Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts

Five myths about the 1974 coup against Makarios

This is an interesting piece, Cyprus 1974: five myths about the coup, written by Marios Evriviades in 2014, who is professor of International Relations at Panteion University. (Read the entire article in Greek here).

The five myths, according to Evriviades, are that: 1. Sampson and EOKA B organised the coup; 2. The objective of the coup was enosis; 3. The objective of the coup was partition; 4. Makarios was deliberately allowed by the junta to escape from the assault on the presidential palace; and 5. The Americans tricked junta leader Dimitrios Ioannides into carrying out the coup.

Below I’ve translated into English extracts that relate to the first three myths Evriviades refers to. I believe Evriviades’ repudiation of the first two myths is compelling and even though I agree with the assertion he makes in discussing myth number three that Turkey’s invasion and partitioning of the island in 1974 did not alter Turkey’s deeper geostrategic goal of controlling the whole of Cyprus, I have my doubts about his view as to when Turkey came to regard partition as falling short of its long-term objectives.

Evriviades starts off his piece by referring to a UK Foreign Office document dated 12 September 1956 revealing that, despite Cyprus being in the throes of its campaign for enosis, Greece, through its foreign minister Evangelos Averoff, was actively promoting the idea of partitioning the island. Evriviades’ says:
‘In July 1956, while EOKA’s liberation struggle was fully underway, Evangelos Averoff was pushing the idea to American diplomats that Cyprus should be partitioned. In September 1956, Averoff repeated to Norway’s foreign minister Halvard Lange that partition was the only possible solution to the Cyprus Question. Two weeks later, Averoff suggested partition in two meetings with Turkey’s ambassador in Athens.’
On to the myths:

1. Sampson and EOKA B organised the coup
Evriviadis says that EOKA B was not involved in the coup and that Nikos Sampson [later installed as president] was completely irrelevant to it. The coup was organised from Athens and was carried out by junta officers in Cyprus, using forces from ELDYK [Hellenic Force in Cyprus] and elite units from the Cyprus National Guard.

Sampson, with a number of bodyguards, came out on to the streets of Nicosia on the morning of the coup on 15 July to find out what was going on. He was arrested along with his bodyguards and held in the basement of the headquarters of the National Guard. Only later, when his identity became known, was Sampson taken to the office of the junta’s main henchman in Cyprus, Brigadier Michalis Georgitsis, who had orchestrated the coup. Because no eminent Cypriots – such as Glafkos Clerides – would agree to be sworn in to replace the deposed (but still alive) president, Archbishop Makarios, Sampson was chosen, even if Sampson was regarded as ‘insane’, both by Athens junta leader Dimitrios Ioannides (who became head of EOKA B when General Georgios Grivas died in January 1974) and Ioannides’ EOKA B representative in Cyprus, Lefteris Papadopoulos.

Despite, Ioannides’ anger and disappointment that the ‘insane’ Sampson was the only man that could be found to make president of Cyprus, the two began to co-operate, with Ioannides’ first order to Sampson being: ‘Nicky, bring me Mouskos’ (i.e. Makarios’) head.’(«Νικολάκη, θέλω το κεφάλι του Μούσκου»).

As for EOKA B, by the beginning of July 1974, it was disintegrating, with its entire local leadership in prison. With the coup, its remaining members took the opportunity to kill resisters and other political opponents. Prior to the coup, EOKA B actions sought to foment conditions of civil war among Greek Cypriots, following the strictures and techniques laid down by the Nato-inspired anti-communist Operation Gladio. The Greek version of Gladio was Κόκκινη Προβιά, and this was applied in Cyprus throughout the reign of the Athens junta (1967-1974). The creation of EOKA B in 1971 and its subsequent activities were products of Κόκκινη Προβιά.

2. The objective of the coup was enosis
Not at all.
Unadulterated, real enosis had been abandoned by Athens in 1957, if not 1956. Any discussion of enosis after the events of 1963-64 [i.e. the Turkish Cypriot uprising] referred to ‘double enosis’, i.e. partition or, more correctly, the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and the annexation of some 60% of the island by Greece, with the rest going to Turkey.

Any assertion by the junta that its actions in Cyprus were motivated by a desire for enosis is sheer hypocrisy. The aim of the Ioannides junta was more simple: it was the survival of the junta regime – which felt threatened by a free and democratic Cyprus and by Turkey in the Aegean. By removing the ‘Red Priest’ [Makarios] in Cyprus, Ioannides believed he was providing a valuable service to his sponsor, the USA, which loathed Makarios and regarded him as an impediment to their plans for the island. Ioannides hoped that by doing the Americans a favour, Washington would restrain Turkey not only in Cyprus but also in the Aegean, where Turkey had begun to make threatening noises in November 1973.

3. The objective of the coup was partition
Yes and No.
It’s true that both the Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-73) and Dimitrios Ioannides (1973-74) juntas were reconciled to the partition of Cyprus, which when they weren’t calling it ‘double enosis’ were calling it ‘enosis with something in return’. Partition was also the ideal solution and strategic aim of the USA.

However, was partition Turkey’s objective on Cyprus? And was Ankara prepared to work first with the Papadopoulos’ and then the Ioannides’ regimes to bring about the division of Cyprus?

Here we are confronted with another myth, that Turkey’s aim was and continues to be the partitioning of Cyprus. Until August 1964, this was the case, but afterwards, it is not so. In August 1964, Turkey rejected partition as envisaged by the Acheson Plan (Greece had accepted the plan), because partition would not have solved its main strategic preoccupation, which was to prevent Greece extending its sovereignty to Cyprus. From this point on, Turkey altered its Cyprus policy in favour of the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and the creation of a federation of two autonomous states on the island [the ‘rulers in the north, partners in the south’ scenario] which would allow geostrategic control of Cyprus to pass to Turkey. Ioannides may have had the aim of partitioning Cyprus, but not Turkey. The form the Turkish invasion of Cyprus took and Turkey’s current Cyprus policy prove this beyond doubt.

Theodoros Kolokotronis: ‘one of the leaders of our race’

One of my favourite parts in one of my favourite Nikos Kazantzakis’ books is the following from Travels in Greece: Journey to the Morea, in which the Cretan author reflects on the character of perhaps the foremost hero of the Greek War of Independence, Theodoros Kolokotronis, the Old Man of the Morea. I’ve always liked Kazantzakis’ description of Kolokotronis, which has him, for 50 years, patiently preparing for the fight against the Turks, for the moment when his life would begin and take meaning.

The Old Man of the Morea
Today as I sit in a Tripolitan coffeehouse watching the people and listening to their talk, I sense that if I were a young man living in Tripolis, I would concentrate – in order to save myself – upon the rich, aggressive and valiant soul of Kolokotronis. Here in Tripolis, air and mountain are still filled with his ample breath. From the days he spent as a merchant in Zakynthos, gazing at the mountains of Morea across the way, sighing:

I see the spreading sea, and afar the Morea,
Grief has seized me, and great yearning…


until his censure by the land that he liberated, and those final serene moments when Charon found him, Kolokotronis’ life was a dramatic, characteristic unfolding of a rich modern Greek soul: faith, optimism, tenacity, valour, a certain, practical mind, deceptive versatility, like Odysseus.

When the penpushers all lost their bearings, or the tin-soldier generals bickered among themselves, Kolokotronis would see the simplest, most effective solution. Gentle and softhearted when it served the great purpose, harsh and savage when necessary. Harsh and savage most of all with himself. When he served as a corsair on the ‘black ships’ he once found himself without tobacco. He opened his pipe and scraped it in order to get some burned tobacco to make a cigarette. But at the same instant he started to smoke, he felt ashamed. ‘Here’s a man for you,’ he muttered to himself with scorn. ‘Here’s a man who wants to save his country, and can’t even save himself from an inconsequential habit.’ And he flung the cigarette away.

Thus he conditioned and hardened himself, in order to be prepared. For years in foreign armies he studied the art of war, the ‘manual of arms’; aboard ship he learned the risalto, the assault; he made himself ready. And when the revolution burst out he was primed, fifty years old by then, organised from top to toe. Armed to the teeth. He had amassed knowledge by the quintal, cunning, bravery, wide experience; he wrought songs to relieve his ‘yearning’; by contributing an axiom at a crucial moment he would silence the unorganised chatter. Our modern Greek problems have not yet found more profound, humorous and epigrammatic expression.

He had both impulse and restraint, he knew how to retreat so that he could advance; hemmed in by enemies, Greeks and Turks, he was forced to mobilise all his bravery and wile so that the Race would not be lost. Often all would desert him, he would be left alone in the mountains, and then burst out weeping. He sobbed like the Homeric heroes, with his long hair and helmet; he sobbed and was refreshed. He regained his fortitude, formulated new schemes in his mind, sent off messages, involved the elders once more, mocked the Turks, conciliated the Greeks; and the struggle began again.

Kolokotronis, with all his faults and virtues, is one of the leaders of our race. Here in Tripolis, which he took with mind and sword, his scent still lingers dissipated in the air; with patience and concentration a youth should be able to reconstruct, as model and guide, the peerless Old Man. And thus, with a struggle now invisible and spiritual, to reconquer and ravish Tripolis.

Mazower, the Greek Revolution and anti-colonial violence


Mark Mazower has written three books that deal with modern Greek history: Inside Hitler’s Greece: the Experience of Occupation 1941-44; Salonica, City of Ghosts; and, most recently, The Greek Revolution: 1821 and the Making of Modern Europe.

The first is a compelling study of the Nazi subjugation of Greece and its impact on ordinary Greeks; the second a more controversial account of the Muslim and Jewish communities that thrived in Thessaloniki during the Ottoman occupation – the controversy stemming from Mazower’s apparent nostalgia for ‘cosmopolitan’ Thessaloniki and sadness at its demise, when, of course, to Greeks and Greek nationalists the Ottoman occupation of this historic Greek city was a disaster and its liberation in 1912 and its re-Hellenisation remains one of the paramount achievements of modern Greece.

Mazower’s work on 1821 is a narrative account of Greeks’ grim and remorseless determination to end Turkish rule, which shows that when Greeks said Freedom or Death they meant it and when they said No Turk in the Morea, No Turk in the World, they meant that too.

As with his work on the Nazi occupation of Greece, Mazower is keen to avoid regurgitating the mythical exploits of those from the pantheon of revolutionary heroes, heroines, political and military leaders and, instead, wants to record the experiences of those, perhaps, previously neglected in the genre – women, children, non-combatant villagers.

Indeed, Mazower’s case is that it was the grotesque abuses suffered by civilians – particularly the Muslim practice of enslavement and forced Islamisation – that decisively turned European public opinion in Greek favour and convinced the continent’s leading powers – Great Britain, France and Russia – to intervene, even if they did this not so much because they wanted to establish Greek independence but to end Ottoman and Egyptian atrocities.

(Mazower claims that the final straw for the three European powers was the concern that the Egyptian commander Ibrahim Pasha would overrun the Peloponnese, exterminate the Greek population there and replace it with Arabs. This caused consternation in London, St Petersburg and Paris not only because it was intolerable to countenance such a slaughter of Christians by Muslims but also because it would represent a dangerous resurgence of Islam on European soil).

A grievance is that Mazower’s book – like Roderick Beaton’s recent Greece: Biography of a Modern Nation – tends to equate the violence suffered by the Greeks at the hands of Turks, Bosniaks, Albanians and Egyptians with that inflicted by Greeks when ridding their country of the Ottoman presence. (This anti-Muslim violence often shocked philhellenes who came to Greece with their heads full of ideas about noble Greeks and universal human dignity, seemingly oblivious to just how dehumanising Turkish rule was and how this seeped into Greek attitudes and morés).

However, not only was Ottoman violence far more widespread than its Greek equivalent but it also often took place where Greeks had not risen to overthrow Ottoman rule – Constantinople, Asia Minor, Cyprus – and amounted to grotesque reminders to Greeks of their subordination. Indeed, religious discrimination and persecution were ingrained in the Ottoman system. Order was maintained through terror and repression and peace dependent on the whims of the sultan or his pashas or beys who, at any moment, could decide that their Christian subjects, their culture, shrines and very lives, were an affront to Muslim ascendancy and should be suppressed or eradicated.

Thus, while it’s true that the Revolution turned decisively in the Greeks’ favour with external intervention – Mazower’s argument is, in fact, that the original revolutionaries of the Philiki Eteiria always knew that, for the Revolution to be successful, help from outside, specifically from Russia, would be required; it’s also right to attribute Greek existence and victory to Greek refusal to submit to the genocidal logic of the Ottoman state and the religious malice that underpinned it.

In terms of religion, Mazower is good at distancing the Greek revolution from the Enlightenment-inspired revolts in France and America by stressing that most Greeks involved in the Revolution had no interest in the Rights of Man or Reason (certainly marginalising the church and its dogma was a minority preoccupation) but were guided by a popular millenarianist tradition entrenched in Orthodoxy that spoke of the illegitimate and sacrilegious authority of the Muslim sultan in Constantinople and how it would inevitably come to an end with the restoration of a Christian ruler in the City.

Ethnic hatred, religious zeal, a sense that a previous state of affairs had existed in which freedom and justice reigned and would come again, were felt more widely among Greeks than Western ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity held by the more ‘educated’ strata.

If the uprising was not the child of the American War of Independence or the French Revolution, then perhaps it was more akin to the Haitian revolution (and subsequent revolutions aimed at overthrowing colonial regimes). Both the Greek and Haitian revolutions start with mythical religious convocations – the Bois Caiman ceremony in Haiti and the Agia Lavra doxology in Greece; are reactions to regimes of tyrannical abomination; and proceed to be characterised by mind-boggling acts of violence and brutality.

In explaining the violence of the colonised oppressed, it might be useful to refer to Frantz Fanon and his classic anti-colonial diatribe The Wretched of the Earth (1961), in which he justifies (if not demands) the use of violence to overthrow colonial tyranny.

‘Decolonisation is always violent,’ Fanon says. ‘National liberation, national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or Commonwealth, whatever the name used, whatever the latest expression, decolonization is always a violent event. At whatever level we study it – individual encounters, a change of name for a sports club, the guest list at a cocktail party, members of a police force or the board of directors of a state or private bank – decolonization is quite simply the substitution of one “species” of mankind by another.’

On the individual level, Fanon goes on, violence is a process of cleansing, which ‘rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence’.

In vanquishing injustice, in raising their heads again – to use General Makriyiannis’ terms in describing the Greek Revolution – Greek revolutionary violence was a necessary act of decolonisation. It purified individual souls and the soul of the country after 400 years of humiliation and repression, restored dignity and self-respect and allowed future generations of Greeks to live with the knowledge that the depredations endured by their ancestors didn’t go unpunished.

Franco-Hellenic defence pact: rectifying a 100-year-old strategic mistake



















France, smarting from being snubbed and humiliated by the signing of the AUKUS pact, which dealt a $66bn blow to France’s defence industries and undermined French ambitions in the Indo-Pacific theatre, showed its geo-strategic aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean this week with the signing of a wide-ranging defence deal with Greece.

The deal complements the agreement inked earlier this year for Greece to buy 24 French-made Dessault Rafale fighter jets and envisages not only the sale of three Belharra FDI-type frigates to Greece – with the option of a fourth – but also amounts to a mutual assistance pact, with both countries pledging to come to each other’s aid in the event of attack by a third country.

‘The Parties shall provide each other with assistance and contribution, with all appropriate means at their disposal, and if necessary by the use of armed force, if they jointly find that an armed attack is taking place against the territory of one of the two, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.’

The agreement is aimed at curtailing Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s Blue Homeland doctrine explicitly challenges Greek sovereignty and imagines Turkish hegemony in the Aegean and expanded sway in the Levant, which France with its long-term interests there, considers its sphere of influence.

Both France and Greece touted the deal as a sign of growing European defence autonomy and co-operation – a step towards an EU defence union; though it’s hard to claim this while other significant European countries, such as Spain, Italy and particularly Germany – with deep economic, defence and geo-strategic ties to Ankara – have repeatedly sided with Turkey as Greece (and Cyprus) brought Turkey’s aggressive threats to Greek sovereignty to the EU level in anticipation of solidarity (and sanctions) only to receive the coldest of shoulders.

Still, the deal does indicate how both Greece and France regard NATO as increasingly unreliable. The 70-year-old military alliance is being narrowly used by the USA to confront Russia – which countries such as Greece and France do not regard as a significant threat; while Greece has also found it increasingly deficient in curtailing the persistent belligerence it faces from Turkey, also a NATO member. 

Ironically, the Franco-Hellenic deal comes 100 years after France, having initially given reluctant approval to the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which allowed for Greece to liberate Ionia and Eastern Thrace from the collapsing Ottoman empire, ended up supporting Turkish nationalists as they sought to prevent the division of Anatolia between Greece, Armenia, Italy and France.

France always jealous and suspicious of British imperial ambitions in the Near East, and concerned that Greece, under the patronage of Britain, would emerge as too powerful in the Eastern Mediterranean, having first handed over Cilicia to the Turks – along with all the weaponry the French army had been using to control the area – decided, in a series of cynical and treacherous moves, to abandon altogether the Allied cause in Turkey.

French diplomatic support and the provision of materiel to the Turks proved fatal for Greek hopes in Ionia and Eastern Thrace and has crystalised, 100 years later, with the re-emergence of vaulting Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In these circumstances, the French are now backing the Greek horse, showing how it can often take decades for faulty strategic decisions to come back to haunt you.

Mikis Theodorakis: living with beauty, living with wisdom and loving the common good


All the accolades and outpouring of love aimed at Mikis Theodorakis, who died last week aged 96, are justified. The Greek government declaring three days of national mourning, his lying in state at the Athens Metropolitan Cathedral, the large crowds who filed past his body and accompanied him to his last resting place in his father’s ancestral village of Galata in Crete, were not an overreaction, counterfeit or mawkish. They were expressions of genuine grief at the demise of a figure who immeasurably enriched Greek culture and society and a strong desire to celebrate his life and legacy. 


Theodorakis’ music – full of beauty, wit, intelligence, love, optimism, humanity, joy, overcoming, thirst for justice, eulogising Greek nature, the Greek spring and summer, rejecting bitterness, cynicism and despair – defined modern Greek sensibility at its best.


In Grigoris Bithikotsis, with his bright crystalline voice, his lucid enunciation of the language, Theodorakis found the perfect vocalist to express his aesthetic. Indeed, this combination of Theodorakis’ music, Bithikotsis’ voice and the poetry of Seferis, Elytis, Ritsos, Gatsos and so on, marks one of the high points of Greek civilisation, in any period. Theodorakis’ songs will be sung for hundreds of years to come in Greece, assuming the country still exists.


As for Mikis Theodorakis’ politics – his life-long and frequent interventions in public affairs – even if his communism increasingly gave way to the stronger pull of patriotism – his left-wing leanings were always informed more by The Sermon on the Mount than Das Kapital. The composer once asked Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens if the Orthodox church couldn't do away with The Old Testament – which he thought un-Greek – and just preach The Gospels. These works of Greek literature, with their message of love, justice and the Resurrection (the triumph of light over dark, life over death) were more in line with what Theodorakis understood to be the Greek vision of the world than the violent, intolerant harangues of the Hebrew Bible.


In his essay, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, Cornelius Castoriadis discusses what Pericles is trying to get at in his Funeral Speech, paying particular attention to the famous phrase Philokaloumen gar met’euteleias kai philosophoumen aneu malakias, which in its usual translation of ‘we love beauty without ostentation and we love wisdom without being soft’, Castoriadis regards as too literal.


‘Pericles’, Castoriadis says, ‘does not say we love beautiful things (and put them in museums), we love wisdom (and pay professors or buy books). He says we are in and by the love of beauty and wisdom and the activity this love brings forth, we live by and with and through them – but far from extravagance, and far from flabbiness.


‘The object of the institution of the polis is for [Pericles] the creation of a human being, the Athenian citizen, who exists and lives in and through the unity of: the love and “practice” of beauty, the love and “practice” of wisdom, the care and responsibility for the common good, the collectivity, the polis.


‘Among the three, there can be no separation; beauty and wisdom such as the Athenians loved them and lived them could only exist in Athens. The Athenian citizen is not a “private philosopher,” or a “private artist,” he is a citizen for whom philosophy and art have become ways of life.’


Castoriadis’ interpretation of Pericles’ words, the Athenian statesman’s exhortation to Athens to create human beings living with beauty, living with wisdom and loving the common good, is a good description of how Mikis Theodorakis lived and wanted us to live.


Above is three hours of Grigoris Bithikotsis singing Mikis Theodorakis to the words of Seferis, Elytis, Ritsos, Gatsos and so on. It’s worth considering how many Greeks would know these exceptional poets, if it hadn't been for Theodorakis.


Below is Mikis Theodorakis singing Άρνηση (Στο περιγιάλι το κρυφό), from the poem by Giorgos Seferis.


After the composer had successfully set the poem to music, Theodorakis recalls Seferis’ reaction to his words being sung so enthusiastically in the tavernas and clubs of Athens.


‘In the fall of 1962 Seferis, George Savidis, my father and I spent a whole night going from taverna to taverna in Plaka. The poet wanted, with his own eyes, to see the artists and the people singing On the Seashore in all the clubs. He wanted to hear it with his own ears… Maybe never before had someone like Seferis become like a small child. He laughed, he radiated happiness and I think that night he permitted his stern heart to love me.’


Greek fires: climate change or state-sponsored terrorism




 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The forest fires currently devastating large swathes of Greece are not the result of climate change nor are they ‘biblical catastrophes’ as the Greek media is fond of calling them.
 
A biblical catastrophe suggests the fires have some supernatural cause or are divine revenge for the transgressions of wicked humanity. Strangely, those trying to attribute climate change to the disasters, blaming humanity’s mistreatment of the environment, our sinful way of life, our excesses, addiction to unsustainable comforts, have a similarly theological take on global warming and its consequences. It’s not just humanity we need to save, it’s the planet, and the only way we can do this is if we repent and give up the vices we’ve become accustomed to.
 
Yet, devastating forest fires have been an annual Greek phenomenon for decades. Every summer, there are fires across Greece that wreak havoc, costing lives, livelihoods, damaging property and the eco-system; yet the Greek state has proved consistently incapable in coming up with plans to contain these events and make sure that when they do occur the damage they cause is kept to a minimum. 
 
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest these current spate of fires began spontaneously – from lightening strikes, for example, which would enable us to say that they are the result of natural phenemenon. 
 
Rather, along with political deficiency, the other dominant element in this narrative is that these conflagrations are the result of human intervention. 
 
Writing in the Israeli daily Haaretz, Ruth Schuster notes that 99 percent of the fires that have recently devastated Israel were attributable to human agency. 
 
While it is undeniable that once these fires start, then the desiccation of forests caused by heatwaves and climate change make conditions for fires to exponentially spread, it remains the case that it is idiots, lunatics, criminals and politically-motivated arsonists that, more often than not, start the fires.
 
Already, in Greece, before the fires have been extinguished, Greek police and media are reporting a number of arrests of Greeks and foreigners on arson-related offences, suggesting the fires are the result of malevolence. The fact that the fires started all over Greece almost simultaneously further suggests the possibility of co-ordination and calculation. 
 
Motives for starting the fires range from spite, madness, profit from the clearing of forests, hatred for the government and a belief that disasters damage it and foreign-sponsored state terrorism. 
 
On the last point, it is noteworthy that this spate of fires in Greece started in the immediate aftermath of forest fires that devastated Turkey. Here, the government of President Recip Tayyip Erdogan was lambasted for its inadequate response to the fires, which some in his party or in government-supporting media blamed on Kurds or Greece.
 
How convenient, then, that while under pressure at home, with the fires in Greece, Erdogan can point to a country suffering as badly as Turkey, especially when it is part of Turkish pathology to always compare itself to Greece, and in this way distract from his government’s failings.
 
It is not only Erdogan’s need to turn attention away from his government’s inadequate response to fires affecting Turkey that permits us to speculate as to who might be behind the infernos devouring Greece; it is also the fact that, in the short and medium term, these fires not only cripple the Greek economy, but they also undermine the physical and psychological well-being of a country that Turkey regards as a strategic and geo-political competitor, and which Turkey intends to go to war with when the time is right.
 
Nor is it the coincidence of the Greek and Turkish fires that allows us to entertain theories of state-sponsored terrorism. In 2015, former Turkish prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, admitted that in the 1990s Turkish agents were responsible for forest fires that hit the islands of Rhodes, Chios, Samos and Kos.
 
According to Yilmaz: ‘All [Turkish] prime ministers when they finish their term in office will inform their successors as to how certain secret funds were used.
 
‘I gave this information to my successor and my predecessors did the same. Erbakan, Ecevit and Demirel informed their successors about the secret funds.
 
‘Only Tansu Ciller didn’t share information on how secret funds were deployed during her premiership… funds that I later found out were used [to facilitate] a coup in Azerbaijan and for retaliation against Greece’s forests.’

Giannis Antetokounmpo: the road to glory

Giannis Antetokounmpo, the Greek basketball star, put in one of the greatest series of sporting performances anyone is likely to see to lift the Milwaukee Bucks to a historic 4-2 victory over the Phoenix Suns in the NBA Finals. 

The achievement culminated in a decisive game six where Antetokounmpo surpassed himself, scoring 50 points, securing 14 rebounds and making five blocks and two assists; though the statistics don’t do justice to the sheer will power, determination, mental strength and physical endurance he displayed in leading his team to glory.
 
The Bucks’ victory, their first NBA championship since 1971, marked a remarkable eight-years for Antetokounmpo, drafted by the Wisconsin side in 2013 as a spindly, inchoate 18-year-old, who some scouts predicted could be a star in the mould of Michael Jordan, Magic Johnson and Kobe Bryant, but most thought his basketball skills were too underdeveloped and untested to merit interest in signing him. 
 
The usual route for NBA stars is to win a scholarship to a US university, hone your skills over two, three, four, years in college basketball, which is highly competitive and where scouts will have repeated chance to watch and judge you, before a gamble is taken. 
 
Antetokounmpo, on the other hand, only played in the lower leagues in Greece – for Filathlitikos Zografou – a standard likened to a local YMCA competition – which led many American scouts to take the view that Antetokounmpo may look good against mediocre players in Europe but this didn’t tell you anything about how well he would compete against US-trained players, who’d had the benefit of years of superior coaching, conditioning and competition.
 
Hundreds of articles have been written, dozens of television programmes made – Disney is now producing a feature film – telling Antetokounmpo’s story; his rise from a cramped flat in an insalubrious part of Athens, the third of five sons, the last four born in Athens to undocumented immigrants from Nigeria, Veronica and Charles Antetokounmpo, to five-time All Star, two-time MVP and now NBA champion and Finals MVP. 
 
The family’s struggles on the margins of the Greek economy – which included hawking sunglasses, CDs, DVDs on Athens’ streets to make a precarious and meagre living – are well established as is the racism of some locals, coming to terms with a wave of immigrants from all the world arriving in Greece. 
 
Yet, amid all the difficulties and travails, the Antetokounmpos persevered, the four Greek-born brothers went to local schools, had people in their community and neighbourhood willing to help them and their parents navigate Greek society and make them feel they had a place and stake in it. 
 
It is these people the Antetokounmpo family chooses to remember rather than the ones who showed hostility or resentment towards them and has made Giannis Antetokounmpo Greece’s greatest advocate abroad and a superhero and superstar at home.
 
* I've read, seen, listened to dozens of articles, TV shows, podcasts, about Giannis Antetokounmpo's amazing NBA story; but this three-part series on his journey from rudimentary basketball talent in Athens to being drafted by the Bucks is the best at revealing what makes him tick.
 
The Giannis Draft: The Woj Pod’s 3-episode narrative podcast on the greatest NBA draft story ever told. 



The Athens junta and the carving up of Cyprus

 

On 21 April 1967, a cabal of officers from the Greek military, military police and intelligence services deposed the caretaker government of Ioannis Paraskevopoulos – which had been charged with guiding Greece to elections on 28 May – and seized power for itself.

The consensus is that what prompted ‘the colonels’, as the Athens junta in its first iteration (1967-73) became known, to overthrow the constitution was the fear of leftist advances in the forthcoming poll and the possibility that Andreas Papandreou – who espoused an anti-American, anti-NATO, anti-royalist credo that allowed him to be labelled a communist – would be the power behind the throne of his ageing and ailing father, Giorgios Papandreou, leader of the Centre Union party, the likely winner of the elections.

It’s become a cliché that it was the CIA that engineered the coup and that the Americans are to blame for all the depredations Greece and Cyprus endured as a result of this imperialist interference. However, even if the leaders of the coup were CIA assets and Washington subsequently helped sustain the junta politically, morally and financially, the coup and the politics that prompted it were deeply rooted in Greek society and politics, particularly the Greek civil war (1946-49).

For Cyprus, the junta in Athens represented another hostile centre of power. Since 1964, President Makarios had been battling the US, the UK, Turkey and its Turkish Cypriot proxies on Cyprus to prevent the island from being partitioned in line with the various Acheson plans.  

These cursory plans, presented by Dean Acheson, secretary of state under President Truman and diplomatic troubleshooter under President Johnson, aimed to divide Cyprus and hand over one part to Greece and another to Turkey. The first Acheson plan found adherents in both Athens and Ankara but was rejected by Nicosia. The second Acheson plan was seen as more favourable to Greece, was repudiated by Turkey outright, while the Cyprus government also spurned it – partitioning the island remained unconscionable to Makarios – and it was the Cypriot view that prevailed over the instincts of the Greek government to engage with the American proposals. The plans for partition were shelved.

With the arrival of the junta, Acheson’s idea of carving up Cyprus between Greece and Turkey was revived.

Thus, with their feet barely under the table, the junta in Athens, in July 1967, were ready to carry out a coup in Cyprus to oust Makarios – who they regarded as the main impediment to partitioning the island.

According to Brendan O’ Malley and Ian Craig, writing in The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish invasion:

‘The coup did not happen, and the junta tried instead to forge a deal above the Cypriots’ heads. After re-opening private contacts with the Turks on the Cyprus question at a NATO meeting in June, they held talks with the Turkish Government at the Evros frontier in September. The Turks thought the military-minded colonels would recognise the need to divide Cyprus to keep the communists at bay and prevent the island being turned into a Soviet satellite. The Greeks offered the Turks a military base if they accepted enosis for the rest of the island. But Turkish premier Demirel demanded two bases and 10 percent of the island’s territory. The Americans would have settled for this, but not the Greeks. All that could be agreed at Evros was a face-saving statement calling for greater co- operation and more effort to find a solution.’

But what the colonels balked at in 1967, the second, more depraved version of the junta – which came to power after the Athens Polytechnic events in November 1973 – was less squeamish about.

Thus, on 15 July 1974, an Athens-engineered coup was carried out in Nicosia with the explicit intention of killing President Makarios – who had come to represent not only an obstruction to Athens’ Cyprus policy but also a symbol of democratic resistance to the junta itself – and establishing a Cypriot government that would collaborate in partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey.

The junta’s expectation was that Turkey would understand – and they hoped the Americans would make this clear to the Turks – that their aim in getting rid of Makarios was not to facilitate enosis but to divide up the Cypriot spoils with Turkey as envisaged by Acheson.

However, the chaotic nature of the coup, its failure to achieve its primary aim – the assassination of Makarios and the installation of a credible but compliant Cypriot leadership – meant the junta had no alternative but to instal as puppet president in Nicosia Nikos Sampson, a gangster masquerading as a nationalist patriot – or as Christopher Hitchens puts it. a man ‘strongly marked by mythic ideas of violence and gunplay’. The coup’s descent into disarray gave Turkey the opportunity to partition the island on its terms rather than on the Acheson-like terms favoured by the junta, an objective Turkey, through invasion and ethnic cleansing, managed to achieve.

Eleftherios Venizelos and the Asia Minor campaign


Above is a talk by Roderick Beaton on Eleftherios Venizelos’ attempt to annex western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace to Greece following the Great War and the collapse of the Ottoman empire.

Beaton asks what Venizelos was trying to achieve with his irredentist policy and, with the benefit of hindsight, how realistic was the aim of fulfilling the Megali Idea.

Beaton traverses the period 1912-1922, i.e. the successful campaigns in the Balkan wars; the predicament Greece faced with the outbreak of the Great War – whether to join the Triple Entente, as Venizelos ardently believed or remain neutral as King Constantine and his supporters demanded; and the occupation of Smyrna, the Treaty of Sèvres and the defeat of the Greek army by Turkish nationalist forces.

Beaton insists that the National Schism over participation in the Great War that led by 1916 to Greece having two governments – one with Venizelos at its head in Thessaloniki and the other in Athens loyal to the king – was not a constitutional dispute – Constantine insisted that foreign policy was his prerogative, whereas Venizelos insisted that the monarch had to subordinate himself to the wishes of the country’s political leadership on the British model; but rather a rift over what it meant to be Greek and what sort of Greece each side of the civil war – Beaton asserts that the schism amounted to a civil war – imagined.

Venizelos saw the Great War as an opportunity to liberate Greeks who found themselves outside of Greece’s borders – Beaton interprets this as prioritising the Greek ethnos (nation;) whereas Constantine and his followers had a narrower vision of Hellenism, were committed to the Greek state and wary of adventures that might undermine or overburden it. The latter argued that Greece was already stretched digesting the gains of 1912-13 – all areas of which were strongly pro-Venizelos – and that Greece was too weak to absorb more people and territory.

Eventually, in 1917, after the French navy blockaded Athens and its army occupied Thessaly, Constantine went into exile and Venizelos, having been forced to resign at the end of 1915, resumed power over the whole country, with Constantine’s brother Alexander ascending the emasculated throne.

Greece’s contribution to the Macedonian front gave it a place at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the war. Here, Venizelos, in May 1919 got approval for the occupation of Smyrna, confirmed by the Treaty of 
Sèvres in August 1920, which also ceded Eastern Thrace to Greece.

In seeking to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres – which the Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal had rejected – Greek forces found themselves dragged deeper and deeper into Anatolia, where the Turks had retreated.

At the same time as Venizelos was lobbying the British for financial and material support for Greek forces to deal a knock-out blow to the Turks, he was also preparing for elections in Greece. When they were lost in November 1920, Constantine and his supporters returned to power.

For opaque reasons, Beaton argues, even though the royalists had campaigned to end the Asia Minor war and bring the troops home, they decided to pursue Venizelos’ knock-out blow policy – but, critically, Beaton says, without seeking British backing. The result was defeat at the Battle of the Sangarios River in August/September 1921 and a year-long retreat to the Asia Minor coast and the end of the Ionian vision.

Critics of Venizelos have argued, Beaton says, that the root causes of the Asia Minor Catastrophe was the idea itself; that a Greek enclave in western Asia Minor was unviable, both from an economic and security standpoint, and that Sèvres was inherently unworkable.

But Beaton argues that Smyrna cut off from its Anatolian hinterland would have been no different from Thessaloniki, liberated in 1912, cut off from its Balkan hinterland and that the Macedonian city survived and thrived within Greece.

Beaton also asserts that rather than Greece, with the annexation of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, ending up having to rule over large numbers of resentful Muslim Turks, Greece would have pushed for a population exchange on the lines of the Balkan wars, with those Turks and Muslims left in the newly-liberated Greek territories being exchanged with Greeks and Christians who found themselves in the rump Turkish state.

As for the assertion that the Asia Minor campaign was doomed from the start by the military difficulties involved, Beaton argues rather that Greek forces nearly won the Battle of Sangarios River – the Turkish nationalist leadership ensconced in Ankara had made plans to evacuate the city – but that the declining morale of Greek troops and, crucially, the lack of backing from Britain swung the war the Turks’ way.

Venizelos, Beaton argues, would never have advanced further into Anatolia without British backing and it was a fatal mistake of the royalists to do so.

Where Venizelos is at fault, according to Beaton, was his over-enthusiastic support for the Triple Entente, his willingness to take Greece into the war from 1914 – even when the French and British were still trying to keep Turkey and Bulgaria out of the war and wanted Greece to hold off its involvement.

Rather than dismissing the objections of King Constantine and his supporters to Greece allying itself with Britain and France, Beaton believes Venizelos should have used his diplomatic skills – which outside of Greece had him heralded as a great European statesman – to persuade Constantine and the royalists of his vision.

If Venizelos wasn’t responsible for the Asia Minor Catastrophe, Beaton says, then he must take his share of the blame for the National Schism.

The project of creating Greece of the five seas and two continents, of reversing hundreds of years of history, needed to be underpinned by a strong, unified state and Venizelos’ failure to ensure this is where his responsibility for the demise of the Megali Idea lies.

Catherine the Great, the Greek Plan and the fate of Constantinople


After the Russo-Turkish War (1768-74) which ended with Russia, at the expense of the Ottoman empire, significantly expanding its territory and influence southwards towards Crimea and the Black Sea, Catherine the Great invited Greeks to colonise the newly conquered regions, which became known as New Russia.

Having humiliated the Turks, the next stage in Russian imperial ambitions was to complete the dissolution of the Turkish empire by dividing it between the Russian and Habsburg empires and restoring a Byzantine state boasting Constantinople as its capital.

The latter would be a Greek-dominated country led by a Romanov emperor – Catherine’s grandson, Constantine, fulfilling the prophecy that the reviver of the Byzantine empire would have the same name as the first Roman ruler of the City – i.e. Constantine the Great – and its last Roman ruler – i.e. Constantine Palaiologos – and who would make sure his realm was subservient to Moscow and served Russian interests.

The first test for this ‘Greek Plan’ was the Orlov Revolt (1780-81), in which Russia inspired, with men, materiel and money, a rebellion among Greeks in the Ottoman-occupied Peloponnese and Crete that aimed at establishing an independent Greek state loyal to Moscow. But the revolt was half-baked, Russian aid too meagre, and the Greeks were left to fend for themselves, suffering, as a result of the suppression of the uprising, massacres not just in the areas where the revolt had erupted but anywhere Greeks resided in the Ottoman empire.

Nevertheless, with the ultimate defeat of the Ottomans in the wider Russo-Turkish war, the Greek Plan survived and crystallised in the 1780s. Cities founded or re-founded on territory taken from the Ottomans in the Crimea and New Russia were given Greek names – Kherson, Yevpatoria, Mariupol, Stavropol, Odessa, Sevastopol, etc – in preparation for the region’s new Greek inhabitants and the state they were going to form. Greeks – escaping Turkish reprisals for the Orlov revolt – began new lives in Russia, many becoming important merchants and high-ranking diplomatic and military figures in Russian imperial service.

Another chance for the Russians to realise Catherine’s Greek Plan came about with the Russo-Turkish War (1787-92), when the Turks sought to reverse losses in the Black Sea a decade earlier. Again, the Turks were humiliated but the Russians never pressed their advantage to take Constantinople and were content with further Pontic concessions.

As European politics became dominated by the French revolution and the grandiose schemes of Napoleon Bonaparte for European hegemony, Russia turned its attention away from the disintegrating Ottoman empire and became more embroiled in the continental theatre.

By the time the Eastern Question reared its head again, the Greeks – now inspired as much by the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions – were less inclined to see autocratic Russia as their saviour. Moreover, by the 1840s, Britain and France were no longer prepared to allow Russia a free hand in precipitating the collapse of the Ottoman empire and taking over its remnants and went to war on behalf of the Ottomans to prevent further Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean.

While the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War (1853-56) provided respite to the Ottoman empire, its demise remained inevitable, except now, with an independent Greek state established in 1830 and the Megali Idea coming to dominate Greek irredentist thinking, Greece and Russia found themselves in competition for territories to be taken from Turkey, with Constantinople being the prize bone of contention.

Indeed, as the Ottoman empire entered its death throes in the Great War and Constantinople seemingly up for grabs again, Russia vetoed Greek participation in the British-led Gallipoli campaign, which aimed to knock Turkey out of the war by capturing its capital, in case Greece got its hands on the City before Russia.

Gallipoli turned into a disaster for the allies while Russia’s internal fissures widened under the strains of the war with revolution and civil war being the result. Thus, at the end of the Great War, Russia was in no position to press its perennial claims against the Turks and indeed, after the Bolsheviks emerged as rulers of Russia, the communists wasted no time in abandoning aspirations to Turkish territory and partnering with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish nationalists, who they regarded as kindred spirits in fighting Western imperialism. As such, the Russian communists provided the Turkish nationalists with gold and weapons to overturn the Treaty of Sevres and thwart Greek and Armenian gains in Thrace, Asia Minor, Transcaucasia and the Black Sea and the turning of Constantinople into a Franco-British protectorate.

Victor Davis Hanson, Thucydides, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey: what causes wars, what prevents wars?

 

‘A general who desires peace must be prepared for war, for the barbarians become very nervous when they face an adversary all set to fight.’ (Emperor Mavrikios, 582-602 AD, Strategikon)

The American classicist Victor Davis Hanson has written a piece for American Greatness asking the question: what causes wars? 

Hanson, whose approach to these matters derives from Thucydides, offers several reasons why violent conflicts break out. These include: ‘Innately aggressive cultures and governments, megalomania, the desire for power, resources, and empire prompt nations to bully or attack others. Less rational Thucydidean motives such as fear and honor and perceptions of self-interest are not to be discounted either.’

Hanson goes on by proposing that we shouldn’t just be asking what causes war, but perhaps more importantly, what prevents war? The answer to this, Hanson says, is a policy of deterrence, echoing the Roman adage ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’ and Byzantine Emperor Mavrikios (582-602 AD), in his Strategikon: ‘A general who desires peace must be prepared for war, for the barbarians become very nervous when they face an adversary all set to fight.’

Hanson asks:  ‘What allows these preemptive or aggressive agendas to reify, to take shape, and to leave tens of thousands dead? The less culpable target (and wars are rarely a matter of 50/50 culpability) also has a say in what causes wars. The invaded and assaulted sometimes overlooked or contextualized serial and mounting aggression. They displayed real military weakness or simple political ineptness that eroded deterrence. They failed to make defensive alliances with stronger nations or slashed defense investments that made the use of deterrent force impossible.’

We’re now in a position to move beyond modern analyses of conflict, heavily influenced by Marxist approaches and other readings of how Western empires expanded from the 15th century, in which we have become used to seeing aggressive human endeavour explained by economic imperatives and not by more tragic, Homeric and Thucydidean values such as rank, prestige, honour, competitiveness, vengeance and shaming. 

Using this ancient Greek paradigm, we can interpret, for example, the Iraq war (2003), perhaps the most significant recent conflict, which overthrew the dictator Saddam Hussein and resulted in any number of dire national, regional and global side effects, not as a war about energy resources, as has become the dominant discourse, but about America’s attempt to reassert its prestige and honour, lost after the New York City terror attacks in 2001.

Now, let’s look at how this expanded understanding of the origins of wars can be applied to the recent history and current confrontations involving Greece and Cyprus and Turkey.

To begin with, we note that Turkey considered invading Cyprus twice in the 1960s – in 1964 and 1967. On both occasions, it was deterred not only by its lack of military capacity to carry out a successful assault on Cyprus, but also by its diplomatic isolation.

Cyprus since 1964 had successfully induced the USSR to take an interest in the course of the Cyprus question, prompting the Soviet Union to understand that the Western plan to partition Cyprus and turn Cyprus into a NATO protectorate was a direct threat to USSR interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Turkey’s threat of invasion also faced diplomatic opprobrium from the USA, concerned that a Turkish attack would provoke a war between Greece and Turkey and alienate whoever lost, potentially drawing that country into the Soviet orbit and seriously weakening NATO’s south-eastern flank. America’s preference was for a negotiated partition of Cyprus, a deal between Greece and Turkey as to how to share the Cypriot spoils, arrived at in a similar way to the London/Zurich agreements (1959) that established Cyprus’ ‘independence’, agreements done behind the back of the island’s communities and presented to them as a fait accompli.

Following its failure to invade Cyprus in 1967, Turkey set about boosting its military preparedness for a landing on Cyprus; improving relations with the USSR – which harboured deep antipathy to Greece and Greek anti-communism and then, as now, keen to detach Turkey from the Western sphere of influence – so that it would not object when Turkey attacked Cyprus, as it did not in 1974; and convincing the superpower it was most obliged to, the USA, that Turkey was more important to it than Greece and that its interests had to be taken more into account than Greece’s. 

Turkey’s calculation in this last instance was entirely correct. When Greece did indeed leave the military wing of NATO in August 1974 to protest Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus, it returned six years later with its tail between its legs. And when the Pasok government of Andreas Papandreou, elected in 1981, attempted a foreign policy more independent of NATO, this proved superficial, mere rhetoric, and it wasn’t long before Greece decided to abandon any pretence that its long-term security interests could be served outside of Western security apparatuses.

But why did Turkey want a chunk of Cyprus in the first place, why were its ears pricked when the UK in the 1950s, aiming to frighten the Greek Cypriots into submitting to British colonial rule, encouraged it to revive interest in the future of Cyprus, in the prospect of the island uniting with Greece? 

Of course, Turkish strategists said it was to do with Cyprus pointing at Turkey’s underbelly, fear of Turkey being surrounded by Greek islands and that there was concern for the fate of the island’s Turkish minority; but the truth was that Turkey always regarded Cyprus as having been unjustly taken from it by the British in 1878 and that restoring Cyprus to it would be righting a historic wrong. In other words, Cyprus became a matter of repairing Turkish national prestige as well as an opportunity for the latest generation of Turks to prove their patriotic credentials in the ongoing war against a perennial ethnic and civilisational rival and nemesis.

Another question worth asking is what prevents Turkey from imposing its will on Cyprus in today’s conditions, i.e. in which Turkey’s ultra-nationalist Islamist regime sends research vessels and warships to Cyprus’ territorial waters not only to challenge Cypriot sovereignty but to assert Turkish claims on the island’s energy resources.

What deterrence does Cyprus have to prevent further Turkish aggression, to stop them finishing the job of 1974? The fact that we are even asking this question suggests that Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its subsequent occupation of the northern third of the island did not fulfil its long-term aim  – of abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and turning the whole of Cyprus into a Turkish satellite. The Republic of Cyprus survived Turkey’s attack, the free areas of the island flourished economically, retained international recognition as sole representative of the island, even joined the EU in 2004. Not one country – not even those closest to Turkey diplomatically, such as Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Somalia, have recognised the pseudo-state Turkey established in occupied Cyprus in 1983.

Certainly, Cyprus has no significant defence force to deter Turkey. It is not a member of any mutual defence pact – Turkey stands in the way of Cyprus joining NATO and even objects to Cyprus participating in the alliance's Partnership for Peace programme. 

Cyprus has a vague military agreement with Greece and Greece used to assert that any Turkish moves against Cyprus would be regarded as a casus belli; but, as Turkey’s manoeuvrings in Cyprus’ EEZ over the last few years have shown, Greece is not going to get involved militarily to protect Cyprus. Historically, Greece’s Cyprus policy, from Constantine Karamanlis, through George Papandreou, to both versions of the junta and back again to Constantine Karamanlis, was to prevent the island’s politics from dragging Greece into a war with Turkey, detaching Greece from the Atlanticist orbit and distracting the winners of the Greek civil war from their continuing fight against communism, which meant, after the military phase of the internecine conflict concluded in 1949, crushing anything that hinted at leftism or suggested accommodation with the Eastern bloc. President Makarios of Cyprus fell foul of successive governments in Athens for not showing sufficient hostility to the communist menace, which was why Cyprus in Greek politics was always a left-wing and not a right-wing – not a traditional nationalist – cause.

Cyprus has been, of course, since 2004, a member of the EU; but this is a free trade zone serving the economic interests of Germany and to a lesser extent France. If Turkey were to attack Cyprus, the EU, as a formality, might impose some sanctions on the aggressor, but the lessons of the last few years of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus’ EEZ , are that these sanctions would be limited and unlikely to deter a determined Turkey. 

Cyprus has made itself useful to Israel – and hence the USA – but there can be no illusions that if there were any chance of reconciliation with Turkey, the Israelis would drop Cyprus like a hot potato and gladly resume the relations it used to enjoy with Ankara. 

Turning to Greece and how it deters Turkey, for decades after the invasion of Cyprus Greece thought it was a core EU country and that this afforded it bulletproof diplomatic cover against Turkish aggression. 

This was exposed as a grotesque fallacy not only by the 2010 economic crisis – when Greece was served up as a sacrificial victim to preserve the integrity of French and German banks – but also by the 2015 refugee crisis, which Greece was left to deal with on its own; and, even more startlingly, by Turkey’s first manoeuvrings to implement its Blue Homeland policy, an explicit challenge not only to Greece’s sovereignty but to its very existence, which left the EU indifferent. 

Again, we would assert, following Hanson, that Turkey’s Blue Homeland policy is not about grabbing the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean, the gas finds discovered off Cyprus and which potentially exist in the Aegean, but about prestige, honour, history, the longing to relive the conflicts of the past – whether it's Manzikert, the fall of Constantinople or the wars in Anatolia and Asia Minor that led to the creation of modern Turkish republic. All these factors crystallise in Turkish nationalist and Islamist fantasies of a revived Turkish-Islamic superpower to rival the pre-eminence of the unjustly maligned and betrayed Ottoman empire, the last 200 years of which saw it steadily and increasingly humiliated by aggressive Western powers and rebellious subjects, especially the Greeks.

Since the EU has proved woefully inadequate in deterring Turkish belligerence, Greece has responded to Turkey’s threats by a concerted effort not only to build its military capabilities, but to prove to others in the region  equally weary of Turkish expansionism – Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Syria – that Greece is a serious military power, willing to defend itself militarily against Turkey, which means willing to make the necessary economic, social, cultural and human sacrifices and hence a useful and reliable partner.

So, to conclude with Hanson: ‘Wars begin when aggressive powers believe that their targets are weaker, or give the false impression that they are weaker, or at least stay inert in the face of provocation… [and]… wars are deterred when all the potential players know the relative strengths of each and the relative willingness to use such power in defense of a nation’s interests. Lack of such knowledge leads to dangerous misjudgments. And war then becomes a grotesque foreordained laboratory experiment to confirm what should have been known in advance.’

Thoughts on Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War

Some points emerging from reading Donald Kagan's Thucydides: The Reinvention of History, particularly in relation to the war between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesians as it transpired in Sicily.

I’m sure I’m not the first one to point out that the disastrous Sicilian expedition, which significantly contributed to the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, evokes striking similarities to the Asia Minor catastrophe: an enthusiastic and capable expeditionary force has initial success but, mostly due to poor leadership and increasing loss of morale and self-belief, fails to consolidate its advantages and finish the job, allowing for a revival of the enemy and leading to calamitous defeat. Indeed, I’m sure the similar fates suffered by the Athenians in Sicily and Greeks in Ionia was not lost on Eleftherios Venizelos, a student and translator of Thucydides.

We note the bitterness and savagery with which Greek fought Greek throughout the Peloponnesian War, but particularly in Sicily. Kagan writes on the treatment of Athenian and Sicilian allied prisoners by the victorious Syracusans and Corinthians:

‘The triumphant Syracusans took their prisoners and booty [from the Athenian expedition] and stripped the armor from the dead enemy, hanging it from the finest and tallest trees along the [Assinarus] river. On returning to Syracuse they held an assembly where they voted to enslave the servants of the Athenians and their imperial allies and to place Athenian citizens and their Sicilian Greek allies into the city’s stone quarries. A proposal to put Nicias and Demosthenes to death provoked more debate… [and] the assembly voted to execute both [the Athenian] generals.

‘The Syracusans held over seven thousand prisoners in their quarries, crowded together in inhuman conditions, burned by the sun during the day and chilled by the autumn cold at night. They were given about a half-pint of water and a pint of food each day… and they suffered terribly from hunger and thirst. Men died from their wounds, from illness and from exposure and the dead bodies were thrown on top of one another, creating an unbearable stench.’

Thus, what the ‘inhumanity’ of the Peloponnesian War – and not just this war, but the virtually continual state of internecine Greek wars – reminds us is that, in practice, in this period, there was as much an Athenian, Corinthian, Syracusan or Spartan ‘nation’ as a Hellenic one and that the pan-Hellenic consciousness that existed did so side by side and, more often than not, competed with ‘national’ identities derived from belonging to a particular city state.

Following on from this, a word on Athenian arrogance and Athenian nationalism. With the advent of the Athenian empire, the Athenians ascribed to themselves the right to decide what it was and what it was not to be a Hellene. Indeed, the Athenians came to believe their way of life was the epitome of Greekness – Pericles’ funeral oration being the clearest expression of this, with his assertion that Athens was ‘an education to Greece’.

Thus, those Athenians who initially argued against the Sicilian expedition did so on the grounds that the Segastans – who had asked the Athenians for assistance in their conflict with Selinus and Syracuse in western Sicily – were not Greeks but ‘an alien race’ and a ‘barbaric people’, even though the Segastans were, in fact, a mixture of Ionian Greek colonists and Hellenised Elymian Sicilians.

We note that Demosthenes the orator in the fourth century BC deployed the same Athenian conceit against the Macedonians, asserting that they had to be resisted and could not claim leadership of Hellas because Philip and his people were not Greeks but barbarians.

Isocrates on Greek culture and race

In an exchange between an anonymous commenter and Hermes on my post More nonsense about Cleopatra’s ‘black ancestry’, the issue of Isocrates famous statement on Greek culture and race came up.

Anonymous wrote: ‘The Ancient Greeks (or at least the Athenians), as Isocrates famously proclaimed, came to consider Greeks those who partook of Greek education and culture irrespective of ancestry.’

Hermes responded: ‘This inference is absolutely incorrect and is a favourite of those forces of multiculturalism that want to foist on the Greek people their culture-destroying religion. Isocrates, not the Athenians, made this statement, and we cannot know for sure whether the majority of Athenians believed what Isocrates stated. We do know for sure that the Athenians had strict laws of citizenship which made it difficult for even a Greek of another city-state with one Athenian parent to claim citizenship. Also, Athenians were obsessed with the concept of autochthony which again runs counter to Isocrates.’

I want to add a couple of points.

Here’s what Isocrates actually said:

‘Athens has so far outrun the rest of mankind in thought and speech that her disciples are the masters of the rest, and it is due to her that the word “Greek” is not so much a term of birth as of mentality, and is applied to a common culture rather than a common descent.’

The statement appears in The Panegyricus, written in about 380 BC, seven years after the infamous King’s Peace, formulated by Sparta and Persia, had returned rebellious Cyprus and Ionia to Persian control and imposed Spartan hegemony throughout Greece. The Panegyricus is a passionate appeal for pan-Hellenic unity, a call to arms against Persia and a eulogy of Athens, which Isocrates believed the only Greek power capable of leading an expedition against Persia.

Isocrates advocates attacking Persia because it would: ‘exchange internal disputes for external war’, i.e. solve the problem of internal conflict (stasis) that plagued individual Greek states and Greece in general by directing Greek energies against a common enemy and opening the way for ambitious or disgruntled Greeks to colonise the east; ‘transfer the wealth of Asia to Europe’; be revenge for the Persian invasions of Greece in the previous century – ‘exact retribution for the insult done to the Greek race’, as the Greeks had previously accomplished when they destroyed Troy in retaliation for the kidnap of Helen of Sparta; liberate once and for all from Persian authority and menace the Greek states in Asia Minor; and fulfil the destiny of Greeks, which was to subjugate foreigners, who were racially and culturally inferior to Greeks. Greeks were free, belligerent and tough, while Persians were soft, effeminate and servile, according to Isocrates.

Isocrates goes on to argue that his native Athens is the city best placed to achieve pan-Hellenic unity and lead the campaign against Persia. Athens, Isocrates, says, is ‘the most ancient, the greatest and the most universally famed of all cities… But distinguished as is the basis which underlies it, there is closely connected with it an even clearer ground for honour. [Athens’] title to possession is not based upon the eviction of others or the acquisition of an untenanted wilderness, nor on forming a mixed collection of races. The distinction and purity of our line has enabled us to remain in unaltered possession of the land of our birth. We sprang from its soil, and can use the same names for it as for our own blood. We are the only Greek state which can properly call our land by the names of nurse, fatherland and mother. Any justifiable pride, any reasonable claim to leadership, any memories of ancestral greatness, must show some such racial origins to support it.’

Athens, therefore, is the most suitable leader of Greece because of its previous contributions to Greek freedom in wars fought against Persia; its cultural influence on the rest of Greece – here Isocrates echoes Pericles, who asserted Athens’ right to hegemony over Greece since ‘Athens is an education to Greece’; and, most significantly for Isocrates, because Athens’ citizens were, of all the Greeks, the most racially pure and homogeneous – the most Greek in blood. (This last point reveals the importance Greeks attached to parentage and descent).

Bearing all this in mind, Isocrates’ statement on the inclusiveness of Greek culture no longer appears so liberal; instead it becomes a radical assertion of Greek cultural superiority; a call to traditional Greek powers – identified by Isocrates as Athens, Sparta, Argos and Thebes – to recognise that the Greek world – those who share Greek culture and mentality – is much larger than Greece and consists of Greek cities and kingdoms that exist from the Pillars of Hercules in the west to Sinope on the Black Sea and Cyprus in the east; and a plea for this Greek world to be united under Athenian leadership, and such unity would not just be an end in itself but a means to successfully wage war against non-Greeks.

■ In 346 BC, Isocrates wrote another essay – To Philip – reaffirming his belief in pan-Hellenic unity and war against Persia. Spartan and then Theban hegemony had proved disastrous for Greece and disillusioned with the prospect of his native Athens leading a pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia, Isocrates urged Philip II of Macedonia to unite the Greek states and attack Persia. Of course, Philip did unite the Greek states – brutally and causing much resentment – but it was left to his son, Alexander, to fulfil Isocrates’ vision of a Greek expedition to destroy the Persian empire.