Greeks of Egypt: the other homeland
Impressive documentary above from Al Jazeera on the long history of the Greek community in Egypt, from the Minoans to Nasser; but concentrating on the modern community, which began to form in the late 1700s and at its height amounted to 200,000 people. Lots of fascinating characters and detail, including the fact that Greek Egyptians felt so committed to Egypt that they joined up to fight against the Anglo-French invasion of the country in 1956.
One can only hope that Greece can take advantage of these ties to countries like Egypt to promote its geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey aspires to yoke Egypt to its neo-Ottoman project and, in this way, achieve its aim of driving out Hellenism – particularly in the form of the Republic of Cyprus – from the Eastern Mediterranean. What Turkey is conniving at is an agreement with Egypt that links their Exclusive Economic Zones, as if Cyprus (and Kastellorizo) simply did not exist. Greece’s goal, of course, should be to cultivate Egypt and thwart Turkish expansionism. This shouldn’t be beyond Greece, especially since there is no evidence to suggest that Egypt – which has aspirations of its own to be a leading power in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean – wants to be part of Turkey’s grandiose plans or shares Turkish nostalgia for the Ottoman empire. Turkey might believe its own propaganda about how tolerant and enlightened the Ottoman empire was – and they may have found enough apologists and stooges from Western Europe and the USA to encourage them in their delusions – but so far Turkey has made little real headway in its efforts to establish regional hegemony.
Cyprus crisis: conspiracies, cock-ups and political agendas
Manthos pointed me in the direction of the talk above by Andreas Constandinos on the junta’s coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The talk emerges from Constandinos’ PhD thesis, published in book form as America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure? which seeks to disprove the so-called conspiracy theories that predominate in the discourse on the events of 1974 – i.e. that America and the UK conspired with Turkey and Greece to bring about the downfall of the Republic of Cyprus as a prelude to partition of the island; and instead assert the cock-up theory – i.e. that the US and UK were largely caught unaware by the coup and the invasion and responded as they did not out of malice or careful calculation but because they failed to read Greek and Turkish intentions correctly. All in all, Constandinos says that, as far as the US and UK were concerned, the coup and invasion were far from a conspiracy to destroy the Republic of Cyprus but rather a foreign policy failure.
Constandinos’ thesis is flawed and implausible. In fact, it’s so flawed and implausible that it’s reasonable to conclude that he’s pushing a dubious political agenda. I’ll just make a few points, mostly about his attempts to exonerate the US from blame in the coup and invasion. I won’t go into his equally dubious effort to whitewash the UK’s role in the partition of Cyprus.
1. There is no Cyprus conspiracy theory in the way Constandinos thinks there is. Christopher Hitchens, who Constandinos accuses of being one of the main exponents of the conspiracy theory, prefers in his book Cyprus: Hostage to History to use the word ‘collusion’ and not ‘conspiracy’. At no point does Hitchens argue that Kissinger or the British gave explicit instructions to the Greeks to overthrow Makarios or to the Turks to invade the island. Rather, Hitchens, as well as insisting on ‘collusion’, characterises US and UK policy as ‘careless’, ‘arrogant’, ‘cynical’ and infused with ‘imperial caprice’.
2. Asserting as Constandinos does that Kissinger was unaware of Greece’s coup plot and Turkey’s determination to invade is naively generous to the US secretary of state. The fact is that it was an open secret that Greece, for years, going back to 1964, had been considering a coup against Makarios and that Ioannides was more committed than his predecessors to bringing this plan to fruition. It was just as much an open secret that Turkey was itching to invade Cyprus and had nearly done so in 1964 and 1967, only stopping, not as Constandinos says – in another attempt to exonerate the US in Cyprus – because of pressure from Washington, but because the Turkish armed forces were not ready to launch such a major operation. It’s worth pointing out that in 1964, some American officials were actually urging the Turks to invade and assuring them that they would not face US censure. (See here for discussion of the Acheson plans and the US encouraging Turkey to invade Cyprus).
3. Despite the well-known role of the US and UK in the 1960s in destabilising the Republic of Cyprus in an effort to bring closer the implementation of the Acheson Plan, i.e. the partition of Cyprus, giving one part of the island to Greece and the other to Turkey, thus securing the whole for Nato and reconciling Greece and Turkey, Constandinos insists that with the Nixon administration this paranoid cold war mentality dissipated and that America and Cyprus had developed a modus vivendi – as exemplified by Makarios acquiescing in America’s use of the UK bases on the island for its U-2 missions in the Middle East. The earlier plans for a coup, invasion and partition had, according to Constandinos, apparently been forgotten by the Americans, by Kissinger et al.
This is not credible. There is no evidence that from 1968 the Americans were now favourably disposed to Makarios or that they had ceased to regard an independent and essentially non-aligned Cyprus, with its large and slavishly pro-Moscow communist party, which routinely opposed the presence of British and US military bases and listening posts on Cyprus, as a continuing threat to Western security interests. Nor would any supposed US rapprochement with Makarios have deflected the Americans from their more substantial interest of mollifying Turkey and Greece. In the case of Greece, this mollification involved preserving the Greek junta in power and to this end, since Makarios was an affront to the junta, the Americans were more than happy to go along with Athens’ plans to do away with the ‘red priest’. It’s also worth stressing that EOKA B, the paramilitary group established on Cyprus in 1971 to further the junta’s goals on the island, was supported not just by Athens, as Constandinos says, but by the CIA.
4. We also know that the Americans viewed the coup against Makarios with sympathy not only because they did not see fit to condemn it but, in fact, the US began the process of recognising the new government and state of affairs created in Cyprus by Ioannides. It matters little whether Kissinger gave direct orders for the removal of Makarios – Constandinos’ anti-conspiracy theory heavily relies on his failure to find documents in the US archives that show Kissinger giving such orders; because we prefer to judge Kissinger and America’s role in the 1974 events not by what was said but by what was done – and whether what was done was in line with long-standing and known US policy, which it was, i.e. all American efforts in 1974 paved the way for the coup, the invasion and partition – and as such were the culmination of a policy initiated by the US State Department (with the support of the British) in 1964. Thus, we can say with certainty that despite knowing that the junta was in the final stages of plotting to oust Makarios, the US did not urge them to abandon their plans – which they would have done if, as Constandinos says, the Nixon administration was well disposed to Makarios. We also know that the coup having failed, with Makarios alive and able to claim to be the legitimate Cypriot head of state, the Americans, still determined to see through the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, decided to back Turkey, implicitly and explicitly, in its ambition to partition the island. So even though Constandinos wants us to believe that the Americans were caught unaware by the Turkish invasion, thought the threat of invasion was only a bluff, we know not only that US efforts to dissuade the Turks from invading were, at best, half-hearted, but that at the Geneva talks that followed the first invasion on 20 July, Kissinger spoke openly about Turkey’s legitimate interest in ‘protecting’ the Turkish Cypriots who, Kissinger helpfully added, deserved more ‘autonomy’. As such, the US did not condemn the second Turkish invasion on 14 August and, in fact, expended most of its diplomatic energy during this period urging Greece not to respond to Turkey’s advances on the island.
What then are we to make of an analysis like Constandinos’ that seeks to exonerate the US and UK from the events of 1974 and his efforts to heap all the responsibility for the tragedy onto the Greek junta – which he portrays as acting on its own or, Constandinos does concede (without, for some reason, it affecting for him his overall thesis), in collaboration with trusted Greek-American CIA agents? What we make of such an analysis is that it is part of a trend in certain British academic circles that busy themselves with Cyprus to portray Britain, in particular, as having a benign or neutral role in Cyprus, show America as a blundering imperial power manqué and trace all Cyprus’ woes to Greece, Greeks and Greek nationalism.
Constandinos’ thesis is flawed and implausible. In fact, it’s so flawed and implausible that it’s reasonable to conclude that he’s pushing a dubious political agenda. I’ll just make a few points, mostly about his attempts to exonerate the US from blame in the coup and invasion. I won’t go into his equally dubious effort to whitewash the UK’s role in the partition of Cyprus.
1. There is no Cyprus conspiracy theory in the way Constandinos thinks there is. Christopher Hitchens, who Constandinos accuses of being one of the main exponents of the conspiracy theory, prefers in his book Cyprus: Hostage to History to use the word ‘collusion’ and not ‘conspiracy’. At no point does Hitchens argue that Kissinger or the British gave explicit instructions to the Greeks to overthrow Makarios or to the Turks to invade the island. Rather, Hitchens, as well as insisting on ‘collusion’, characterises US and UK policy as ‘careless’, ‘arrogant’, ‘cynical’ and infused with ‘imperial caprice’.
2. Asserting as Constandinos does that Kissinger was unaware of Greece’s coup plot and Turkey’s determination to invade is naively generous to the US secretary of state. The fact is that it was an open secret that Greece, for years, going back to 1964, had been considering a coup against Makarios and that Ioannides was more committed than his predecessors to bringing this plan to fruition. It was just as much an open secret that Turkey was itching to invade Cyprus and had nearly done so in 1964 and 1967, only stopping, not as Constandinos says – in another attempt to exonerate the US in Cyprus – because of pressure from Washington, but because the Turkish armed forces were not ready to launch such a major operation. It’s worth pointing out that in 1964, some American officials were actually urging the Turks to invade and assuring them that they would not face US censure. (See here for discussion of the Acheson plans and the US encouraging Turkey to invade Cyprus).
3. Despite the well-known role of the US and UK in the 1960s in destabilising the Republic of Cyprus in an effort to bring closer the implementation of the Acheson Plan, i.e. the partition of Cyprus, giving one part of the island to Greece and the other to Turkey, thus securing the whole for Nato and reconciling Greece and Turkey, Constandinos insists that with the Nixon administration this paranoid cold war mentality dissipated and that America and Cyprus had developed a modus vivendi – as exemplified by Makarios acquiescing in America’s use of the UK bases on the island for its U-2 missions in the Middle East. The earlier plans for a coup, invasion and partition had, according to Constandinos, apparently been forgotten by the Americans, by Kissinger et al.
This is not credible. There is no evidence that from 1968 the Americans were now favourably disposed to Makarios or that they had ceased to regard an independent and essentially non-aligned Cyprus, with its large and slavishly pro-Moscow communist party, which routinely opposed the presence of British and US military bases and listening posts on Cyprus, as a continuing threat to Western security interests. Nor would any supposed US rapprochement with Makarios have deflected the Americans from their more substantial interest of mollifying Turkey and Greece. In the case of Greece, this mollification involved preserving the Greek junta in power and to this end, since Makarios was an affront to the junta, the Americans were more than happy to go along with Athens’ plans to do away with the ‘red priest’. It’s also worth stressing that EOKA B, the paramilitary group established on Cyprus in 1971 to further the junta’s goals on the island, was supported not just by Athens, as Constandinos says, but by the CIA.
4. We also know that the Americans viewed the coup against Makarios with sympathy not only because they did not see fit to condemn it but, in fact, the US began the process of recognising the new government and state of affairs created in Cyprus by Ioannides. It matters little whether Kissinger gave direct orders for the removal of Makarios – Constandinos’ anti-conspiracy theory heavily relies on his failure to find documents in the US archives that show Kissinger giving such orders; because we prefer to judge Kissinger and America’s role in the 1974 events not by what was said but by what was done – and whether what was done was in line with long-standing and known US policy, which it was, i.e. all American efforts in 1974 paved the way for the coup, the invasion and partition – and as such were the culmination of a policy initiated by the US State Department (with the support of the British) in 1964. Thus, we can say with certainty that despite knowing that the junta was in the final stages of plotting to oust Makarios, the US did not urge them to abandon their plans – which they would have done if, as Constandinos says, the Nixon administration was well disposed to Makarios. We also know that the coup having failed, with Makarios alive and able to claim to be the legitimate Cypriot head of state, the Americans, still determined to see through the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, decided to back Turkey, implicitly and explicitly, in its ambition to partition the island. So even though Constandinos wants us to believe that the Americans were caught unaware by the Turkish invasion, thought the threat of invasion was only a bluff, we know not only that US efforts to dissuade the Turks from invading were, at best, half-hearted, but that at the Geneva talks that followed the first invasion on 20 July, Kissinger spoke openly about Turkey’s legitimate interest in ‘protecting’ the Turkish Cypriots who, Kissinger helpfully added, deserved more ‘autonomy’. As such, the US did not condemn the second Turkish invasion on 14 August and, in fact, expended most of its diplomatic energy during this period urging Greece not to respond to Turkey’s advances on the island.
What then are we to make of an analysis like Constandinos’ that seeks to exonerate the US and UK from the events of 1974 and his efforts to heap all the responsibility for the tragedy onto the Greek junta – which he portrays as acting on its own or, Constandinos does concede (without, for some reason, it affecting for him his overall thesis), in collaboration with trusted Greek-American CIA agents? What we make of such an analysis is that it is part of a trend in certain British academic circles that busy themselves with Cyprus to portray Britain, in particular, as having a benign or neutral role in Cyprus, show America as a blundering imperial power manqué and trace all Cyprus’ woes to Greece, Greeks and Greek nationalism.
Albert Camus: The New Mediterranean Culture
Below is the text of a lecture Albert Camus gave on Mediterranean culture at the Maison de la Culture in 1937, and indeed the reflections are very much of their time, with concerns over the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish civil war and the rise of Nazi Germany. They are also, of course, the product of a Pied-Noir, a European born and raised in French colonial Algeria. The lecture is not so much interesting for its commitment to internationalism and collectivism; but for its attempt to describe a distinct Mediterranean culture and physical way of life, under threat from joyless northern Europeans, ‘buttoned right up to the neck’. Camus is, of course, one of the twentieth century's great exponents of Greek civilisation and there are many observations he makes here and elsewhere that remind us of the poet Odysseas Elytis and his Hellenism. Indeed, Elytis could have come up with the phrase 'nationalism of the sun' to describe his own aesthetics, which Camus invents to stress the unique humanism of Mediterranean culture. Also, Camus' thoughts on the ontological differences separating the Mediterranean from northern Europe seem pertinent given the small cultural war that has resurfaced between Germany and Greece in which the economic crisis afflicting Greece has been portrayed by Germans as a consequence of southern European 'laziness and propensity to corruption and thievery'; while Greeks have responded to the hostility by depicting Germans as soulless bullies and mass murderers.The New Mediterranean CultureI. The aim of the Maison de la Culture, which is celebrating its opening today, is to serve the culture of the Mediterranean. Faithful to the general directions governing institutions of its type, it seeks within a regional framework to encourage the development of a culture whose existence and greatness need no proof. Perhaps there is something surprising in the fact that left-wing intellectuals can put themselves to work for a culture that seems irrelevant to their cause, and that can even, as has happened in the case of Maurras, be monopolized by politicians of the Right.
It may indeed seem that serving the cause of Mediterranean regionalism is tantamount to restoring traditionalism with no future, celebrating the superiority of one culture over another, or, again, adopting an inverted form of fascism and inciting the Latin against the Nordic peoples. This is a perpetual source of misunderstandings. The aim of this lecture is to try to dispel them.
The whole error lies in the confusion between Mediterranean and Latin, and in attributing to Rome what began in Athens. To us it is obvious that our only claim is to a kind of nationalism of the sun. We could never be slaves to traditions or bind our living future to exploits already dead. A tradition is a past that distorts the present. But the Mediterranean land about us is a lively one, full of games and joy. Moreover, nationalism has condemned itself. Nationalisms always make their appearance in history as signs of decadence. When the vast edifice of the Roman empire collapsed, when its spiritual unity, from which so many different regions drew their justification, fell apart, then and only then, at a time of decadence, did nationalisms appear.
The West has never rediscovered unity since. At the present time, internationalism is trying to give the West a real meaning and a vocation. However, this internationalism is no longer inspired by a Christian principle, by the Papal Rome of the Holy Roman Empire. The principle inspiring it is man. Its unity no longer lies in faith but in hope. A civilization can endure only insofar as its unity and greatness, once all nations are abolished, stem from a spiritual principle. India, almost as large as Europe, with no nations, no sovereignty, has kept its own particular character even after two centuries of English rule.
This is why, before any other consideration, we reject the principle of a Mediterranean nationalism. In any case, it would never be possible to speak of the superiority of Mediterranean culture. Men express themselves in harmony with their land. And superiority, as far as culture is concerned, lies in this harmony and in nothing else. There are no higher or lower cultures. There are cultures that are more or less true. All we want to do is help a country to express itself. Locally. Nothing more. The real question is this: is a new Mediterranean civilization within our grasp?
II. Obvious facts, (a) There is a Mediterranean sea, a basin linking about ten different countries. Those whose voices boom in the singing cafes of Spain, who wander in the port of Genoa, along the docks in Marseilles, the strange, strong race that lives along our coasts, all belong to the same family. When you travel in Europe, and go down toward Italy or Provence, you breathe a sigh of relief as you rediscover these casually dressed men, this violent, colorful life we all know. I spent two months in central Europe, from Austria to Germany, wondering where that strange discomfort weighing me down, the muffled anxiety I felt in my bones, came from. A little while ago, I understood. These people were always buttoned right up to the neck. They did not know how to relax. They did not know what joy was like, joy which is so different from laughter. Yet it is details like this that give a valid meaning to the word 'Country.' Our Country is not the abstraction that sends men off to be massacred, but a certain way of appreciating life which is shared by certain people, through which we can feel ourselves closer to someone from Genoa or Majorca than to someone from Normandy or Alsace. This is what the Mediterranean is – a certain smell or scent that we do not need to express: we all feel it through our skin.
(b) There are other, historical, facts. Each time a doctrine has reached the Mediterranean basin, in the resulting clash of ideas the Mediterranean has always remained intact, the land has overcome the doctrine. In the beginning Christianity was an inspiring doctrine, but a closed one, essentially Judaic, incapable of concessions, harsh, exclusive, and admirable. From its encounter with the Mediterranean, a new doctrine emerged: Catholicism. A philosophical doctrine was added to the initial store of emotional aspirations. The monument then reached its highest and most beautiful form – adapting itself to man. Thanks to the Mediterranean, Christianity was able to enter the world and embark on the miraculous career it has since enjoyed.
Once again it was someone from the Mediterranean, Francis of Assisi, who transformed Christianity from an inward-looking, tormented religion into a hymn to nature and simple joy. The only effort to separate Christianity from the world was made by a northerner, Luther. Protestantism is, actually, Catholicism wrenched from the Mediterranean, and from the simultaneously pernicious and inspiring influence of this sea.
Let us look even closer. For anyone who has lived both in Germany and in Italy, it is obvious that fascism does not take the same form in both countries. You can feel it everywhere you go in Germany, on people's faces, in the city streets. Dresden, a garrison town, is almost smothered by an invisible enemy. What you feel first of all in Italy is the land itself. What you see first of all in a German is the Hitlerite who greets you with 'Heil Hitler'; in an Italian, the cheerful and gay human being. Here again, the doctrine seems to have yielded to the country – and it is a miracle wrought by the Mediterranean that enables men who think humanly to live unoppressed in a country of inhuman laws.
III. But this living reality, the Mediterranean, is not something new to us. And its culture seems the very image of the Latin antiquity the Renaissance tried to rediscover across the Middle Ages. This is the Latinity Maurras and his friends try to annex. It was in the name of this Latin order on the occasion of the war against Ethiopia that twenty-four Western intellectuals signed a degrading manifesto celebrating the 'civilizing mission of Italy in barbarous Ethiopia.'
But no. This is not the Mediterranean our Maison de la Culture lays claim to. For this is not the true Mediterranean. It is the abstract and conventional Mediterranean represented by Rome and the Romans. These imitative and unimaginative people had nevertheless the imagination to substitute for the artistic genius and feeling for life they lacked a genius for war. And this order whose praises we so often hear sung was one imposed by force and not one created by the mind. Even when they copied, the Romans lost the savor of the original. And it was not even the essential genius of Greece they imitated, but rather the fruits of its decadence and its mistakes. Not the strong, vigourous Greece of the great tragic and comic writers, but the prettiness and affected grace of the last centuries. It was not life that Rome took from Greece, but puerile, over-intellectualized abstractions. The Mediterranean lies elsewhere. It is the very denial of Rome and Latin genius. It is alive, and wants no truck with abstractions. And it is easy to acknowledge Mussolini as the worthy descendant of the Caesars and Augustus of Imperial Rome, if we mean by this that he, like them, sacrifices truth and greatness to a violence that has no soul.
What we claim as Mediterranean is not a liking for reasoning and abstractions, but its physical life – the courtyards, the cypresses, the strings of pimientos. We claim Aeschylus and not Euripides, the Doric Apollos and not the copies in the Vatican; Spain, with its strength and its pessimism, and not the bluster and swagger of Rome, landscapes crushed with sunlight and not the theatrical settings in which a dictator drunk with his own verbosity enslaves the crowds. What we seek is not the lie that triumphed in Ethiopia but the truth that is being murdered in Spain.
IV. The Mediterranean, an international basin traversed by every current, is perhaps the only land linked to the great ideas from the East. For it is not classical and well ordered, but diffuse and turbulent, like the Arab districts in our towns or the Genoan and Tunisian harbors. The triumphant taste for life, the sense of boredom and the weight of the sun, the empty squares at noon in Spain, the siesta, this is the true Mediterranean, and it is to the East that it is closest. Not to the Latin West. North Africa is one of the few countries where East and West live close together. And there is, at this junction, little difference between the way a Spaniard or an Italian lives on the quays of Algiers, and the way Arabs live around them. The most basic aspect of Mediterranean genius springs perhaps from this historically and geographically unique encounter between East and West. (On this question I can only refer you to Audisio).
This culture, this Mediterranean truth, exists and shows itself all along the line: (1) In linguistic unity – the ease with which a Latin language can be learned when another is already known; (2) Unity of origin – the prodigious collectivism of the Middle Ages – chivalric order, religious order, feudal orders, etc., etc. On all these points, the Mediterranean gives us the picture of a living, highly colored, concrete civilization, which changes doctrines into its own likeness – and receives ideas without changing its own nature.
But then, you may say, why go any further?
V. Because the very land that transformed so many doctrines must transform the doctrines of the present day. A Mediterranean collectivism will be different from a Russian collectivism, properly so-called. The issue of collectivism is not being fought in Russia: it is being fought in the Mediterranean basin and in Spain, at this very moment. Of course, man's fate has been at stake for a long time now, but it is perhaps here that the struggle reaches its tragic height, with so many trump cards placed in our hands. There are, before our eyes, realities stronger than we ourselves are. Our ideas will bend and become adapted to them. This is why our opponents are mistaken in all their objections. No one has the right to prejudge the fate of a doctrine, and to judge our future in the name of a past, even if the past is Russia's.
Our task here is to rehabilitate the Mediterranean, to take it back from those who claim it unjustly for themselves, and to make it ready for the economic organistation awaiting it. Our task is to discover what is concrete and alive in it, and, on every occasion, to encourage the different forms which this culture takes. We are all the more prepared for the task in that we are in immediate contact with the Orient, which can teach us so much in this respect. We are, here, on the side of the Mediterranean against Rome. And the essential role that towns like Algiers and Barcelona can play is to serve, in their own small way, that aspect of Mediterranean culture which favors man instead of crushing him.
VI. The intellectual's role is a difficult one in our time. It is not his task to modify history. Whatever people may say, revolutions come first and ideas afterward. Consequently, it takes great courage today to proclaim oneself faithful to the things of the mind. But at least this courage is not useless. The term 'intellectual' is pronounced with so much scorn and disapproval because it is associated in people's minds with the idea of someone who talks in abstractions, who is unable to come into contact with life, and who prefers his own personality to the rest of the world. But for those who do not want avoid their responsibilities, the essential task is to rehabilitate intelligence by regenerating the subject matter it treats, to give back all its true meaning to the mind by restoring to culture its true visage of health and sunlight.
I was saying that this courage was not useless. For if it is not indeed the task of intelligence to modify history, its real task will nevertheless be to act upon man, for it is man who makes history. We have a contribution to make to this task. We want to link culture with life. The Mediterranean, which surrounds us with smiles, sea, and sunlight, teaches us how it is to be done. Xenophon tells us in The Persian Expedition that when the Greek soldiers who had ventured into Asia were coming back to their own country, dying of hunger and thirst, cast into despair by so many failures and humiliations, they reached the top of a mountain from which they could see the sea. Then they began to dance, forgetting their weariness and their disgust at the spectacle of their lives. In the same way we do not wish to cut ourselves off from the world. There is only one culture. Not the one that feeds off abstractions and capital letters. Not the one that condemns. Not the one that justifies the excesses and the deaths in Ethiopia and defends the thirst for brutal conquests. We know that one very well, and want nothing to do with it. What we seek is the culture that finds life in the trees, the hills, and in mankind.
This is why men of the Left are here with you today, to serve a cause that at first sight had nothing to do with their own opinions. I would be happy if, like us, you were now convinced that this cause is indeed ours. Everything that is alive is ours. Politics are made for men, and not men for politics. We do not want to live on fables. In the world of violence and death around us, there is no place for hope. But perhaps there is room for civilization, for real civilization, which puts truth before fables and life before dreams. And this civilization has nothing to do with hope. In it man lives on his truths.
It is to this whole effort that men of the West must bind themselves. Within the framework of internationalism, the thing can be achieved. If each one of us within his own sphere, his country, his province agrees to work modestly, success is not far away. As far as we are concerned, we know our aim, our limitations, and our possibilities. We only need open our eyes to make men realize that culture cannot be understood unless it is put to the service of life, that the mind need not be man's enemy. Just as the Mediterranean sun is the same for all men, the effort of man's intelligence should be a common inheritance and not a source of conflict and murder.
Can we achieve a new Mediterranean culture that can be reconciled with our social idea? Yes. But both we and you must help to bring it about.
Kostas Karyotakis: impressions of a drowning man
Thanks to Hermes for drawing my attention to the recent ERT series on the poet Kostas Karyotakis, one of the most troubling figures in modern Greek literature, who committed suicide in 1928, aged 32.
I watched the first episode of Karyotakis earlier and it was very good. Watch all six episodes (in Greek) here. Above is the opening sequence from episode one (with my English subtitles), in which Karyotakis tries to drown himself, fails, then succeeds in taking his life using a revolver. In between suicide attempts, Karyotakis wrote this suicide note:
It is time for me to reveal my tragedy. My greatest faults were unbridled curiosity, a diseased imagination, and my attempts to become acquainted with every emotion without being able to feel most of them. However, I despise the base act that is attributed to me. I experienced but the ideation of its atmosphere, the ultimate bitterness. Nor am I the suitable person for that profession. My entire past will show that much. Every reality to me was repulsive.
I felt the rush brought on by danger. And with glad heart I shall accept the coming danger.
P.S. And, to change the tone: I advise those who can swim never to try to commit suicide in the sea. All night and for ten hours I was battered by the waves. I drank much water but, by and again and without me knowing how, my mouth would surface. Perhaps some time, given the opportunity, I shall write down the impressions of a drowning man.
Karyotakis' last poem, written a month before his death, was Preveza.
Preveza
Death is the crows clattering
on dark walls and roof-tiles;
death – those women who make love
as if they were peeling onions.
Death these grimy, insignificant streets
with their great, illustrious names,
the olive grove, in all directions the sea,
and even the sun – death amid deaths.
Death – that cop who wraps up
an 'Insufficient' serving and weighs it;
death – these hyacinths on the balcony
and that teacher with the newspaper.
Base, Garrison, Platoon of Preveza.
On Sunday we'll hear the band.
I got a savings book from the bank,
first deposit – thirty drachmas.
Walking slowly on the wharf you say,
'Do I exist' and then, 'You do not exist!'
The ship arrives, Raised flag.
Perhaps His Honor the Governor is coming.
If, among these people, just
one would die from disgust…
Silent, sad, decorous,
we'd all have fun at the funeral.
Dimitris Tsafendas: ‘The wandering Greek’
I want to add a couple of things to the interesting piece Dean Kalimniou has put together on Dimitris Tsafendas, who stabbed to death in 1966 Henrik Verwoerd, the South African prime minister and architect and chief exponent of apartheid.
Tsafendas was born in Mozambique, the illegitimate child of a Cretan father and a mixed-raced local woman, who after an apparently happy early childhood with his paternal grandmother in Alexandria returned to the Portuguese colony and his father's new all-Greek family, which felt uncomfortable with the prodigal son and farmed him out to a boarding school in South Africa. Despite intelligence – Tsafendas spoke eight languages – the young adult quadroon found it hard to bear the numerous stigmas and symptoms of his outsiderness in racially conscious southern Africa and drifted into menial employment – and became a defiant, belligerent, uncompromising, opinionated and unstable character, attracted to radical politics and Christianity.
A remarkable period of adventures and wanderings followed, which took Tsafendas all over the world, and from one prison and psychiatric institution to another – Tsafendas suffered from schizophrenic episodes – before he managed to return to South Africa, where he precariously flitted between jobs and white and coloured communities, finally finding employment as a messenger in the all-white parliament in which he committed the murderous deed that landed him in prison and psychiatric care for the rest of his life – he died in 1999, aged 81.
Tsafendas' slaying of Verwoerd was denounced as the act of a madman, an interpretation the numerous filmmakers and writers who became interested in Tsafendas' story after apartheid collapsed, objected to, insisting instead on the political dimension to his crime. On the wreath she sent to his funeral, the documentary filmmaker Liza Key described Tsafendas as 'Displaced Person, Sailor, Christian, Communist, Liberation Fighter, Political Prisoner [and] Hero'.
However, this rehabilitation of Tsafendas as a political hero doesn't do justice to his story either. Reading Tsafendas' tragic narrative – superbly documented in Henk van Woeden's book, A Mouthful of Glass – it's hard not to regard Tsafendas as some sort of perverse Odysseus, driven from his native land by his family's hostility, desperate to return to kin and country but rejected and denied at every turn, exuding not cunning and intelligence but madness, who makes it back 'home' but fails to fit in, boring and alienating friends and family – who wish he'd never returned – with his outlandish tales of the world and high seas, and driven in the end to a brutal act of violence, which doesn't restore order but condemns him instead to the living hell of apartheid's prison and mental institutions.
There are also elements of Tsafendas' story that make us think of the specific experience of Greeks in the 20th century. In particular, van Woeden's book provides a fascinating glimpse into Hellenism in colonial Africa – in Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa – which is, perhaps, the least well-known of the Greek diasporas; and, as the 'Wandering Greek', Tsafendas also becomes an extreme symbol of modern Greece’s failure to fulfil its promise to become a country capable of providing security and opportunity for its tekna, disgorging them instead to the four corners of the world and exposing them, in one way or another, to annihilation.
The video clip is from Liza Key’s film, The Furiosus, which briefly features Tsafendas, describing the killing of Verwoerd.
Contradictions, Conflicts and Paradoxes: a framework for a Cyprus solution, by Nikos Kotzias
Contradictions, Conflicts and Paradoxes: a framework for a Cyprus solution
In the spirit of this project, I will try to think outside the box about the future of Cyprus. A future solution for Cyprus could be based on four different models, The first possible solution might be a “velvet divorce”, based on the Czechoslovak model. The second option is the consolidation of the status quo, which could lead to a situation similar to Taiwan. The third option, which is largely the Annan Plan option, can be referred to as the Bosnian model. Finally, the fourth option, which contains elements from the Belgian model and other similar arrangements can be described as the “modern federation”model. Up to now, discussions have been geared more towards the first three models and less towards the fourth model.
The “modern federation”, in my view, would maximise opportunities for Cyprus as a whole as well as for both communities on the island. Nevertheless, if the “modern federation” solution is not acceptable to the relevant actors, the first solution, that of the velvet divorce, appears the most realistic option and preferable to the status quo.
In this paper, I will first examine the feasibility and desirability of each approach. In the second part, I turn to the problem of minorities in Cyprus and examine ways in which the political recognition of minorities could contribute to reaching an alternative solution.
Finally, I highlight the reasons why the deadlock in intercommunal relations is mistakenly attributed to the political problem in Cyprus, whereas in fact it is due to the regime of guarantees established under the 1960 settlement which are still in force.
Paradoxes and Alternative Models Velvet Divorce on the Czechoslovak model: The first possible solution could be the division of the territory through a velvet divorce, based on the Czechoslovak model; in other words, the recognition of northern Cyprus as a separate state, in exchange for the return of territory to the Republic of Cyprus. Under this proposition, the territorial settlement outlined in the Annan Plan could be useful, particularly the proposals prior to the fifth version of the plan. As a pre-condition for this first solution, the EU would accept that the new state under the control of the Turkish-Cypriots immediately becomes a member: the two Cypriot communities will be together in the EU under the same obligations and immediately under the regime of the four Freedoms.
I am well aware that a clearheaded discussion of a solution along these lines is difficult in the present circumstances. Indeed, it could be argued that this solution requires the legal recognition of a situation which was caused by the illegal invasion and the ensuing occupation of northern Cyprus in the first place. This is obviously very difficult for the Greek-Cypriots to accept, especially those dislocated from their homes in the north. Last but not least, if the northern area of Cyprus manages to survive with the support of the Republic of Cyprus and of the EU, Turkey risks the chance of losing overall control even in the northern part of Cyprus.
A series of political paradoxes explain why, despite the various objections to a “velvet divorce”, many in both Cypriot communities are in favour of this solution (as was the case in Czechoslovakia), especially if it were to guarantee the interests of northern Cyprus vis à vis the EU. First, the invasion and subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish military authorities have to some extent “homogenised” the Republic of Cyprus further. Despite the constraining clauses contained in the 1959 Zurich Accords, the Republic of Cyprus has acquired total control over all the territory that was not occupied. In other words, territorial limitations in turn have actually made territorial sovereignty in some way absolute (so far it is possible inside the EU and under the conditions of the Globalisation), thus completing the process launched by the Greek-Cypriots right after 1963 - though at considerable cost. On the contrary, specific proposals for the unification of Cyprus, including the fifth version of the Annan plan, could dramatically limit the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, particularly if the clauses concerning the intervening role of the guarantor powers came into effect. It is reasonable to assume that the Greek-Cypriots would also have to share power with the Turkish-Cypriots. Paradoxically, because of the occupation of one-third of the territory, the Republic of Cyprus has gained the greatest possible control over the remaining unoccupied part of its territory, and thus both “full” sovereignty and security.
Secondly, for a number of years a large part of the Turkish leadership and military authorities have unequivocally declared their intention to annex northern Cyprus into Turkey, or proceed with its formal international recognition, unless the Republic of Cyprus agrees to their demands.
Thirdly, the Turkish-Cypriot community is more attached to the unification of Cyprus as this would result in their immediate entry into the EU, the withdrawal of the bulk of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus and improved economic prospects. Paradoxically, precisely because the fifth version of the Annan Plan contained more concessions to the Turkish-Cypriots than any of the previous versions, this had the effect of blocking their most important objective – the unification of Cyprus and entry into the EU. This paradox was caused both by constant interventions by the Turkish military establishment while negotiations were being held between the third and fifth version of the Annan plan, and the absence of any counter-intervention by the Greek side to redress the balance and ultimately prevent the Annan Plan from being rejected.
Maintenance of the status quo according to the Taiwan model: A second possible solution to the Cyprus problem is the “wait and see” approach premised on the tolerance of the status quo by political forces on the island and their primarily concern with the idea of restoration. However, in the current era of globalisation and rapid change the rejections of various potential solutions on the ground that they are not the best possible solutions — unless this goes hand in hand with an adoption of the “Czechoslovak model” — could pave the way to a worsening of the situation. The status quo is no second best solution for two reasons.
First and perhaps paradoxically, in recent years, the Republic of Cyprus has achieved a relative economic miracle. Having successfully integrated into international markets, especially in the fields of banking, services, public works and tourism, the Republic of Cyprus cannot be totally exempt from the general tendency towards secession of resourceful regions from nation states. This is a by-product of globalisation. In the internationalist era, the creation of new nation states was primarily a consequence of the secession of poor provinces from empires, so that national elites in these areas could create their own markets and systems of governance. In the era of globalisation, this tendency is accompanied by a parallel trend towards the secession or demands thereof of rich regions from nation states (such as the Czech Republic from Czechoslovakia, Slovenia from Yugoslavia, northern Italy from the rest of the country, Catalonia from Spain, and so on). Rich regions no longer regard the unified, local state as the only source of cheap labour, essential resources, or geo-strategic advantage. More accurately, they no longer view the state solely from this perspective. On the contrary, they regard the state as a burden – a place where they must “sacrifice” a percentage of their budget under worse conditions than in the international market. Relatively cheap resources – once only available domestically – can now be acquired at better rates in the global market, which offers low-priced primary resources, new materials, and lower labour costs. So the Greek-Cypriots’ will to pay for the unification with north Cyprus is not as strong as it was in the past.
Second, those among the voters who objected to the Annan Plan on the grounds that it granted too many favourable concessions to Turkish-Cypriots, have essentially “dug their own grave”, because circumstances cannot remain static until the next round of negotiations. Significant changes have already taken place since the rejection of the Annan Plan, with mostly negative consequences for Greek-Cypriots. For instance, more and more Turkish-Cypriots are moving to the south of the island, where they are calling for recognition of their rights and benefits as the Republic’s citizens. At least 78,000 Turkish-Cypriots have acquired Cypriot passports or IDs and are therefore entitled to social welfare, healthcare, and pensions, even though the majority do not pay taxes. Some of them have claimed the return of their property. At the same time, the number of Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus is increasing; northern Cyprus faces the threat of becoming more and more of a Turkish colony, to the detriment of all Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus. It is therefore obvious that the status quo is untenable.
The Bosnian Solution and the Annan Plan: A third possible solution to the Cyprus problem would be the implementation of the basic principles of the fifth version of the Annan Plan, along the lines of the Bosnian model. In my opinion, the premise of such a solution would be an attempt to create a unified state through formal processes, but in such a way that it would maintain ethnic differences, without creating bridges to transcend those differences. However, in today’s globalised world citizens are not only defined by their nationality; they have multiple identities. They might be Turkish-Cypriot or Greek-Cypriot, but at the same time they have different social, cultural, and political identities. They might be citizens on the left or the right, employees or owners of companies. All over Europe, a heated debate is taking place about the hierarchy of identities - for example, whether citizens are first British then Muslim, or first French then Arabs. Yet the Annan Plan approaches the Cypriots from a one-dimensional perspective, as members of two distinct communities, rather than as citizens of Cyprus. Any genuinely democratic and viable solution to the Cyprus problem must forge links between the two communities beyond institutional links – links that will encourage a process of osmosis and social fusion.
I fear that the Annan Plan will be dysfunctional as it provides the explosive potential to break up the Republic of Cyprus, without any safety valves. For instance, it inhibits the revision of the Constitution by either community, which serves the interests of third parties to leave the establishment intact, rather than serving the interests and policies of the citizens of Cyprus. The architects of the Annan Plan intended to create a legal framework that could be amended, even if the majority of Cypriots on all sides agreed upon this. Nevertheless, banning constitutional amendments does not prevent real changes from taking place. In the case of Cyprus it simply impeded the process as the Treaty of Establishment of 1959 did not equally provide for adequate democratic procedures for amendments, i.e. agreed by both communities. As a result, instead of problems being solved by constitutional means conflict became the only means of breaking the deadlock, through ethnic cleansing, bombing campaigns, an Athens-instigated military coup against Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish military invasion followed by occupation.
In short, a new solution for Cyprus must include the basic democratic right of all Cypriots to amend their own Constitution, with increased majorities and the approval of both communities, as well as other interest groups such as minorities. A creative solution must provide for a process of cross-cultural cooperation and social fusion in Cyprus, a process of unification no longer defined only by ethnic identity and dividing lines, but also by community interests and social or political strategies. These would create opportunities for new alliances and agreements, as we propose in the fourth and final possible solution.
It is worth noting that the Annan Plan is also dysfunctional because it frequently runs counter to past experiences in international affairs. This is especially evident in the clauses regarding shared institutions. In my analysis of the second model above, I referred to the new global tendency towards secession of the rich. This tendency would be exacerbated by the Annan Plan because it calls on the Greek-Cypriots not only to cover the costs of unification, and to accept responsibility for the economic deficits and budgetary requirements of a Turkish-Cypriot constituent state/entity within a unified Cyprus, but also to relinquish control of the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC). A sixth version of the Annan Plan might be acceptable to a Greek majority, if it endorsed the old principle according to which, he who pays, enjoys rights. The American Revolution was staged under the banner “no taxation without representation”. The same principle guided the unification of Germany: the central bank of what was then West Germany was not subject to controls by East Germans or foreign bankers. On the contrary, the Annan Plan proposed for the shared control CBC, comprising a representative of the flourishing and financially successful Greek-Cypriot community, a representative of the impoverished Turkish-Cypriot community and a foreign representative.
One of the fundamental shortcomings of the Annan Plan is that in the name of the absolute equality of both communities, one community is called upon to subsidise the other without being granted the right to control the institution that will cover the costs. As with the case of minorities, discussed below, this goes against international standards and existing principles of state creation applied in other Western countries such as Germany and the United States. Obviously, if the CBC remained under Greek-Cypriot control it would be much easier for Greek-Cypriots to accept any future plan, whereas it would not be such an important point for the Turkish-Cypriot community. In a globalised world, it does not matter who issues the cheque, under whose name, but who cashes it. In short, the most important factor for the Turkish-Cypriots is not who signs off the transferral of funds from the Greek-Cypriot side to the Turkish-Cypriot side, but a guarantee that these funds will be duly transferred and collected by the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state/entity.
A “Post-modern” Federation: A fourth possible solution for Cyprus could lie beyond the “self-evident” notions that ruled the negotiations during the last 32 years and promote a new type of bi-zonal, bi-communal solution that would encourage cultural, political and social alliances, which go beyond ethnic dividing lines. Of course, any such solution cannot ignore the current situation, including the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979, the various plans already on the table, and the extent to which and means by which each of these proposed plans has been accepted by both communities. But even within this complex historical framework, and the negative commitments contained therein, there is still room for creative thinking.
The variations of the Annan Plan were all premised on two self-sufficient communities and two sub-state entities, which could only interact around the institutions of the centric Cypriot state. In addition, the Annan plan contained a multitude of transitional provisions that could impede osmosis between the two sides and the creation of a genuine common Cypriot state.
The Annan Plan finally aimed at the social separation of the two communities rather than enforcement by the central organs and institutions. If such a model were to be endorsed, the first option of a “velvet divorce” would appear to be more preferable for all the Cypriots, along with some of the proposals outlined in the other three models suggested in this paper.
I believe there is a strategy for Cyprus that would contribute to positive progress and provide long term democratic stability guaranteeing at the same time fundamental rights and generating creative potential for all citizens from both communities. In my opinion, the key to such a solution is the guaranteed existence of a constituent state/entity for each community, through which the central state apparatus would operate and the equality of Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots would be recognised. Although this solution will be difficult to achieve, it remains the only viable solution (along with the first model outlined above); the second and third models would inevitably be short-lived.
Three additional factors should be taken into consideration to make this model more viable.
The first factor is the minorities living in Cyprus discussed below, the second factor is the creation of a common federal state shared by both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots (and whoever else is willing to participate), beyond the creation of two territorially separate states. This federated state could be established in the city of Nicosia, with equal participation by both communities, not only in numbers but also in practice. In today’s united Europe, it is a political shame that Nicosia, the most politically and socially developed city in Cyprus, remains divided. This should not be the case in a reunited Cyprus. As the vital capital of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia could play a similar role to that of Brussels in Belgium. As a result, the domestic policies of the Nicosia entity would increasingly reflect the various political and social identities of its residents, not just their ethnic identity. The inhabitants of such a capital city would develop a strong sense of both Cypriot and European identity. The EU and the United Nations must recognise that the citizens of Nicosia cannot be defined exclusively in terms of the ethnic community to which they belong; otherwise, we would have to resort to the first model – the deliberate, premeditated divorce. On the other hand, the creation of a bi-communal zone in Nicosia would automatically change the way new institutional mechanisms are established in Cyprus, as well as their composition. Since some people are sceptical about the possibility that such a “unified” solution based on the Brussels model could be accepted, two sub-systems could be established in the city – one for each community – for a limited transitional period.
The third factor is the establishment of three or four regions within the two constituent entities/states of the federation, which would operate both as sub-systems of the authorities of the federal states/entities from the Republic of Cyprus as well as from other independent bodies. As such, they could undertake joint initiatives, not just within their own communities but also with other neighbouring regions. Neighbouring regions that belong to different constituencies (for instance, Morphou and Paphos in western Cyprus) often have greater common interests than regions in the east and west of the same constituent state/entity. This could also provide a framework to resolve the governance of the Karpasia region
This model opens up the possibility of a democratic, unified, and federal Cyprus, organised through a system that operates on multiple levels. Representatives of the constituent states representing each of the two communities could participate at the level of the federal government. Alongside this, there could be a third, mixed constituent state based in Nicosia. Wherever a problem of imbalance arises additional emphasis could be given to the participation of minorities whose independent rights of representation would be guaranteed in all other cases. Below the federal level, a system of regions could be created. These regions, possibly eight or ten altogether (plus two from Nicosia) could reserve the right to take action within their constituent state with relative autonomy, provided they are in accordance with the federal constitution. This would encourage political alliances combining regional and nationwide social issues, so that the future of Cyprus would not be heavily influenced by pressing ethnic demands. In addition to these ten regions, an eleventh independent body for minorities could also be established. In such a federation, federal laws on issues specified by the Federal Constitution would outweigh community laws and there would be clear guarantees for the Republic of Cyprus concerning implementation of the solutions outlined in the agreements, particularly for the transitional period.
This model could create opportunities to develop common approaches and interests among different sections of the Cypriot society on the basis of regional cooperation. In turn, this could lead to the formulation of common social and political interests, as well as common social and political leaders.
However, the fourth model is only a meaningful option if one looks forward to a Cyprus that is not merely united through formal legal and constitutional mechanisms, but is united in substance. This means a thoroughly demilitarised Cyprus with no foreign troops stationed on its soil and no right of intervention by any foreign powers, whether they are labelled as guarantor powers or other incidental ones. This means a Cyprus that takes into account the different identities of contemporary society (religious, ethnic, national, regional, European, social, political) and aims to bridge the divide between Cypriots who belong to different ethnic communities without undermining their own particular identity, while guaranteeing equal rights and equal participation for all members of each community. That is why I call this model “the (post)-modern federal solution”.
I argue that this proposal could provide a genuine alternative to the Annan Plan without undermining the unity or jeopardising the interests of either community. It could be reached by combining the traditional route of reaching an agreement between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities, the guarantor powers, the United Nations and the EU and the drafting of a new constitution in accordance with democratic principles. Thus any new plan (such as “Annan 6”) would guarantee equal democratic representation of all parties through a Constitutional Convention. If this strategy cannot be implemented, which is quite possible, priority should be given to the first model, the “velvet divorce”.
Institutional recognition of minority rights: a vital contribution to a sovereign Cyprus and an active EU member
I called the fourth model a (post-)modern federation because I believe that in the current context of globalisation it will be impossible to build a federal state in Cyprus which only recognises the rights of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Until now, all parties involved in Cyprus fail to consider the presence of minorities on both sides of the island and systematically leave them out of any proposed solutions. I believe that the autonomy and independence of the Armenian, Latin and Maronite minorities must be recognised in Cyprus, as in any other modern state. In 1960, these minorities were forced to formally join one of the two recognised communities: the Greek and Turkish communities, according to the 1960 Constitution. They showed their preference to join the Greek-Cypriot community, a situation which was accepted without any further thought by the Annan Plan. As a result, their role in a possible solution for the island is consistently overlooked.
The three minority groups in Cyprus (and there are other minorities as well, not yet recognised by the constitution or international treaties) are, indeed, small. But they still deserve to be recognised as independent groups, rather than being assimilated with one of the two constitutionally accepted communities. The role of minorities in the solution to the Cyprus question should not be viewed only from the perspective of representative self-determination or at least the constitutional and international protection of minority rights.
Instead, it should be viewed as a positive factor that could help overcome various uncertainties concerning the balance of institutional power in a future united Cyprus. Moreover, since the EU recognises the participation of EU citizens in the affairs of European countries other than their own, nationals from other EU member states could also participate in local representative institutions in Cyprus in the future.
A solution in Cyprus requires solving an inherent contradiction: on the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot community cannot decide on the future of the whole state alone, without taking into consideration the real interests of the smaller Turkish-Cypriot community; on the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot side should not have the exclusive right to veto, thus rendering the whole decision making system dysfunctional. The Annan Plan proposed as a solution for this contradiction, that foreign judges should be appointed to the Supreme Court of Cyprus. With six judges from each community and three appointees from other countries (as laid out in Annan V) judges from the two Cypriot communities could form a majority (such as seven versus five, four and three of each community, or vice versa) yet they could be overruled by the minority (three plus two or vice versa) if the three foreign judges sided with the minority. Thus, in an independent, sovereign state, the majority in the Supreme Court could be made up of outsiders. The same problem occurs in the Annan Plan with regard to other institutions such as the Repatriation Committee, the Property Court, and the Property Commission, which would all include foreign members unaccountable to the citizens of Cyprus, regardless of which community or minority they belong to.
With regards to the Supreme Court, the problem is magnified because it would not only arbitrate on legislative and constitutional issues but also be involved in political decisions in case of stalemate in the Presidential Council. Thus, the three foreign judges would not only be empowered to take decisions as the highest ranking legal arbiters, but would also comprise the highest political authority. Is this democratic? Would this be conducive to creating a sovereign Cyprus? What impact would a Supreme Court of this kind have on the EU, given that nationals from third countries would be able to decide whether and how Cyprus should vote in EU affairs?
A simple solution to this problem would be to ensure that these three judges would automatically become Cypriot citizens; however, this is not feasible in the Annan Plan as it stands because they would have to become simultaneously members of one or other of the two communities and take the internal citizenship of the constituent state, and therefore take sides. Alternatively, one of the Cypriot minorities could provide a seventh judge, or more radically, could be appointed as a member of the Presidential Council, to ensure it could not be blocked as with the proposed dysfunctional provisions. If this is thought to give minorities a disproportionate weight in the central decision making body, representatives from minority groups could instead comprise the third arm of the Supreme Court. No matter how small numerically the minorities are, they represent the reality of Cypriot society to a larger extent than foreign appointees who have never experienced Cyprus, except perhaps as visitors, and who, rightly or wrongly, can be perceived as agents of their original country.
My proposal therefore aims to strengthen the role of minorities, a positive presence that could play an active role in a united, democratic Cyprus. They could potentially help Cyprus overcome the status of protectorate which will be inevitable if foreign nationals and third parties can influence critical decision making bodies. This would in turn improve the functionality of the institutional system overall, and ensure that the Cypriot vote in the EU represents the will of the Cypriot people, and not the interests of a third party.
A bi-communal problem or a problem of guarantees?
Last but not least, I believe that one of the fundamental problems in Cyprus is not intercommunal relations per se, but the guarantor status of third countries, which undermines the sovereignty of the island (insofar as sovereignty can exist in the context of globalisation and European unification). Today, the Cyprus question is, of course, connected to antagonism between the two communities, but this is primarily a consequence of the Greek junta’s coup in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion – a fact that many Greeks tend to forget. On the other hand, the consequences of the coup were “cleansed” by the restoration of democracy to the Republic of Cyprus after 1974. On the contrary, the consequences of the Turkish occupation have multiplied, a fact that many Turks try to cover up. It is no coincidence that one of the most difficult and complex problems is the issue of settlers who were brought in to the island from Turkey after the invasion. This factor cannot be related to inter-communal relations but is a consequence of the protracted and ongoing Turkish occupation.
Furthermore, the stalemate in Cyprus is to a large extent a product of the positions and geostrategic interests of the Turkish military establishment a fact to keep in mind when advocating the fourth model which is predicated inter alia on the final withdrawal of Greek or Turkish troops. Yet, history has shown that the Turkish military has not defined Turkey’s interests in accordance with the views of the Turkish people let alone Turkish-Cypriots. Thus, when the Turkish army talks of the interests of the Turkish-Cypriots, it is really referring to its own interests. To a certain extent, the same applies to Greece (a fact borne out by the events of summer 1974), which is the reason why all Greek troops should also be withdrawn from the island.
Consequently, I believe that Turkey does not favour a fully independent Cyprus, since it places its strategic need to control Cyprus over and above the interests of the Cypriot people. This also explains why it is so difficult for Turkey to accept a real independent Cypriot state, without the intervention of foreign guarantor powers. From this perspective, one could conclude that the weakest element of the Annan Plan is that, with regard to the presence of foreign troops on the island, it puts the interests of the Turkish military authorities above the needs of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Many well-intentioned analysts may disagree, citing the fact that the Annan plan anticipates that after decades of occupation the number of Turkish troops remaining on the island would be significantly reduced. In any case, the distance between Turkey and Cyprus is so small that if Turkey maintained the status of guarantor power, it could intervene even if it did not have a single soldier stationed on Cyprus. Even a small military unit on Cyprus could act as a beachhead. Obviously, the presence of foreign troops — whether they are classified as an army of occupation or as a security guarantee — in an independent EU member state is fundamentally a political problem. We all know, for example, that after the reunification of Germany, Russia agreed to withdraw all its troops from the country.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I advocate a solution based on the fourth model, that of a (post-)modern federal solution. All sections of the population including the numerically least significant ones should have the right to participate in the state apparatus. Such a solution must be promoted through a democratic Constitutional Convention founded on international law and the European acquis, as well as respect for human rights. This solution will be based on the needs, will, and hopes of both communities in Cyprus, rather than the will, expediency, or interests of any guarantor powers. In this context, the principle of equality, the right of those who pay to make decisions, and the independent role of minorities, could all play a decisive part in the search for effective institutional solutions. Cyprus would have the same degree of sovereignty as all other EU member states in today’s globalised world, and nothing less; otherwise, the functionality of the EU, as well as the principle of justice, will be compromised.
Finally, if the fourth model is not feasible, the second best solution would be not a passive acceptance of the status quo based on the Taiwan model, but a velvet divorce, whereby territories are exchanged for recognition and there is still an EU future for the Turkish-Cypriots.
Eighteen years after the murders of Isaac and Solomou
Good documentary marking the 18th anniversary of the murders by the forces and supporters of the Turkish occupation regime in Cyprus of Tassos Isaac and Solomos Solomou.
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