Five myths about the 1974 coup against Makarios

This is an interesting piece, Cyprus 1974: five myths about the coup, written by Marios Evriviades in 2014, who is professor of International Relations at Panteion University. (Read the entire article in Greek here).

The five myths, according to Evriviades, are that: 1. Sampson and EOKA B organised the coup; 2. The objective of the coup was enosis; 3. The objective of the coup was partition; 4. Makarios was deliberately allowed by the junta to escape from the assault on the presidential palace; and 5. The Americans tricked junta leader Dimitrios Ioannides into carrying out the coup.

Below I’ve translated into English extracts that relate to the first three myths Evriviades refers to. I believe Evriviades’ repudiation of the first two myths is compelling and even though I agree with the assertion he makes in discussing myth number three that Turkey’s invasion and partitioning of the island in 1974 did not alter Turkey’s deeper geostrategic goal of controlling the whole of Cyprus, I have my doubts about his view as to when Turkey came to regard partition as falling short of its long-term objectives.

Evriviades starts off his piece by referring to a UK Foreign Office document dated 12 September 1956 revealing that, despite Cyprus being in the throes of its campaign for enosis, Greece, through its foreign minister Evangelos Averoff, was actively promoting the idea of partitioning the island. Evriviades’ says:

‘In July 1956, while EOKA’s liberation struggle was fully underway, Evangelos Averoff was pushing the idea to American diplomats that Cyprus should be partitioned. In September 1956, Averoff repeated to Norway’s foreign minister Halvard Lange that partition was the only possible solution to the Cyprus Question. Two weeks later, Averoff suggested partition in two meetings with Turkey’s ambassador in Athens.’

On to the myths:

1. Sampson and EOKA B organised the coup
Evriviadis says that EOKA B was not involved in the coup and that Nikos Sampson [later installed as president] was completely irrelevant to it. The coup was organised from Athens and was carried out by junta officers in Cyprus, using forces from ELDYK [Hellenic Force in Cyprus] and elite units from the Cyprus National Guard.

Sampson, with a number of bodyguards, came out on to the streets of Nicosia on the morning of the coup on 15 July to find out what was going on. He was arrested along with his bodyguards and held in the basement of the headquarters of the National Guard. Only later, when his identity became known, was Sampson taken to the office of the junta’s main henchman in Cyprus, Brigadier Michalis Georgitsis, who had orchestrated the coup. Because no eminent Cypriots – such as Glafkos Clerides – would agree to be sworn in to replace the deposed (but still alive) president, Archbishop Makarios, Sampson was chosen, even if Sampson was regarded as ‘insane’, both by Athens junta leader Dimitrios Ioannides (who became head of EOKA B when General Georgios Grivas died in January 1974) and Ioannides’ EOKA B representative in Cyprus, Lefteris Papadopoulos.

Despite, Ioannides’ anger and disappointment that the ‘insane’ Sampson was the only man that could be found to make president of Cyprus, the two began to co-operate, with Ioannides’ first order to Sampson being: ‘Nicky, bring me Mouskos’ (i.e. Makarios’) head.’(«Νικολάκη, θέλω το κεφάλι του Μούσκου»).

As for EOKA B, by the beginning of July 1974, it was disintegrating, with its entire local leadership in prison. With the coup, its remaining members took the opportunity to kill resisters and other political opponents. Prior to the coup, EOKA B actions sought to foment conditions of civil war among Greek Cypriots, following the strictures and techniques laid down by the Nato-inspired anti-communist Operation Gladio. The Greek version of Gladio was Κόκκινη Προβιά, and this was applied in Cyprus throughout the reign of the Athens junta (1967-1974). The creation of EOKA B in 1971 and its subsequent activities were products of Κόκκινη Προβιά.

2. The objective of the coup was enosis
Not at all.
Unadulterated, real enosis had been abandoned by Athens in 1957, if not 1956. Any discussion of enosis after the events of 1963-64 [i.e. the Turkish Cypriot uprising] referred to ‘double enosis’, i.e. partition or, more correctly, the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and the annexation of some 60% of the island by Greece, with the rest going to Turkey.

Any assertion by the junta that its actions in Cyprus were motivated by a desire for enosis is sheer hypocrisy. The aim of the Ioannides junta was more simple: it was the survival of the junta regime – which felt threatened by a free and democratic Cyprus and by Turkey in the Aegean. By removing the ‘Red Priest’ [Makarios] in Cyprus, Ioannides believed he was providing a valuable service to his sponsor, the USA, which loathed Makarios and regarded him as an impediment to their plans for the island. Ioannides hoped that by doing the Americans a favour, Washington would restrain Turkey not only in Cyprus but also in the Aegean, where Turkey had begun to make threatening noises in November 1973.

3. The objective of the coup was partition
Yes and No.
It’s true that both the Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-73) and Dimitrios Ioannides (1973-74) juntas were reconciled to the partition of Cyprus, which when they weren’t calling it ‘double enosis’ were calling it ‘enosis with something in return’. Partition was also the ideal solution and strategic aim of the USA.

However, was partition Turkey’s objective on Cyprus? And was Ankara prepared to work first with the Papadopoulos’ and then the Ioannides’ regimes to bring about the division of Cyprus?

Here we are confronted with another myth, that Turkey’s aim was and continues to be the partitioning of Cyprus. Until August 1964, this was the case, but afterwards, it is not so. In August 1964, Turkey rejected partition as envisaged by the Acheson Plan (Greece had accepted the plan), because partition would not have solved its main strategic preoccupation, which was to prevent Greece extending its sovereignty to Cyprus. From this point on, Turkey altered its Cyprus policy in favour of the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and the creation of a federation of two autonomous states on the island [the ‘rulers in the north, partners in the south’ scenario] which would allow geostrategic control of Cyprus to pass to Turkey. Ioannides may have had the aim of partitioning Cyprus, but not Turkey. The form the Turkish invasion of Cyprus took and Turkey’s current Cyprus policy prove this beyond doubt.

Papandreou’s plan to overthrow Makarios

Below is another translated extract from Marios Evriviades’article  (‘Plans for betrayal from 1964’) that argues that the Ioannides coup against Makarios in 1974 was nothing more than the implementation of a Greek policy aimed at partitioning Cyprus with Turkey that had been dreamed up 10 years previously.

In fact, it is striking that the nature of the coup planned by Giorgos Papandreou in 1964 – overthrow Makarios, declare enosis, then open negotiations with the Turks on which part of Cyprus to give them – was precisely what Ioannides had in mind in 1974. It was a stupid idea in 1964 – which is presumably why Papandreou was persuaded to abandon it – and it was an even stupider idea in 1974, the predictable consequences of which were the Turkish invasion and partition of Cyprus not on Greece’s terms but on Turkey’s.

Plans for betrayal from 1964 
In August 1964, with the knowledge of the Americans and, previously, with American encouragement (in February 1964, US Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, was the main protagonist), the government  of Giorgos Papandreou drew up a plan for a coup in Cyprus and informed President Johnson’s special Cyprus representative, Dean Acheson, in Geneva of their proposal.

In Geneva, while on the surface the talks taking place between Greece and Turkey on the future of Cyprus were under UN auspices, in practice it was Acheson who was running the show, with his plan or, more correctly, plans for the division of Cyprus. There were many Acheson plans (just as there were many Annan plans), and the Turks accepted only the first one, which would have secured them sovereignty over 30% of Cyprus and the Greek island of Kastelorizo.

From the Greek side, Papandreou accepted the proposal for a leased Turkish base on the island comprising 99 square miles and informed Acheson of this in Geneva in writing on 22 August. Nowhere does there exist a corresponding Turkish letter as to whether Turkey accepted this proposal, but there is a Turkish letter to Acheson dated 28 August, according to which Turkey rejected Acheson’s efforts at mediation because there was no longer on the table an offer that secured Turkey sovereignty over a part of Cyprus. 

Earlier, on 23 August, Giorgos Papandreou gave an order by telephone to Greece’s negotiators in Geneva, Sosiades and Nikolareizis, to inform Acheson that Greece could overthrow Makarios within a week, after which ‘immediate enosis’ would be declared and then negotiations would start with the Turks on the basis of the Acheson plan, which would result in Greece providing Turkey with a base area in Cyprus, in the Cape Greco region [south of Famagusta] rather than in the Karpas peninsula, and the granting of minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. Acheson told Sosiades and Nikolareizis that Washington agreed with the proposed coup against Makarios.

Why did Greece want to overthrow Makarios?

I was reading a very interesting article on the infognomonpolitics blog, written by Marios Evriviades and which originally appeared in the Cypriot daily, Phileleftheros.

Evriviades argues that the 15 July 1974 coup against Makarios was not necessarily a hastily concocted putsch by the junta, but the culmination of 10-years of Greek state policy.

Greece, during this period, Evriviades says, was determined to come to an agreement with Turkey on the partition of Cyprus and was prepared to contemplate the forced removal of Cyprus’ president, Makarios, and the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, in order to accelerate its aims.

I’ve translated below the first part of Evriviades’ article, which suggests that even if the goal of removing Makarios remained the same, the reasons for Athens wanting it done in 1964, under the premiership of Giorgos Papandreou, were different to those that motivated Dimitris Ioannides, the head of the junta, in 1974.

Just to add that the more I find out about Greece’s official policy towards Cyprus in the years leading up the coup and Turkish invasion, the more I am struck by the breathtaking incompetence and stupidity of Greece's policy makers, and this applies to those associated with the junta and those who ran Greece before the colonels seized power. In fact, one of the reasons the story of Greece’s betrayal of Cyprus remains of interest, is because this same incompetence and stupidity continued in Greece after 1974 and is responsible for the sweeping crisis affecting the country right now.

I’ll try and post further translation of Evriviades’ piece later this week.

Plans for betrayal from 1964
The betrayal of 15 July 1974 was the culmination of 10-years of scheming by Greece. However, the reasons for the scheming during this period change. In 1964, when the scheming starts, the aim and target of the coupists was the overthrow of the Makarios government and the dissolution of the Cypriot state, with the rationale of preventing Cyprus from becoming another Cuba, of becoming communist. In 1974, the aim of the coupists was more simple. It was the survival of the regime in Athens. Junta leader Dimitris Ioannides and the rest of his gang organised the coup in order to buy time from their transatlantic patrons and to appease the Turks and prime minister Bulent Ecevit, who were threatening Greece in the Aegean.

By overthrowing Makarios – the ‘devil-priest’, the ‘red-priest’, the ‘anti-Greek’ – the junta believed it was providing a service to Washington and Ankara, who would be duly grateful. Ioannides believed the Americans would press Turkey to react to the coup with moderation since it was Athens’ intention, with Makarios out of the way, to sit down with the Turks and ‘close’ the Cyprus problem, which Greece and Turkey had been discussing intermittently from 1964, on the basis of the US-inspired Acheson plan, which envisaged partition of the island.

A second motive the Ioannides’ junta had for wanting to be rid of Makarios was that in doing so it would end the threat posed to the Athens regime by the democracy that existed in Cyprus. In the paranoid world of the Athens junta, Cyprus was a haven for dissidents conspiring against the regime ruling Greece; dissidents, particularly those made up of former officers from the Greek armed forces, who, the junta believed, were being aided and abetted by Makarios.

For more of this article, go here.