expeditionary force has initial success but, mostly due to poor leadership and increasing loss of morale and self-belief, fails to consolidate its advantages and finish the job, allowing for a revival of the enemy and leading to calamitous defeat. Indeed, I’m sure the similar fates suffered by the Athenians in Sicily and Greeks in Ionia was not lost on Eleftherios Venizelos, a student and translator of Thucydides.

We note the bitterness and savagery with which Greek fought Greek throughout the Peloponnesian War, but particularly in Sicily. Kagan writes on the treatment of Athenian and Sicilian allied prisoners by the victorious Syracusans and Corinthians:

‘The triumphant Syracusans took their prisoners and booty [from the Athenian expedition] and stripped the armor from the dead enemy, hanging it from the finest and tallest trees along the [Assinarus] river. On returning to Syracuse they held an assembly where they voted to enslave the servants of the Athenians and their imperial allies and to place Athenian citizens and their Sicilian Greek allies into the city’s stone quarries. A proposal to put Nicias and Demosthenes to death provoked more debate… [and] the assembly voted to execute both [the Athenian] generals.

‘The Syracusans held over seven thousand prisoners in their quarries, crowded together in inhuman conditions, burned by the sun during the day and chilled by the autumn cold at night. They were given about a half-pint of water and a pint of food each day… and they suffered terribly from hunger and thirst. Men died from their wounds, from illness and from exposure and the dead bodies were thrown on top of one another, creating an unbearable stench.’

Thus, what the ‘inhumanity’ of the Peloponnesian War – and not just this war, but the virtually continual state of internecine Greek wars – reminds us is that, in practice, in this period, there was as much an Athenian, Corinthian, Syracusan or Spartan ‘nation’ as a Hellenic one and that the pan-Hellenic consciousness that existed did so side by side and, more often than not, competed with ‘national’ identities derived from belonging to a particular city state.

Following on from this, a word on Athenian arrogance and Athenian nationalism. With the advent of the Athenian empire, the Athenians ascribed to themselves the right to decide what it was and what it was not to be a Hellene. Indeed, the Athenians came to believe their way of life was the epitome of Greekness – Pericles’ funeral oration being the clearest expression of this, with his assertion that Athens was ‘an education to Greece’.

Thus, those Athenians who initially argued against the Sicilian expedition did so on the grounds that the Segastans – who had asked the Athenians for assistance in their conflict with Selinus and Syracuse in western Sicily – were not Greeks but ‘an alien race’ and a ‘barbaric people’, even though the Segastans were, in fact, a mixture of Ionian Greek colonists and Hellenised Elymian Sicilians.

We note that Demosthenes the orator in the fourth century BC deployed the same Athenian conceit against the Macedonians, asserting that they had to be resisted and could not claim leadership of Hellas because Philip and his people were not Greeks but barbarians.

The remarkable Salaethus and the siege of Mytilene

I mentioned in a previous post how, three years into the Peloponnesian war (i.e. in 428 BC), taking advantage of Athenian setbacks – plague, the death of Pericles, diminishing resources – the oligarchic regime in Mytilene saw an opportunity to fulfill its long-held aims of expanding its authority over the whole of Lesvos and removing the island from the Athenian empire.

In this revolt, Sparta, inevitably, offered backing and encouragement, while the Mytileneans promised that a united Lesvos under their hegemony would attach itself to the Peloponnesian alliance.

Outraged by Mytilenean duplicity and impudence, and defying the repeated blows it had recently endured, the Athenians summoned all their fiscal and materiel resources to despatch a task force to put down the Mytilene rebellion. After skirmishing and an inconclusive battle, the Mytileneans retreated behind their city walls and prepared to hold out against Athens until Spartan relief arrived.

JE Lendon, in his Song of Wrath: the Peloponnesian war begins, describes the increasing desperation of the Mytileneans after six months of siege:
‘A winter’s day in embattled Mytilene. The hungry guards looked out from the walls at the Athenian stockade surrounding the city; the cold Athenians on the stockade gazed resentfully at the city walls topped with cozy towers. All the long winter, Mytilene has been blockaded by darting ships upon the deep and by soldiers from the landward side: food was running short, and once again there was talk of begging Athens for terms. But suddenly a knock on a postern or a low cry from no-man’s land revealed the impossible: someone wanted to get into the city.

‘Opening a gate in the city wall, the astonished guards admitted a drenched figure whose long hair and red cloak – and no doubt his chilly equanimity at having crept through the Athenian lines – revealed him as a Spartan. Salaethus was his name, and in a trireme he had crossed the stormful February Aegean to land at one of Mytilene’s small allies on Lesvos; then on foot to Mytilene he had come, slipping under the Athenian fortifications by crawling up the bed of a torrent. Now, having rattled the ice out of his beard, he spoke his message to the besieged. The Peloponnesians were coming!’
Despite the heroic Salaethus’ confidence, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies, encumbered by hesitation and misjudgment, did not come and the demoralised Mytileneans were soon compelled to surrender their city to Athens. Then there follows one of the most celebrated episodes in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian war, in which the Athenian assembly debates what punishment to mete out to defeated Mytilene.

Mytilenean ambassadors pled their city’s case, only for the appalling (to Thucydides) Cleon to demand that Mytilene be made an example of to deter any other potential defectors from the Athenian empire. And, indeed, his proposal for the wholesale destruction of Mytilene, the slaughter of its male population and the selling into slavery of the city’s women and children, is passed and a ship with the grim order is despatched to the Athenian garrison stationed on the island.

However, the following day, having reflected on the harsh punishment they had decided to inflict on the Mytileneans, the Athenians conduct a new debate and vote, which rescinds the original order in favour of a more moderate one, targetting only the rebellion’s ringleaders.

Now, in a race against time, to prevent the first order from being carried out, a second ship is sent to Lesvos. It arrives in the nick of time, just as the Athenian commander Paches is preparing Mytilene’s annihilation.

As for the remarkable Salaethus, having failed to convince the Mytileneans to attempt a break out rather than surrender and having escaped from Mytilene before the Athenians entered the city, finding sanctuary in an allied town on Lesvos, he is eventually captured, sent to Athens and executed, along with 1,000 Mytileneans, supporters of the rebellion.

For more discussion on issues emanating from JE Lendon’s Song of Wrath: the Peloponnesian war begins, see here.

Once Again for Thucydides



Some Thucydides resources I’ve come across.

First, I’ve been having another look at Peter Handke’s Once Again for Thucydides, which consists of a series of ‘micro-epics’ in which the Austrian writer (following the technique of Thucydides) with painstaking precision, anchored to time and place, observes the minutiae of human and natural life and ascribes epic meaning to them. These are intense pieces, parts of a travel journal taking in the Balkans, Spain and Japan, which invite you to (literally) see the world differently, more vividly, with the eyes of a painter, a good painter dedicated to detail and the pursuit of essence. (Read some of the 17 pieces here).

The classical historian Neville Morley has written this essay on the influence of Thucydides on Handke, which I haven’t been able to access fully, but the abstract reads:
‘Noch einmal für Thukydides, a collection of prose pieces by the Austrian writer Peter Handke, invites reflection on the history of his engagement with this classical author. In Kindergeschichte [Child Story], he draws on a reading of Thucydides as a war narrative in order to solve the problems he experienced in telling the story of the relationship between a father and daughter, interpreting the History of the Peloponnesian War as an account not of violence but of decisive moments and the developing characters of two peoples. In this book as elsewhere, Handke is commonly read as repudiating all history in favour of myth and mysticism, but in fact he draws upon Thucydides’ approach to history as a means of describing, understanding and exorcizing the past. This theme is pursued further in Noch einmal, where he also combines critique and homage in an exploration of Thucydides’ style and the theme of ‘realism’ (and its limits) in the depiction of events. His reading of Thucydides differs significantly from the prevailing modern traditions of reception; and, unlike those who revere the ancient author solely as an analyst and critic, Handke explores what it might mean to write as a modern Thucydides.’
On the unveiling of a monument in London to RAF Bomber Command, Morley also had this piece published on Thucydides. It pays particular attention to Pericles’ funeral speech (i.e. the speech the Athenian statesman gave on the internment of those Athenian soldiers who fell in the early part of the war against Sparta). Morley describes the funeral speech as a ‘masterpiece of rhetoric’ deployed down the years to justify the sacrifices demanded of a population at war. It is striking, Morley says ‘how far the oration subordinates individuals to the collective good’ and how Pericles’ sentiments ‘reflect a thoroughly un-modern conception of the relationship between the citizen and his community. One might suppose that, at least within the portion of the ideological spectrum that is suspicious of state power, they would raise doubts about Pericles’ political tendencies.’

Morley adds:
‘the oration is extremely (and deliberately) vague about the actual machinery of the Athenian state. Its grand statements about the power of the people, equality before the law, and emphasis on ability rather than class can be co-opted by any nation that chooses to call itself a democracy.’
Now, anyone who’s read my post on Robin Lane Fox’s analysis of Pericles’ funeral speech – which Lane Fox says projects a laudable balance between individual freedom and collective responsibility – and my presentation (and critique) of the even more penetrating interpretation of the oration put forward by Cornelius Castoriadis – in which the Greek philosopher portrays Pericles as describing an entwined city and citizenry that aims to create human beings living with beauty, living with wisdom and loving the common good – will realise that Morley’s depiction of the speech as patriotic tub-thumping or a rationale for totalitarianism is banal, superficial and inept, utterly failing to grasp the power of Pericles’ oration and what it reveals about Athens, its state, citizens and democracy.

Finally, the video above is a BBC production from 1991 of John Barton’s The War that Never Ends, an adaptation/dramatisation of Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, with some Plato thrown in. It is quite good.

Margaret Atwood: Introduction to Christa Wolf’s Medea


Of all the seductive, sinister and transgressive women who have haunted the Western imagination, none has a reputation more lurid than Medea’s. Judith, Salome, Jezebel, Delilah, Lady Macbeth— these murdered or betrayed grown men, but Medea’s crimes are yet more chilling: credited with having slaughtered her younger brother, she is also said to have sacrificed her own two children out of revenge for rejected love.

The Greek myth—so old it is spoken of as ancient by Homer—has many variations, but it goes roughly as follows. Aeson, king of Iolcus in Thessaly, had his throne usurped by his half brother Pelias. Aeson’s son Jason was saved, and sent away to be educated by the centaur Cheiron. Grown to manhood, he arrived at the court of Pelias to claim his birthright, but Pelias said he would surrender the throne only on condition that Jason bring back the Golden Fleece from Colchis—a demand which was thought to be the equivalent of a death sentence, as Colchis, situated at the extreme end of the Black Sea, was thought to be unreachable.

The Golden Fleece was the skin of the flying ram which had rescued Jason’s ancestors, Phrixos and Helle, from threatened murder at the hands of their stepmother. Arrived safely at Colchis, Phrixos in gratitude sacrificed the ram and hung its fleece up in the temple of the war god Ares. Jason had either to refuse the quest and give up all hope of the throne, or accept it and endanger his life. He chose the latter course, and summoned fifty heroes from all over Greece to his aid. These were the Argonauts—named after their ship —who after many perils and adventures arrived at last at Colchis, a “barbarian” kingdom with strange customs—where, for instance, men’s bodies were not buried, but suspended in sacks from trees. There Jason demanded the Golden Fleece as his by inheritance.

Aeëtes, King of Colchis, set more impossible conditions: Jason must harness two fire-breathing brazen-footed bulls, defeat the earth- born warriors that would spring up after he had sown a field with serpents’ teeth, and slay the deadly dragon that guarded the Fleece. Jason was ready to admit defeat when he was seen by Princess Medea, daughter of Aeëtes, granddaughter of Helius the sun god, priestess of the Triple Goddess of the Underworld, and a powerful sorceress renowned for her ability to heal as well as to destroy. Overcome by love for Jason, she used her occult knowledge to help him surmount the various obstacles and to obtain the Fleece, in return for which Jason swore by all the gods to remain true to her forever. Together with the Argonauts, the two lovers set sail by night; but once the alarm was raised, King Aeëtes and the Colchians followed them.

Here traditions differ. Some say Jason killed Medea’s younger brother Apsyrtus with a spear as he stood in a pursuing ship; others, that Medea herself murdered the boy, dismembered him, and scattered the pieces in the ocean. The grieving Aeëtes had to collect them and was thus delayed, and so the Argonauts escaped. In any case, the two needed to be purified for the death of Apsyrtus, and went to the island of the enchantress Circe, Medea’s aunt and a daughter of Helius. After several more escapades—Medea, for instance, did away with the usurping King Pelias by tricking his own daughters into killing him, thus making Jason’s own kingdom an even unhealthier place for him to be—the two, now lawfully man and wife, were welcomed at Corinth by its King, Creon.

It’s at this point that the story turns from romantic adventure to tragedy. For Jason, forgetting both his debt of gratitude and his vows to all the gods, forsook his loyalty to Medea. Some say he was swayed by the insinuations of Creon—why live with such a dangerous woman, so much wiser and more powerful than yourself? —others, that he was overcome by a new love; others, that he was impelled by ambition; but in any case he decided to repudiate Medea, and to marry Creon’s daughter Glauce, thus becoming the heir to Corinth. Medea herself was to be banished from the city.

Medea, torn by conflicting emotions—sorrow for lost love, wounded pride, rage, jealousy, hatred—concocted a horrible revenge. Pretending to accept Jason’s decision and to wish for peace between them, she sent a bridal gift to Glauce—a beautiful but poisonous dress, which, when the rays of the sun hit it, burst into flame, whereupon Glauce in agony threw herself into a well. Some say that the people of Corinth then stoned Medea’s children to death; others, that she herself killed them, either to save them from a worse fate or to pay Jason back for his treachery. She then disappeared from Corinth, some say in a chariot drawn by dragons. Jason himself, abandoned by the gods whom he had forsworn, became a wandering vagabond and was at last crushed by the prow of his own rotting ship.

This story has been retold time and again over the past two and a half millennia. It has been used as the source for poems, plays, paintings, prose fiction, and operas, of which last there are twenty- four at least. Each artist has chosen among the variant traditions, and some have made their own changes and additions. For instance, we owe the slain children—two, not fourteen, as earlier versions had it —to the oddly sympathetic play by the Greek tragedian Euripides; and the many operas in which Medea sets fire to the temple of Hera and burns herself to death borrow this fiery finish from the seventeenth-century French dramatist Corneille. The poet Ovid is most interested in the eye-of-newt dimension, and spends much time on moonlit sorcery; the Roman dramatist Seneca goes in for unbridled rhetoric and gore. William Morris, in his narrative poem The Life and Death of Jason, gives us a blushing, trembling, Pre- Raphaelite maiden, reduced to a weepy pulp by Jason’s infidelity, and a blonde into the bargain; Charles Kingsley, he of Water Babies fame, tries for a muscular-Christian interpretation—keep away from the bad women, lads, especially dark-haired witches! Each author has redone Medea in the light of his or her own age and its concerns; and so does Christa Wolf.

Her attack is head-on and original. Others before her have condemned Medea’s main crimes—fratricide, infanticide, and the murder of the bride-elect Glauce by toxic frock—or viewed them as partially understandable under the circumstances, but Christa Wolf’s Medea flatly denies that she committed any of these crimes at all. Drawing on the insights of modern anthropology, Wolf sets Medea in a period in which the old goddess-centered religions are being overwhelmed by new patriarchal god-ruled ones, in which kings are flouting the rights of queens, and in which former customs—including human sacrifice and the yearly dismemberment of the king in a fertility ritual—are falling into obsolescence, although they still have enough true believers to be resurrected by various rulers for their own purposes, most often the solidification of power. The murder and dismemberment of Apsyrtus, then, are seen to have a kinship with, for instance, the death of Orpheus, torn to pieces by Maenads at the Spring Festival; and Medea’s betrayal of her father Aeëtes, and the aid she gives to Jason, are not ascribed, as usual, to an overwhelming passion caused by a shaft from naughty Cupid’s golden bow, but to her secret knowledge of her father’s role in the murder of  his own son and dynastic rival.

In Wolf’s version, Jason is beloved, true, but later: this Medea is no helpless slave of sexual passion. At first Jason is largely the means to an end—Medea’s escape from blood-smeared Colchis in search of a higher and more humane civilization. Jason’s betrayal of her is also Corinth’s betrayal of her idealistic quest, and her contempt for his behavior is the contempt of the disillusioned nineteenth-century colonial arriving in Paris or London to find that the imperial promises of a nobler life ring hollow.

But Medea is neither an anthropological retelling of myth in the style of Mary Renault, nor a simpleminded story of men-versus- women, of a sensuous moon-and-earth religion versus a cold and abstract sky theology. It is a study of power, and of the operations of power, and of the behavior of human beings under pressure when power squeezes them tight.

Wolf begins her story in Corinth, at the moment when Medea has been rejected by Jason and the forces ranged against her are coming fully into play. Medea and the band of Colchians who have escaped with her are immigrants and refugees among the Corinthians. The Colchians have brown skin and woolly hair, in contrast to the pallid Corinthians. They keep to themselves in their own quarter, following their own customs and leading the marginal and often squalid life of exiles, and are viewed as aliens and therefore as ideal scapegoats for anything that might go wrong. Medea, as their princess and erstwhile leader, a healer and wise woman—one step away in reputation from sinister witch—is particularly exposed. Jason’s position is ambiguous: a ruler in his own right, he cannot however claim his kingdom, and holds whatever power he possesses at the whim of King Creon, who is using Jason to further his own ambitions. Medea’s star is falling, Jason’s is rising, and the courtiers and hangers-on at the Palace—even Medea’s friends and her former pupil —engage in a Machiavellian dance, as each one approaches and retreats. Shall they further their own careers by hastening her decline, shall they lend her a small and furtive helping hand, or shall they stand by and watch passively? Does Medea still have the power to retaliate, or has she been rendered harmless? Fear, admiration, envy, lust and hatred waltz hand-in-hand, for whatever else she is, Medea is not a nobody: beautiful, high-ranking, reckless, intelligent and skilled, she cannot be simply dismissed.

Medea herself is the wise child who knows too much and can’t keep her mouth entirely shut about the Emperor’s lack of clothing. One of the things she knows is the real manner of her brother Apsyrtus’s death, which Creon is now trying to pin on her by means of a whispering campaign. Another thing she knows is the dirty little secret of Corinth itself. She’s been down into the dark places, down into the cellar, and has discovered that Corinth, with its wealth and grandeur and snobbery, and its pretensions to a higher form of civilization, is no better than Colchis: deny and conceal the fact as it may, its power too is founded upon the sacrifice of children. Like many a civilization before and after it, Corinth rests on the oppression of the weak and the death of the innocent. So much knowledge is dangerous; but Creon and his toadies cannot confront Medea with what she knows without admitting that they know the same thing themselves, and the thing itself is unspeakable. Cat watches mouse, but which will turn out to be which?

Wolf’s intention in this gripping retelling is signaled by her initial quotation from Elisabeth Lenk: “... the walls around time-periods are extremely close to one another. The people of other centuries hear our phonographs blaring, and through the walls of time we see them raising their hands towards the deliciously prepared meal.” This tale is about Medea, yes; but it is also about us. Like J. M. Coetzee’s extraordinary novel Waiting for the Barbarians, which is about an imagined empire but also about the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and like Ryszard Kapuscinski’s tour-de-force The Emperor, which is about the last days of Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie but also about the corrupt communist regime in Poland, Wolf’s Medea stirs up uneasy resonances. At one moment we’re identifying the dark-skinned Colchians with, perhaps, the Turks in Germany, or those of African descent in Europe and North America, or the Jews; at another, we seem to be in the atmosphere of distrust and betrayal that characterized the collapse of the East German hegemony, when to back-stab first appeared to be the only defense against having the knife plunged swiftly into your own spine. Yet again, we’re in the era of big business—our own time and place, here and now, when capitalist mini-kingdoms form and dissolve unseen within the walls erected around them by large corporations, when chieftains’ heads roll bloodlessly, lopped off over lunch by faithless right-hand men, when pretexts abound and true texts get shredded, when spies are everywhere and even the watercoolers have ears.

Medea is no two-dimensional allegory. Like a tunnel full of mirrors, it both reflects and echoes. The question it asks the reader, through many voices and in many different ways, is: What would you be willing to believe, to accept, to conceal, to do, to save your own skin, or simply to stay close to power? Who would you be willing to sacrifice? Hard questions, but the posing of them is the troubling yet essential task of this tough, ingenious, brilliant and necessary book.

Robin Lane Fox on whether Alexander thought he was a god



Above Robin Lane Fox gives an interesting talk to the Hellenic Society on the religious cults that developed in Hellenistic times associated with Alexander the Great and argues that these were not advanced by Alexander nor were they a product of Alexander’s pretensions to divinity – there is a widespread assumption that Alexander was driven mad by a belief in his own divinity and that he insisted he should be worshipped as a god. Rather, Lane Fox says, the cults associated with Alexander emerged as ‘tactical’ honours, in specific cities, for specific political and cultural reasons. In other words, Alexander did not think of himself as a god and did nothing to encourage such beliefs.

While watching Lane Fox’s lecture on youtube, I also came across this video clip in which Lane Fox says that the two things that made him want to devote a considerable part of his intellectual life to the career and character of the Macedonian king were: 1. Alexander’s fearlessness; and 2. Alexander’s ‘rivalry’ (as Lane Fox puts it) with Homer and the values of the Homeric world.

Comparing Alcibiades and Plato

'Comparing Alcibiades and Plato, one could say that in a sense… Plato is a sort of inverted Alcibiades. Considerably younger than Alcibiades, undoubtedly thirty years his junior, Plato sublimates this passion for power that Alcibiades couldn’t master and that led him to do what he did in the history of Athens; Plato transposes it onto another level, the level of writing, of schooling, of counsel given to the powerful and to tyrants. This is what he did, it seems, in Sicily with Dionysius and then with Dion.’ (Cornelius Castoriadis: On Plato's Statesman).

Chaos and goodness: from Hesiod and Plato to Christianity and Nietzsche

What does Nietzsche mean when he says: ‘Christianity is Platonism for the masses’? An interesting essay, Chaos corrected: Hesiod in Plato’s creation myth, by E.E. Pender, gives us an idea.

The subject of the essay is Plato’s attempt, particularly in the Timaeus but also in the Republic, to establish a new creation myth for the Greeks that would supplant Hesiod’s Theogony, which Plato objected to on the grounds that it wasn’t sufficiently edifying and, indeed, that Hesiod’s depiction of the gods and their role in creating the universe was fundamentally wrong.

In particular, according to Pender, what Plato wants to correct in Hesiod is the ‘moral chaos’ of the Theogony, in which the gods are often portrayed as jealous and spiteful, engaged in plotting, deception and violence. For Plato, god is incapable of malevolence. He is by nature good and his motive in creating the universe is to advance goodness.
‘Unlike Hesiod’s Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus, Plato’s supreme god is not seeking to create a world order that will allow him simply to gain and then hold on to power. This god and those he creates are themselves good and their aim is to create further goodness.’
Furthermore, Pender says, into Hesiod’s universe, in which chaos is the primal force and strife and power politics define the relationship between the gods, Plato wants to interject a benign and rational being – a demiurge or craftsman-father – able to impose harmony and rationality. Whereas Hesiod identifies a universe permeated by disorder, out of which an ordered cosmos can never fully emerge, Plato sees a world infused with goodness, always striving to achieve perfectibility.

Plato also wants to correct Hesiod when it comes to defining the attributes of the Muses, the goddesses that inspire in the creation of art and the pursuit of knowledge. In Hesiod, the Muses exist to soothe grief and help men forget their troubles; but in Plato they lose their psychogogic qualities and acquire a more transcendental and metaphysical role, which is to guide the human soul (through philosophy and philosophical exercises) towards divine harmony and reason.

In Plato’s creation tale, then, Pender concludes, ‘the principle of goodness is eternally present, the triumph of order and reason is assured by design, human beings have the means to become like gods’.

In which case, to return to Nietzsche and his ‘Christianity is Platonism for the masses’ – a statement, it’s worth stressing, intended to insult Christianity, Platonism and the masses; we can now see that it is not a long road to travel to get from Plato’s ‘eternally present principle of goodness’ to Christianity’s depiction of God as the epitome of goodness; from Plato’s ‘triumph of order and reason assured by design’ to Christianity’s God the Creator and Jesus the embodiment of divine logos; or from ‘human beings [that] have the means to become like gods’, to Christianity’s belief in transfiguration, in which man, innately good (i.e. even if not born good, then always capable of it), aspires, via communion with God or redemption through Jesus, to become suffused by the divine.

* Chaos corrected: Hesiod in Plato’s creation myth is contained in the book Plato and Hesiod, which you can download as a PDF from here.

Sparta: its political regime and grand strategy



I mentioned in a previous post the tendency among Sparta’s detractors to caricature it as a despotic, tyrannous, even fascistic regime, suggesting it was a model for Nazi ideologues or resembled Soviet society – in the latter case, it’s often pointed out that, just like the communist Eastern bloc, Sparta did not welcome foreigners and prevented its citizens from travelling beyond its borders for fear of ideological contamination. I also mentioned that rather than trying to interpret Sparta adopting modern preoccupations and prejudices it’s more useful to consider Aristotle’s view that the Spartan political system was a mixed regime – oligarchic, monarchical and democratic.

This nuanced approach to the Spartan polity is emphasised by Paul Rahe in the talk above, in which he draws attention to those elements in the Spartan constitution that could be described as democratic – general participation in the assembly, the selection of ephors by lottery, the checks and balances inherent in Spartan government designed not to allow one branch to exert sole and untrammelled influence over any other.

In The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, Rahe expands on his analysis of the Spartan constitution and way of life, before explaining how this revealed itself at the high point of Spartan civilisation, i.e. its command of allied Hellenic forces in the repulsion of the Persian invaders in the fifth century BC.

Rahe insists, however, that Sparta’s leadership in securing Hellenic independence against the Persians should not mislead us about Sparta’s ‘grand strategy’, which, Rahe says, was limited and conservative and dominated by anxieties closer to home, of helot revolt and the threat this posed to the Spartiates’ aristocratic way of life – with its disdain for work and emphasis on military training, hunting, wrestling and athletics. 

Thus, Rahe points out, although Sparta has the reputation of being a belligerent and belicose power, in reality the Spartans tried to avoid fighting and were loathe to engage in wars outside their immediate sphere of influence and vital living space – i.e. the Peloponnese. Indeed, for Rahe, echoing J.E. Lendon’s account of the Peloponnesian War, if any Hellenic power deserves the label of aggressive and imperial, it was ambitious democratic Athens not cautious authoritarian Sparta. 

Sorceress or scapegoat?

Of all the seductive, sinister and transgressive women who have haunted the Western imagination, none has a reputation more lurid than Medea’s. (Margaret Atwood)

The city is founded on a monstrous deed. (Medea)

East German writer Christa Wolf’s Medea is a harrowing novel that seeks to retell the story of the Colchian princess and rehabilitate her from evil, barbarian witch to knowing foreigner and immigrant who can see the hypocrisy, lies and violence on which Corinth (the city she is exiled in with her feeble husband Jason) is organised and ruled. Such a woman, who has learned the dirty secrets of Corinth’s power elite, which is now struggling with political unrest and natural disaster, is dangerous and has to be discredited and destroyed, and this, Wolf suggests, is the process by which Medea is turned into a scapegoat and comes to be falsely accused of killing her children and murdering Glauce, the Corinthian princess Jason has abandoned her for.

The novel is written as a series of voices, as each protagonist feints, plots and manoeuvres as the crisis engulfing Corinthian society unfolds, and below is an excerpt from one of Medea’s monologues:

‘So this is how it is: either I’m out of my mind, or their city is founded on a crime. No, believe me, I’m quite clear on this point, what I say or think about it is quite clear to me, for I’ve found the proof, yes, I’ve touched it with my own hands. Oh, it’s not arrogance that threatens to undo me now. The woman – I simply followed her. Perhaps I just wanted to teach Jason a lesson, since he’d stood by and let them seat me at the end of the table among the servants, that’s it, I didn’t dream that, that was yesterday. At least they’re the highest-ranking servants, he said pathetically, don’t cause a scandal, Medea, please, not today, you know what’s at stake, the King can’t lose face in front of all his foreign guests. Ah, Jason, save your breath. He still hasn’t understood that King Creon can’t grieve me anymore, but that’s not what I’m talking about, I have to clear my head. I have to promise myself never to speak about my discovery to a living soul. The best thing would be to do what Chalciope and I used to do with secrets when we were children, do you know what that was, Mother? We’d wrap our secret up tight in a leaf and eat it up while staring into one another’s eyes. Our childhood – or rather everything in Colchis – was full of dark secrets, and when I arrived here, a refugee in King Creon’s gleaming city-state of Corinth, I had an envious thought: these people have no secrets. And that’s what they think too, that’s what makes them so convincing; with every look, with every one of their measured movements, they’re drumming it into you: Here’s one place in the world where a person can be happy. It was only later that I realized how much they hold it against you if you express doubts about their happiness. But that’s not what I’m talking about either, what’s the matter with my head? It’s buzzing with a whole swarm of thoughts, why is it so hard for me to reach into the swarm and snatch out the one thought I need?’

Burning down Persepolis

This is a portrait from 1781 by the English painter Joshua Reynolds of the courtesan Emily Warren as Thaïs, the Athenian mistress of Alexander the Great, who infamously urged the Greek conquerors to torch Persepolis to punish the Persians for burning down the Acropolis during the Persian Wars.

Plutarch describes the scene thus: 
‘As the drinking went on, Thais delivered a speech which was intended partly as a graceful compliment to Alexander and partly to amuse him. What she said was typical of the spirit of Athens, but hardly in keeping with her own situation. She declared that all the hardships she had endured in wandering about Asia had been amply repaid on that day, when she found herself revelling luxuriously in the splendid palace of the Persians, but that it would be an even sweeter pleasure to end the party by going out and setting fire to the palace of Xerxes, who had laid Athens in ashes. She wanted to put a torch to the building herself in full view of Alexander, so that posterity should know that the women who followed Alexander had taken a more terrible revenge for the wrongs of Greece than all the famous commanders of earlier times by land or sea. Her speech was greeted with wild applause and the king's companions excitedly urged him on until at last he allowed himself to be persuaded, leaped to his feet, and with a garland on his head and a torch in his hand led the way.’

Isocrates on Greek culture and race

In an exchange between an anonymous commenter and Hermes on my post More nonsense about Cleopatra’s ‘black ancestry’, the issue of Isocrates famous statement on Greek culture and race came up.

Anonymous wrote: ‘The Ancient Greeks (or at least the Athenians), as Isocrates famously proclaimed, came to consider Greeks those who partook of Greek education and culture irrespective of ancestry.’

Hermes responded: ‘This inference is absolutely incorrect and is a favourite of those forces of multiculturalism that want to foist on the Greek people their culture-destroying religion. Isocrates, not the Athenians, made this statement, and we cannot know for sure whether the majority of Athenians believed what Isocrates stated. We do know for sure that the Athenians had strict laws of citizenship which made it difficult for even a Greek of another city-state with one Athenian parent to claim citizenship. Also, Athenians were obsessed with the concept of autochthony which again runs counter to Isocrates.’

I want to add a couple of points.

Here’s what Isocrates actually said:

‘Athens has so far outrun the rest of mankind in thought and speech that her disciples are the masters of the rest, and it is due to her that the word “Greek” is not so much a term of birth as of mentality, and is applied to a common culture rather than a common descent.’

The statement appears in The Panegyricus, written in about 380 BC, seven years after the infamous King’s Peace, formulated by Sparta and Persia, had returned rebellious Cyprus and Ionia to Persian control and imposed Spartan hegemony throughout Greece. The Panegyricus is a passionate appeal for pan-Hellenic unity, a call to arms against Persia and a eulogy of Athens, which Isocrates believed the only Greek power capable of leading an expedition against Persia.

Isocrates advocates attacking Persia because it would: ‘exchange internal disputes for external war’, i.e. solve the problem of internal conflict (stasis) that plagued individual Greek states and Greece in general by directing Greek energies against a common enemy and opening the way for ambitious or disgruntled Greeks to colonise the east; ‘transfer the wealth of Asia to Europe’; be revenge for the Persian invasions of Greece in the previous century – ‘exact retribution for the insult done to the Greek race’, as the Greeks had previously accomplished when they destroyed Troy in retaliation for the kidnap of Helen of Sparta; liberate once and for all from Persian authority and menace the Greek states in Asia Minor; and fulfil the destiny of Greeks, which was to subjugate foreigners, who were racially and culturally inferior to Greeks. Greeks were free, belligerent and tough, while Persians were soft, effeminate and servile, according to Isocrates.

Isocrates goes on to argue that his native Athens is the city best placed to achieve pan-Hellenic unity and lead the campaign against Persia. Athens, Isocrates, says, is ‘the most ancient, the greatest and the most universally famed of all cities… But distinguished as is the basis which underlies it, there is closely connected with it an even clearer ground for honour. [Athens’] title to possession is not based upon the eviction of others or the acquisition of an untenanted wilderness, nor on forming a mixed collection of races. The distinction and purity of our line has enabled us to remain in unaltered possession of the land of our birth. We sprang from its soil, and can use the same names for it as for our own blood. We are the only Greek state which can properly call our land by the names of nurse, fatherland and mother. Any justifiable pride, any reasonable claim to leadership, any memories of ancestral greatness, must show some such racial origins to support it.’

Athens, therefore, is the most suitable leader of Greece because of its previous contributions to Greek freedom in wars fought against Persia; its cultural influence on the rest of Greece – here Isocrates echoes Pericles, who asserted Athens’ right to hegemony over Greece since ‘Athens is an education to Greece’; and, most significantly for Isocrates, because Athens’ citizens were, of all the Greeks, the most racially pure and homogeneous – the most Greek in blood. (This last point reveals the importance Greeks attached to parentage and descent).

Bearing all this in mind, Isocrates’ statement on the inclusiveness of Greek culture no longer appears so liberal; instead it becomes a radical assertion of Greek cultural superiority; a call to traditional Greek powers – identified by Isocrates as Athens, Sparta, Argos and Thebes – to recognise that the Greek world – those who share Greek culture and mentality – is much larger than Greece and consists of Greek cities and kingdoms that exist from the Pillars of Hercules in the west to Sinope on the Black Sea and Cyprus in the east; and a plea for this Greek world to be united under Athenian leadership, and such unity would not just be an end in itself but a means to successfully wage war against non-Greeks.

■ In 346 BC, Isocrates wrote another essay – To Philip – reaffirming his belief in pan-Hellenic unity and war against Persia. Spartan and then Theban hegemony had proved disastrous for Greece and disillusioned with the prospect of his native Athens leading a pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia, Isocrates urged Philip II of Macedonia to unite the Greek states and attack Persia. Of course, Philip did unite the Greek states – brutally and causing much resentment – but it was left to his son, Alexander, to fulfil Isocrates’ vision of a Greek expedition to destroy the Persian empire.

Castoriadis on the objectivity of the Greeks

Just to go back to a post I wrote a couple of weeks ago, Thermopylae, the Persian invasions and Greek triumphalism, in which I insisted that the pride and sense of superiority characteristic of Greek culture was tempered by self-criticism and objectivity, this idea is found in Cornelius Castoriadis’ essay, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy (in Politics, Philosophy, Autonomy), from which the following is an excerpt:

‘Hannah Arendt has rightly said that impartiality enters this world through the Greeks. This is already fully apparent in Homer. Not only can one not find in the Homeric poems any disparagement of the “the enemy”, the Trojans, for example, but the truly central figure in the Iliad is Hector, not Achilles, and the most moving characters are Hector and Andromach. The same is true for Aeschylus’ Persians – a play performed in 472 BC, seven years after the battle at Plataea, with the war still going on. In this tragedy, there is not a single word of hatred or contempt for the Persians; the Persian queen, Atossa, is a majestic and venerable figure, and the defeat and ruin of the Persians is ascribed exclusively to the hubris of Xerxes. And in his Trojan Women (415 BC), Euripides presents the Greeks as the cruelest and most monstrous beasts – as if he were saying to the Athenians: this is what you are. Indeed, the play was performed a year after the horrible massacre of the Melians by the Athenians (416 BC).’

Democracy as a tragic regime


Ancient Greece: The Greatest Show on Earth is a documentary from the BBC and the Open University on Greek drama, presented by Michael Scott, whose two-part series Who were the Greeks? I posted on here and here. In this programme – the first of three in the series – Scott looks at tragedy and democracy, arguing that the two are intimately connected and it is no coincidence that tragic theatre emerged at the same time as democracy in Athens. It’s not a bad programme, despite the appearance of a number of leading British classicists, who are a bland lot with nothing particularly exciting to say.

The Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis is also concerned about the connections between tragedy and democracy, asserting that democracy is a ‘tragic regime’ and that tragedy is so connected to the rise of democracy in Athens that it makes more sense to refer to Athenian rather than Greek tragedy. Castoriadis arguments on tragedy and democracy are contained in two of his essays. One is The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, contained in Politics, Philosophy and Autonomy; and the other is Aeschylean Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation of Man, which is from the collection of essays Figures of the Unthinkable, which is available to download here.

There’s also an essay critical of Castoriadis’ work on tragedy and democracy by Nana Biluš Abaffy, which can be read here.

* See part two of the series here and part three here.