America in Cyprus: a history of malice, cynicism and hypocrisy

Here’s a fascinating and, ultimately, nauseating document compiled by the US Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training consisting of 500+ pages of oral history interviews with some 70 American diplomats – ambassadors, consular officers, desk officers, special emissaries, etc – who served in or covered Cyprus, Greece, Turkey during the period 1950-2005 and their observations about Cypriot political developments during the period.

The events the US foreign service bureaucrats discuss include the EOKA uprising; Cyprus’ independence; the Turkish Cypriot insurrection in 1963; the deterioration of the political situation in Greece and the emergence of the junta – how this affected Cyprus; the junta’s coup against Makarios; the Turkish invasion; the efforts by Greek Cypriots to recover from the devastation of Turkey’s onslaught; the various efforts to achieve a Cyprus settlement, concluding with the Annan plan in 2004.

The accounts of these officials provide an insight into how America’s global power was put together and maintained. In Cyprus’s case, we see it was done with malice, cynicism and hypocrisy. Of the dozens of US diplomats involved with Cyprus over 60 years, only one or two can escape denunciation.

The primary interviewer in these oral histories is Charles Stuart Kennedy, who was US consul general in Athens from 1970-74. Kennedy is not interested in any critical or sophisticated assessment of American policy on Cyprus. Rather, he relentlessly tries to direct his interviewees into supporting his own prejudices and views – which involve an intense dislike of Greeks, a contempt for Greek Cypriots, and an obsession with the influence of the Greek American lobby, which he blames for the Cyprus problem not being decisively taken off the agenda as it should have been, according to him, in 1974 with Turkey’s invasion.

It’s become unfashionable nowadays to talk about America’s responsibility for bringing catastrophe to Cyprus and cliched to point out Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s malign influence in the entire affair.

However, the view that America abetted, one way or another, the Athens junta in overthrowing the Makarios government and, then, Turkey in its invasion and partitioning of Cyprus – and that Henry Kissinger played the dirtiest of roles in these events – is fully vindicated by these oral histories.

Here are a some more specific points that emerge from reading these oral histories:

From the outset, the prevailing US view was that: ‘Cyprus was not going to be allowed to destroy NATO’. Everything had to be done to stop Greece and Turkey going to war over this insignificant dot on the map.

In effect, America’s desire to protect the smooth functioning of NATO meant placating Turkey, since Turkey was regarded as far more important to the US’s cold war and strategic interests than Greece.

The democratically-elected president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, for the Americans, was ‘a very unsavory, untrustworthy, unpredictable man.’ He is further described as uncooperative, slippery, Byzantine, a tribal chieftain.

However, Washington didn’t really despise Makarios for his ‘Byzantine’ personality, but because he objected to US plans to ‘solve’ the Cyprus problem by doing away with Cyprus’ independence, Cyprus’ ability to determine its out future, and making the island a NATO protectorate. Makarios opposition to the Acheson plans, devised by former secretary of state Dean Acheson, which envisaged abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and partitioning Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, was explained by Washington by suggesting Makarios was vain and enjoying the trappings of being head of an independent country.

Making Cyprus a NATO outpost is what mattered to Washington and Cypriot independence – embodied by Makarios – was the obstacle to its ambitions.

This is how Walter Silva, part of the State Department’s Cyprus Task Force in 1974 describes the prevailing US view of Cyprus:

‘It was such a small problem. There was a great deal of searching in the Department to find out what possible interest we had in whether Cyprus was divided between Greece and Turkey, whether it was united with Greece under the "enosis" plan or whether it all went with Turkey. In any of those scenarios Cyprus would be part of NATO and become a NATO stronghold, the head of the spear aimed at the heart of the Middle East sort of thing. I don't recall any strong feelings among those who had served in Greece, served in Cyprus or served in Turkey. They usually took the positions of their former hosts. There was some of that clientitis thing. But other than that it was hard to get anybody above the Desk level really excited. They were excited by the possibility that we could use Cyprus, that would be the thing. It would have been nice.’

Q: Use Cyprus how? 

SILVA: As a military forward base. That would have been very nice, you see, if we could replace the British there and have naval and air forces that close to our interests in the Middle East. But it didn't turn out that way. Independent Cyprus was not about to become a forward base for the Sixth Fleet.’

American officials needed to justify Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus, which they knew was accompanied by atrocities and ethnic cleansing, by asserting that Greek Cypriots had it coming for the way they had supposedly mistreated the Turkish Cypriots – not just in the 1960s but, apparently, throughout Cyprus’ history. Partition, therefore, not only served NATO/US interests but was somehow justice being served to Greek Cypriots for their oppressive chauvinism. 

This is James Morton, State Department Cyprus Desk Office 1975-6:

‘I think, and I had previously served in Greece, basically the feeling amongst most officers serving in Cyprus, and it wasn't a large embassy, was that the Greek Cypriot community had brought it on themselves. The distribution of population was such that small isolated pockets of Turkish Cypriots kind of sprinkled around the larger Greek sea within the island of Cyprus. We heard stories of how for fun on a Sunday Greek Cypriots would jump in their car and ride through villages and fire and even shoot and kill women and children in these pockets. The Turks were totally vulnerable. Finally because of all sorts of events… the coup, Nicos Sampson and a lot of stuff that has been recorded elsewhere… the Turks had just had it. I feel personally, and I can say it now more than I could say it then, that they were fully justified in coming in to protect their brethren.’

American maligning and dehumanising of Greek Cypriots continued after Turkey’s invasion. What Greek Cypriots had endured was minimised, if not dismissed.  

This is Geoffrey Chapman, State Department Cyprus Desk Officer, 1977-79, claiming that the refugees were pampered and exerted undue influence in determining the island’s future:

‘The Greek Cypriot government was of course under heavy pressure from the refugee organizations, representing Greek Cypriots who had been forced out of their homes in the north and would settle for nothing less than returning to them. A lot of these refugees quite deliberately refused to integrate with the rest of Greek Cyprus, which they could easily have done, and instead maintained a refugee status. The U.S. taxpayer [through foreign aid] funded quite luxurious housing for them; they by no means lived in what one normally would conceive to be refugee camps. The refugees were a very powerful lobby and no Greek Cypriot president or other leading politician could afford to ignore them, and their demands were absolute. So Greek Cypriot flexibility and ability to compromise was circumscribed from the word go.’ 

In these oral histories, American officials overwhelmingly reject any responsibility for the Greek junta’s coup against Makarios and Turkey’s invasion and are contemptuous of Greek and Greek Cypriot anti-Americanism after 1974, believing it represented Greeks’ political immaturity, always looking to blame others for their own problems and mistakes.

US hypocrisy and deceit is also conspicuous whenever Nikos Sampson  enters the Cyprus story.
Sampson is variously described in these oral histories as despicable, a psychopathic killer, an extreme Greek nationalist, a Turk-hater, a thug, etc, and that with him installed as president of Cyprus by the Athens junta, Turkey was fully justified in invading the island. 

This is how James Williams, political officer Nicosia (1973-75) described his encounters with Sampson:  

‘Sampson would usually be sitting at a huge desk when you went into his office with shelves that were lined with newspapers and magazines and books. I doubt he’d read many of them. But quite often, and I’m not joking, he would be looking at the centerfold of a Playboy magazine when you came in. I don’t know if this was for my benefit as an American diplomat, or if that was his standard reading material. But he was totally unembarrassed about it, put it to the side, and then would talk rather freely about how he saw the political development within the Greek Cypriot community, or within Cyprus.’

Not once is it recognised that Sampson was a long-standing CIA asset, valued for his anti-communism, and that the small media empire that allowed him to become well-off and prominent in Cypriot society was covertly funded by American intelligence services.

The ‘institutionalised tilt’ towards Turkey in US foreign policy, a result of Turkey’s perceived geo-strategic worth, leads to Turkish motives in Cyprus being taken at face value and rarely, if ever, described in negative or critical terms. 

Rather, Turkey’s interests in Cyprus – defined as a desire to protect the ‘beleaguered’ Turkish minority and prevent the encircling of Turkey by Greek islands – are presented as rational and reasonable.
Even when the Turks tell the Americans to their faces the real reason they invaded Cyprus, the Americans don’t demur let alone understand the implications of what they have unleashed. 

This is William Crawford, US ambassador to Cyprus, 1974-78 reporting a discussion he had with Turkey’s ‘ambassador’ in occupied Cyprus after the invasion: 

‘The [Turkish ‘ambassador’] said, “Turkey is an imperial power and a continental power. That we are unnaturally prevented from breathing to the north and the east by the presence of the Soviet Union makes it all the more important that we be able to breathe to the south and to the west. 1974 solved the southern dimension. It remains to solve the western dimension.”’

America’s efforts to contribute to UN initiatives aimed at a Cyprus settlement after 1974 come across as half-hearted and cynical. Most American diplomats shared the Turkish view that the Cyprus problem had been solved in 1974 and that any attempts to reverse matters were superfluous. 

Others, who did acknowledge that the status quo was not entirely desirable, expended most of their energy trying to get Greek Cypriots to agree a settlement that accepted the ‘facts on the ground’ created by Turkey’s invasion. 

American interest in Cyprus after Turkey’s invasion only ever peaked when they believed a settlement would help Turkey. It’s clear from these oral histories that the entire Annan plan process was developed as a means to remove obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU. 

The interests of Cypriots, fairness and functionality, were last on America minds when it came to devising settlement proposals. In fact, the US worked towards a bizonal bicommunal federation even though they knew such a plan, if ever implemented, would likely fail. 

This is Nelson Ledsky, US special coordinator on Cyprus (1989-1991), giving his oral history in 2003, on the fairness and durability of a bizonal bicommunal federation:

‘I think there will be a negotiated solution. Whether that will also lead to peace on the island, I cannot say. I don’t think the agreement now being negotiated will actually work. I don’t think the country of Cyprus is a viable entity as it is currently envisaged by the draft agreement. This agreement does not provide for a workable solution; it provides for a solution, which over time will probably not be sustainable. Changes will have to be negotiated or imposed. I think, for example, that the Greek Cypriots will eventually take over the whole island. [Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf] Denktash’s fears may be realized. I think it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the agreement as presently constituted will fall apart, two or three or five years after it has been assigned. The governmental system now being envisaged is intrinsically unworkable.’

 Finally, to bring things up to date, there is nothing new in the current Turkish insistence that before negotiations for a Cyprus settlement can start, the ’Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and Turkish Cypriot ‘sovereign equality’ have to be recognised. 

This is the same position Denktash took in the 1990s. 

Alfred Moses, special presidential envoy for the Cyprus conflict, 1997-2000, describes how these seemingly impossible Turkish demands were overcome in 2000 during the Annan process:

‘We later had another long session in Geneva in November 2000. [I came up with an initiative] intended to deal with Denktash’s insistence that there be prior recognition of the sovereignty of the TRNC as a condition to moving to meaningful negotiations on a final agreement. I came up with language for Secretary General Annan to use which was to the effect that the parties would be equal in the negotiations, and that any final resolution would take into account the equal status of the parties. Denktash saw that as an enormous victory. It was really intended to move Denktash off his position on recognition of TRNC’s sovereignty. He played it as a big win, whereupon Clerides [Cyprus’ president] played it as a big loss, and withdrew from the talks. I had to hold his hand, literally, in his suite in the Waldorf Towers, before he announced he would continue the proximity talks.'

Wikileaks: the Americans abandon Ioannides after shambolic coup against Makarios

Below is an interesting Wikileaks cable (original here) sent from the US Embassy in Athens to the US State Department detailing a meeting on 16 July 1974, i.e. the day after the Athens-engineered coup that overthrew President Makarios in Cyprus, between Greece’s junta leader Dimitrios Ioannides and the US ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca.

It’s clear from the cable that Ioannides believed he had American support for the coup and that he is infuriated when it becomes clear to him that, with Makarios alive and the coup a shambles, the Americans were now not prepared to defend Ioannides’ putsch in Cyprus, which meant, it must have been obvious to Ioannides, there was now nothing to stop a Turkish invasion of the island, that, indeed, the Americans were sympathetic to such a development. Ioannides desperately seeks to assure Tasca that the coup was in American interests, ranting about Makarios and the imminent prospect of Cyprus ‘falling into the hands of the communists’. The cable also confirms that, inasmuch as Ioannides had thought through the coup, his immediate aim was not annexation of Cyprus to Greece, but the removal of Makarios in order to facilitate an understanding with Turkey on the future of the island, i.e. partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. I USED SECURE RELIABLE CHANNEL DIRECTLY TO GENERAL IOANNIDES TO DELIVER MESSAGE REFTEL [Reference Telegram]. HE BEGAN BY EXPLAINING HE HAD PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM USG [US government]. AFTER EMISSARY HAD READ TWO PARAGRAPHS, IOANNIDES COMMENTED MESSAGE MUST BE SAME AS THAT AMBASSADOR HAD GIVEN KYPREOS [Greece’s foreign minister],IN WHICH CASE EMISSARY WASTING HIS TIME SINCE HE WOULD RECEIVE MESSAGE ANYWAY. EMISSARY EXPLAINED HIS JOB WAS TO FINISH READING MESSAGE AND HAD IT TO HIM AND WOULD DO SO, TO WHICH GENERAL IOANNIDES SAID FINE.

2. AFTER EMISSARY COMPLETED MESSAGE, THE GENERAL LITERALLY BLEW UP, JUMPED UP, BACKED UP, KNOCKED OVER A TABLE, BROKE EMPTY GLASS AND UTTERED A STRONG OBSCENITY. HE CONTINUED THAT ONE DAY KISSINGER MAKES PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING NON-INTERFERENCE IN GREEK INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND A FEW WEEKS LATER THE USG SAYS "CONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES..." AND THREATENS INTERFERENCE. NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENED IN CYPUS I (IOANNIDES) WILL BE BLAMED. IF I HAD PULLED THE TROOPS OUT THE FORMER POLITICIANS WOULD HAVE BLAMED ME FOR TURNING THE ISLAND OVER TO THE COMMUNISTS. SOME DAY USG WILL REALIZE THAT ON 15 JULY 1974 CYPRUS WAS SAVED FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS".

3. GENERAL THEN CALMED DOWN, CAME OVER TO WHERE EMISSARY WAS SITTING AND SAID HE KNEW HE UNDERSTOOD HIM: DIPLOMATIC TALK IS TIME-CONSUMING BUT HE WOULD ANSWER IN AS DIPLOMATIC FASHION AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE HE HAD DIPLOMATIC MISSION.

4. GENERAL STATED THAT GREECE ALSO BELIEVED IN NON-INTERFERENCE AND IN A FREE, INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE OF CYPRUS; GREECE WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, MOST OF WHOM WERE NATIONALISTS, AND THESE NATIONALISTS WERE THE ONES WHO HAD MOVED AGAINST MAKARIOS. IT WAS IMMATERIAL WHETHER THESE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONALISTS MOVED WITH OR WITHOUT THE PRIOR BLESSING OF GREECE OR WHETHER GREEK OFFICERS SUBSEQUENTLY ASSISTED THEM. AT THIS POINT HE WENT OFF ON A TANGENT STATING THAT NEITHER GREECE NOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD ASKED FOR ENOSIS, THAT GOT [government of Turkey] HAD OBVIOUSLY ACCEPTED THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS, THAT TURKS UNDER STOOD THAT THE MATTER WAS AN INTERNAL GREEK CYPRIOT AFFAIR.

5. ACCORDING TO IOANNIDES ONLY REAL RESISTANCE LEFT ON CYPRUS WERE COMMUNIST SUPPORTS OF MAKARIOS IN PAPHOS;THESE SUPPORTERS WERE EVEN SINGING EAM/ELAS SONGS. MOST OF THE REST OF ISLAND WAS IN NATIONALIST HANDS. GENERAL IOANNIDES STATED THAT EVERYONE SHOULD FORGET THAT MAKARIOS WAS AN INTERNATIONAL FIGURE, THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL HERO, THAT HE HAD SERVED SEVERAL USEFUL FUNCTIONS AND THAT HE WAS A MAN OF THE CLOTH; MAKARIOS HAD BECOME A ROTTEN PRIEST HOMOSEXUAL; HE WAS PERVERTED, A TORTURER, A SEXUAL DEVIATE AND THE OWNER OF HALF THE HOTELS ON THE ISLAND. TO PRESERVE HIS POSITION AND TO CONTINUE HIS ACTIVITIES, MAKARIOS WAS WILLING TO SACRIFICE SEVENTY PER CENT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT POPULATION (ONLY THIRTY PER CENT WERE AKEL) AND ENTIRE ANTI-COMMUNIST TURKISH CYPRIOT POPULATION. IOANNIDES ASSERTED GREEK CYPRIOTS IN NATIONAL GUARD REALIZED THESE FACTS AND HAD BEGGED MOTHERLAND FOR CHANCE TO ACT AGAINST MAKARIOS; GENERAL CLAIMED THAT HE ONLY ASSISTED AFTER BEING PRESENTED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI.

6. AT THIS POINT EMISSARY INTERJECTED AND TOLD IOANNIDES POINT-BLANK THAT, WITH COUP ONLY TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER HIS REPORTING TO US REGARDING A POSSIBLE OVERTHROW OF MAKARIOS THIS WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO BELIEVE. AT THIS POINT THE GENERAL AGAIN BLEW UP WITH ARMS WAVING, KNOCKED OVER SAME TABLE, BROKE A SECOND GLASS AND, BETWEEN OBSCENITIES, STATED THAT HE DID NOT PLOT AND ARRANGE THE COUP; INITIAL PLAN AND APPROACH WAS FROM GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONALISTS ON 13 JULY, AFTER LATTER LEARNED THAT GOG [government of Greece] INTENDED TO ACCEDE TO MAKARIOS' DEMANDS TO REDUCE NUMBER OF GREEK OFFICERS IN NATIONAL GUARD.GENERAL STATED HE COULD NOT ACCEPT AT LEAST 85,000 GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES  FROM MAKARIOS' TYRANNY. THIS COUPLED WITH MAKARIOS' ANTI-REGIME EFFORTS, MADE HIM DECIDE TO ASSIST GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONALISTS. THE GENERAL STATED THAT IF MAKARIOS SUCCEEDED IN KICKING  GREEKS OUT OF CYPRUS WHAT COULD KEEP HIM FROM THINKING HE COULD NOT KICK JUNTA OUT OF GREECE. AFTER DECIDING TO ASSIST GREEK CYPRIOTS, THE GENERAL CLAIMED THAT HE DID NOT TELL THE ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP NOR ANY GREEK OFFICIAL. HE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF HIS INTENTIONS TO FEW SELECT OFFICERS ON 13/14 JULY; NO ONE ELSE KNEW AND EVEN AFTER EVENTS UNFOLDED ON 15 JULY ONLY A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF HIS ROLE. IOANNIDES JUSTIFIED THIS ACTION BY ASSERTING THAT IF HE HAD BRIEFED NUMEROUS PEOPLE THEY WOULD HAVE RAISED SUGGESTIONS, ADVICE, ALTERNATIVES, AND POSSIBLE PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT HE ACTED ON SPUR OF THE MOMENT.

7. IOANNIDES DECLARED THAT GAME WAS NOW OVER FOR MAKARIOS, THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BOOTED HIM OUT, THAT NATIONAL GUARD AND GREEK OFFICERS HAD ASSISTED NATIONALIST GREEK CYPRIOT BROTHERS, AND THAT ONLY RESISTANCE NOW WAS IN PAPHOS. IN REPLY TO EMISSARY'S DIRECT QUESTION IOANNIDES STATED THAT MAKARIOS WAS STILL ALIVE  "BUT WHO CARES; HE NOW HAS NO POWER AND NO ONE, IF HE BELIEVES IN PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN NATION WILL ASSIST HIM- NOT EVEN THE RUSSIANS UNLESS TURKS ASK THEM TO DO SO AND THE TURKS JUST DON'T CARE."

8. IN REPLY TO QUESTION WHETHER GREEKS WERE IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH TURKS, GENERAL STATED WE HAVE NOT BOTHERED THE TURKS; WE HAVE NOT DECLARED ENOSIS. TURKS AGREE THAT "THE PRINCIPAL THORN" (I.E., MAKARIOS) IS GONE AND, "I AM NOT IN TOUCH WITH THE TURKS." HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT GREECE AND TURKEY COULD NOW PROCEED AT SOME FUTURE TIME TO SIT DOWN, TALK AND SOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES. INDEED, ACCORDING TO IOANNIDES GREEKS MIGHT EVEN BE WILLING TO SHARE PROFITS OF PETROLEUM FINDS IN A JOINT EXPLORATION COMPANY; HOWEVER, GREECE WOULD NEVER SURRENDER AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF BECAUSE THIS WOULD MEAN TURKISH CONTROL OF GREEK ISLANDS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD PROBABLY SOLVE THEIR DIFFICULTIES PEACEFULLY, QUIETLY AND AMICABLY. HE EVEN JOKED THAT IN A YEAR OR PERHAPS MORE REALISTICALLY TEN, THE TURKS MIGHT WANT TO SELL THEIR SHARE OF CYPRUS FOR INCREASED PERCENTAGE OF PETROLEUM RIGHTS. AGAIN IN REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION, GENERAL IOANNIDES STATED THAT HE WAS NOT IN CONTACT WITH ANY TURKISH OFICIAL; HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT TURKS WERE "OFFICIALLY AWARE" THAT ENOSIS WAS NOT THE OBJECTIVE AT THIS POINT AND THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT INTEND ANY BLOODY ACTION AGAINST TURK CYPRIOTS.

9. WHEN ASKED FOR SPECIFICS ON MAKARIOS, IOANNIDES STATED THAT ACCORDING TO GREEK INFORMATION, MAKARIOS WAS ALIVE AND IN HANDS OF BRITISH AT EPISKOPI BASE, HE HAD GONE THERE WITH ASSISTANCE OF CANADIANS AND BRITISH ON ISLAND.

10. AT THIS POINT IOANNIDES SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:
A) HE STRESSED THAT HE TOO HAD A GOD; HE WAS DEFINITELY NOT ANTI-AMERICAN; "EVEN A JACKASS NEEDED A POST TO BE TIED TO" AND IN HIS CASE IT WAS THE U.S.

B) HIS HASTY DECISION ON 13 JULY MIGHT HAVE BEEN STUPID. INSTEAD OF ABANDONING CYPRUS AND LETTING U.S. WORRY ABOUT ITS FATE AND POUR MONEY DOWN ANOTHER RATHOLE, HE HAD ALLOWED LOVE OF COUNTRY, A MORAL OBLIGATION TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONALISTS AND HIS "PHILOTIMO" TO OVERRULE LOGIC AND TO ASSIST GREEK CYPRIOTS.

C) GREECE WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO STAY ANTI-COMMUNIST. IF THIS MEANT KEEPING YIAROS OPEN IT WOULD STAY OPEN AS LONG AS IT WAS NECESSARY AND HE WOULD ACCEPT NO STATIC FROM ANYONE ON THIS SCORE. INDEED,HE HAD INSTRUCTED A GREEK OFFICIAL TO TELL BRITISH OFFICIALLY THAT WHENEVER THE BRITISH LET IRISH POLITICAL PRISONERS OUT OF BRITISH JAILS, HE WOULD FREE THE FORTY-TWO GREEK POLITICAL PRISONERS ON YIAROS.

D) HE PERSONALLY DIDN'T LIKE NIKOS SAMPSON, BUT THAT WAS GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONALIST DECISION. HE KNEW SAMPSON PERSONALLY AND IN HIS OPINION SAMPSON WAS "CRAZY." HE JOKINGLY REMARKED THAT NEW CYPRIOT MINISTER OF DEFENSE DIMITRIOU WAS VERY PRO-AMERICAN AND THAT OUR EMBASSY THERE WOULD SOON REALIZE THIS. HE ALSO KNEW DIMITRIOU PERSONALLY.

E) WHILE SHAKING HANDS AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION IOANNIDES STATED "REMEMBER WE TOO BELIEVE IN A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN CYPRUS, WE TOO BELIEVE IN NON INTERFERENCE, ALONG WITH TURKS AND ESPECIALLY WITH KISSINGER. WE TOO BELIEVE THAT THE CYPRIOTS SHOULD BE FREE TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, BE THEY GREEK CYPRIOTS, TURK CYPRIOTS OR BOTH."

Kissinger against the Greeks… except Karamanlis

Below is another excerpt from confidential conversations now available in the archives of President Gerald Ford. (See also my previous post). This time the conversation is from 20 February 1975 and involves Ford, his secretary of state Henry Kissinger and other members of Ford's national security team briefing Congressional leaders on, among other things, recent developments in the Middle East, relations with the Soviet Union, the state of Greece and the Cyprus issue following the Turkish invasion of the island. In relation to Greece and Cyprus, Kissinger is particularly anxious that: prime minister Konstantinos Karamanlis – who Kissinger describes as 'a great leader' who 'wants to put Cyprus behind him' – is supported as a bulwark against the left in Greece and Makarios in Cyprus – who Kissinger describes as an agent of 'chaos'; and that the arms embargo imposed by Congress on Turkey after the invasion of Cyprus is lifted, otherwise, according to Kissinger, Turkey will be driven into the arms of radical Middle Eastern states and Israel's security jeopardised, something he thinks should be stressed to the Jewish-American lobby, which could then be used to counter Greek arguments in Congress for cutting aid to Turkey. Read the whole document here.

Kissinger: Makarios is the only party who is interested in continued chaos. Cyprus is a millstone to the Greeks…

Scott: What will the Turks do?

Kissinger: They will sever, step-by-step, their contact with us, and get more active in Middle East affairs. They will soon be running out of spare parts.

McFall: Won't Karamanlis say something privately to the Greek leaders here?

Kissinger: He is a great leader. He is flanked by [Andreas] Papandreou and Makarios. He wants a settlement but has to watch his flanks…

Albert: Wouldn't Turkey handicap operations like in the last [Arab-Israeli] war?

Kissinger: Yes. We have installations there which are irreplaceable. And if there is another Israeli-Syrian war and the Soviet Union behaves more intransigently, a hostile Turkey would be very dangerous. The Clerides-Denktash talks are now suspended. Even if we reversed the situation today, it would take time. The chief loser is Karamanlis, who wants to put it behind him, to build Greek democracy. He doesn't want Cyprus to be an issue in Greek domestic politics.

McFall: Can't Karamanlis say that?

Kissinger: No…

Rhodes: What is [Archbishop of North America] Iakovos' role? He just gave an anti-American speech. I think they are under Makarios.

Scott: It looks to me like the Jewish interests are being imperiled by Greek interests.

Kissinger: No question about it.

Cederberg: Papandreou is the problem. He is not for Karamanlis. He wants to get back in Greece.

Kissinger: You are absolutely right. Papandreou and Makarios profit by chaos. There is now coup talk in Greece.

Byrd: Can the Jewish community help?

Kissinger: My impression is that [Congressman Ben] Rosenthal is trapped. He recognizes his problem but he doesn't know how to get off it.

Burton: Ben just has to be convinced on the merits…

Byrd: I think it is time that the Jewish community became visible in this.

How Karamanlis' 'moderation' did for Cyprus

I was reading on the Ινφογνώμων Πολιτικά website, this confidential conversation that took place on 29 May 1975 between Greece's then prime minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and US president Gerald Ford and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger. The conversation took place at the US embassy in Brussels and was dug up by the Washington-based Cypriot journalist Michalis Ignatiou. Among other things, the conversation deals with the restoration of democracy in Greece and Greek-Turkish relations in the light of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and Turkish aggression in the Aegean. It is deeply embarrassing to read the egomaniacal Karamanlis praise himself for his role in establishing democracy in Greece after the fall of the junta, explain away his surrender of Cyprus and then plead – like the flunky he was – with the Americans to restrain the Turks, jubilant with their victory in Cyprus and now threatening Greece on all fronts. You can almost hear Ford and Kissinger laughing inside at Karamanlis' bizarre display of vainglory and sycophancy.

Anyway, below is an excerpt of the conversation that I've translated from Ignatiou's Greek translation back into English. The original English transcript of the conversation was available in the Ford archives, but for 'national security' reasons was withdrawn in 2004. In the extract, Karamanlis describes the events, as he experienced them, as they unfolded in Cyprus the previous year. It is a staggering statement of narcissism, cowardice and misjudgement dressed up as 'moderation'. As well as Karamanlis' statement being interesting from a historical point of view, it's also noteworthy because it reeks of the impotence and fear that continues to inform contemporary Greek responses to Turkish aggression. Karamanlis is, of course, bewilderingly and tellingly, something of a revered figure among conservatives in Greece.

Karamanlis [addressing Ford and Kissinger]: Permit me to begin by speaking about recent history. Before I returned to power, there was the junta's coup in Cyprus. Makarios was overthrown. The Turks argued that they acted [in Cyprus] as a guarantor power, something that granted them, they said, the right to restore the legitimate government and protect the Turkish Cypriot population. Their guarantor status explicitly refers to any action being aimed at the restoration of legitimacy in Cyprus and the upholding of the island's territorial integrity. Legality was restored three days after the invasion [23 July]. I returned [from exile in Paris] and took over the government of Greece and Clerides did the same in Cyprus. Turkey had fulfilled its aims as a guarantor. But they are still there. A few weeks after [legality in Greece and Cyprus were restored], Turkey seized 40% of the island.

I remember those days very well, because your secretary of state [i.e. Kissinger] woke me at four in the morning. There was no justification for the second Turkish invasion. No one comes up with strategic plans overnight. Turkey's military operation must have been in the planning for a long time. The occupation of 40% of the island occurred on the basis of a military plan with the codename ATTILA. This indicates premeditation. This move [the second phase of the invasion] created 250,000 refugees. You might say that this is not a large amount; but the population of the island is only half a million. Also, the 40% they seized is the most prosperous and productive part of the island.

On 14 August [the start of the second phase of the invasion], I encountered uproar in the army and among the Greek people. I went to the headquarters of the armed forces and they demanded action. There was pressure for a declaration of war. It was natural that everyone should feel they'd been made fools of. But I decided to choose the path of unpopularity, to tell the people to stay calm and to trust me. I told them we would receive help from our friends to find a solution.

In that dramatic moment, I had three choices. First, to go to war. Second, to resign and again withdraw from political life; and, third, to withdraw [Greece] from the military wing of NATO. I went for the third choice, which I considered to be the least painful and damaging. That is the history of Cyprus. It is difficult to prove something that is self-evident, but the Turks made a mistake. The Greeks showed moderation, despite all that happened to them. They are still showing moderation.

Cyprus crisis: conspiracies, cock-ups and political agendas

Manthos pointed me in the direction of the talk above by Andreas Constandinos on the junta’s coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The talk emerges from Constandinos’ PhD thesis, published in book form as America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure? which seeks to disprove the so-called conspiracy theories that predominate in the discourse on the events of 1974 – i.e. that America and the UK conspired with Turkey and Greece to bring about the downfall of the Republic of Cyprus as a prelude to partition of the island; and instead assert the cock-up theory – i.e. that the US and UK were largely caught unaware by the coup and the invasion and responded as they did not out of malice or careful calculation but because they failed to read Greek and Turkish intentions correctly. All in all, Constandinos says that, as far as the US and UK were concerned, the coup and invasion were far from a conspiracy to destroy the Republic of Cyprus but rather a foreign policy failure.

Constandinos’ thesis is flawed and implausible. In fact, it’s so flawed and implausible that it’s reasonable to conclude that he’s pushing a dubious political agenda. I’ll just make a few points, mostly about his attempts to exonerate the US from blame in the coup and invasion. I won’t go into his equally dubious effort to whitewash the UK’s role in the partition of Cyprus.

1. There is no Cyprus conspiracy theory in the way Constandinos thinks there is. Christopher Hitchens, who Constandinos accuses of being one of the main exponents of the conspiracy theory, prefers in his book Cyprus: Hostage to History to use the word  ‘collusion’ and not ‘conspiracy’. At no point does Hitchens argue that Kissinger or the British gave explicit instructions to the Greeks to overthrow Makarios or to the Turks to invade the island. Rather, Hitchens, as well as insisting on ‘collusion’, characterises US and UK policy as ‘careless’, ‘arrogant’, ‘cynical’ and infused with ‘imperial caprice’.

2. Asserting as Constandinos does that Kissinger was unaware of Greece’s coup plot and Turkey’s determination to invade is naively generous to the US secretary of state. The fact is that it was an open secret that Greece, for years, going back to 1964, had been considering a coup against Makarios and that Ioannides was more committed than his predecessors to bringing this plan to fruition. It was just as much an open secret that Turkey was itching to invade Cyprus and had nearly done so in 1964 and 1967, only stopping, not as Constandinos says – in another attempt to exonerate the US in Cyprus – because of pressure from Washington, but because the Turkish armed forces were not ready to launch such a major operation. It’s worth pointing out that in 1964, some American officials were actually urging the Turks to invade and assuring them that they would not face US censure. (See here for discussion of the Acheson plans and the US encouraging Turkey to invade Cyprus).

3. Despite the well-known role of the US and UK in the 1960s in destabilising the Republic of Cyprus in an effort to bring closer the implementation of the Acheson Plan, i.e. the partition of Cyprus, giving one part of the island to Greece and the other to Turkey, thus securing the whole for Nato and reconciling Greece and Turkey, Constandinos insists that with the Nixon administration this paranoid cold war mentality dissipated and that America and Cyprus had developed a modus vivendi – as exemplified by Makarios acquiescing in America’s use of the UK bases on the island for its U-2 missions in the Middle East. The earlier plans for a coup, invasion and partition had, according to Constandinos, apparently been forgotten by the Americans, by Kissinger et al.

This is not credible. There is no evidence that from 1968 the Americans were now favourably disposed to Makarios or that they had ceased to regard an independent and essentially non-aligned Cyprus, with its large and slavishly pro-Moscow communist party, which routinely opposed the presence of British and US military bases and listening posts on Cyprus, as a continuing threat to Western security interests. Nor would any supposed US rapprochement with Makarios have deflected the Americans from their more substantial interest of mollifying Turkey and Greece. In the case of Greece, this mollification involved  preserving the Greek junta in power and to this end, since Makarios was an affront to the junta, the Americans were more than happy to go along with Athens’ plans to do away with the ‘red priest’. It’s also worth stressing that EOKA B, the paramilitary group established on Cyprus in 1971 to further the junta’s goals on the island, was supported not just by Athens, as Constandinos says, but by the CIA.

4. We also know that the Americans viewed the coup against Makarios with sympathy not only because they did not see fit to condemn it but, in fact, the US began the process of recognising the new government and state of affairs created in Cyprus by Ioannides. It matters little whether Kissinger gave direct orders for the removal of Makarios – Constandinos’ anti-conspiracy theory heavily relies on his failure to find documents in the US archives that show Kissinger giving such orders; because we prefer to judge Kissinger and America’s role in the 1974 events not by what was said but by what was done – and whether what was done was in line with long-standing and known US policy, which it was, i.e. all American efforts in 1974 paved the way for the coup, the invasion and partition – and as such were the culmination of a policy initiated by the US State Department (with the support of the British) in 1964. Thus, we can say with certainty that despite knowing that the junta was in the final stages of plotting to oust Makarios, the US did not urge them to abandon their plans – which they would have done if, as Constandinos says, the Nixon administration was well disposed to Makarios. We also know that the coup having failed, with Makarios alive and able to claim to be the legitimate Cypriot head of state, the Americans, still determined to see through the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, decided to back Turkey, implicitly and explicitly, in its ambition to partition the island. So even though Constandinos wants us to believe that the Americans were caught unaware by the Turkish invasion, thought the threat of invasion was only a bluff, we know not only that US efforts to dissuade the Turks from invading were, at best, half-hearted, but that at the Geneva talks that followed the first invasion on 20 July, Kissinger spoke openly about Turkey’s legitimate interest in ‘protecting’ the Turkish Cypriots who, Kissinger helpfully added, deserved more ‘autonomy’. As such, the US did not condemn the second Turkish invasion on 14 August and, in fact, expended most of its diplomatic energy during this period urging Greece not to respond to Turkey’s advances on the island.

What then are we to make of an analysis like Constandinos’ that seeks to exonerate the US and UK from the events of 1974 and his efforts to heap all the responsibility for the tragedy onto the Greek junta – which he portrays as acting on its own or, Constandinos does concede (without, for some reason, it affecting for him his overall thesis), in collaboration with trusted Greek-American CIA agents? What we make of such an analysis is that it is part of a trend in certain British academic circles that busy themselves with Cyprus to portray Britain, in particular, as having a benign or neutral role in Cyprus, show America as a blundering imperial power manqué and trace all Cyprus’ woes to Greece, Greeks and Greek nationalism.

Karamanlis’ betrayal of Cyprus: ‘Greece cannot help you. You’re on your own.’

Above is an interesting item from RIK news broadcast this week in the aftermath of the death of former president of Cyprus Glafkos Clerides in which the prominent jurist Polys Polyviou talks about the period between the first (20 July) and second (14 August) phases of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

The three-week ‘ceasefire’ was supposed to allow peace talks to proceed in Geneva between Britain, Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriot sides, while in fact Turkey used the hiatus to build up its forces on the island in preparation for a more decisive military operation, the first operation having failed to achieve its objectives. It was during the Geneva talks period that the Americans – even if we accept their claim that they were ignorant of the Greek junta’s coup against President Makarios and impotent to prevent the first Turkish invasion – provided encouragement and diplomatic cover to Ankara to complete the forcible partition of Cyprus.

At the Geneva talks, Glafkos Clerides was chief negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side and it’s worth drawing attention to Polyviou’s recollection of the interaction between Clerides and Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had assumed power in Greece following the fall of the junta.

Prior to going to Geneva, Clerides visited Athens for consultations with the Greek government.

Polyviou – who was part of the Cypriot team – says that in Athens, Clerides met with Karamanlis and minister of defence, Evangelos Averoff.

Karamanlis said to Clerides: ‘The situation is exceptionally difficult. Our armed forces are in a chaotic and deficient state. I can’t predict what will happen, but I’m 70-80 percent certain Greece cannot help Cyprus.’

Karamanlis’ advice to Clerides was to prolong the negotiations in Geneva in order to give Greece time to influence the positions of the major powers, which were favouring Turkey. Clerides responded to Karamanlis that, in his view, in Geneva the Turks were going to demand partition and that, in the event of the Greek Cypriots not agreeing to this, would resume hostilities to bring about their aim. Clerides asked Karamanlis what Greece proposed to do should Turkey resume military operations against Cyprus.

Karamanlis’ reply was: ‘Glafkos, I can’t tell you anymore than I’ve already told you.’

With the Greek Cypriots unwilling to accept the Turkish demands for partition and the Turks not prepared to further delay their military plans, Turkey broke off the Geneva talks. On 14 August, the Greek Cypriot delegation flew to Athens to seek the support of Karamanlis and the Greek government against what seemed imminent Turkish attack.

In a dramatic meeting, Polyviou recalls Karamanlis telling Clerides: ‘Greece cannot help you. You’re on your own.’

To which Clerides replied: ‘Mr President, in the name of God, can’t you offer us anything at all? I appreciate you cannot send land forces; but can’t you at least send a ship, something, anything, to divert the Turks?’

Karamanlis: ‘Glafkos, we cannot do anything.’

Clerides: ‘So what did [Greek foreign minister, Georgios] Mavros mean when he told us in Geneva, “in a choice between dishonour and war, we prefer war”? Why did he tell us this?’

Karamanlis: ‘I don’t know. I’m not Mavros.’

Tough Cypriots and incompetent Turks: or pinpointing the roles of the UK and USA in the downfall of Cyprus

The dynamic duo: Kissinger and Callaghan

Thanks to the Hellenic Antidote reader for referring me to this paper by George Kazamias that uses official government documents to reveal UK and US policy towards Cyprus as the crisis of 1974 unfolded, first with the Athens junta’s coup against Makarios and then Turkey’s two-phased invasion of the island, with the first landing taking place on 20 July 1974 and the second assault on 14 August.

I’ll refer only briefly to Kazamias’ argument – which is that the evidence as to who brought about the downfall of the Republic of Cyprus does not point to a ‘conspiracy’, involving the UK, USA, Greece and Turkey, as described, most notably, by Christopher Hitchens in his Cyprus: Hostage to History. I’ve written before (here and here) about these efforts to disprove so-called Cyprus conspiracy theories, insisting they are not credible. For a start, no one suggests secret pre-invasion deals were done between Greece, Turkey, the USA and UK to partition Cyprus. Hitchens talks of ‘collusion’ not conspiracy and he characterises US and UK policy on the island as resulting not from meticulous and consistent plotting but carelessness, cynicism, arrogance and imperial caprice.

And, secondly, any attempt to diminish the role of the UK and USA or lessen the guilt of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the CIA in bringing about the partition of Cyprus demands an incredulously benign interpretation of American and British motives and machinations on the island and, as such, offers a wholly inaccurate portrayal of which actors and factors brought about partition and why.

In fact, if anything, the documentary evidence Kazamias presents corroborates Hitchens’ collusion, cynicism and caprice theory, which is that the UK and, particularly, the USA, knew about an impending coup against Makarios, knew that this would likely be followed by a Turkish invasion, knew that the Turkish invasion would take the form of a land grab; and that nothing was done to preserve legitimacy in Cyprus – and that this inaction cannot be taken to reflect indifference, incompetence or neutrality but amounted to approval, both explicit and tacit, and this was because, ultimately, the outcome – the removal of Makarios and the partition of Cyprus – suited both the Americans and the British and, in fact, were options for Cyprus they had been harbouring and promoting, in various ways and to varying degrees, in the decade (and more, in the British case) leading up to 1974.

So, putting aside Kazamias’ misinterpretation of the evidence and the interest he has in wanting to disprove a theory or version of events that does not exist, let’s look at some of the documents he presents us with in his paper:

To start with, Kazamias reveals a number of reports compiled by the British intelligence services and presented to the UK government on the eve of Turkey’s first invasion (20 July 1974) which discuss the preparedness and objectives of a Turkish military assault on Cyprus. Thus, on 19 July, the Joint Intelligence Committee is confident that given the imbalance in effectiveness and numbers between the Greek armed forces, the Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish military, any Turkish invasion of Cyprus would very quickly obtain its goals, which the British believed to be the seizure of the northern third of the island:

‘We cannot make any firm prediction as to how long it would take the Turks to achieve their military objectives, but we think that most would have been achieved within 24-48 hours of landing.’

Kazamias then presents a document sent by Australian diplomats in London to Canberra on 21 July, i.e. a day after the first Turkish landings on Cyprus, reporting a meeting the Australians had had at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to gauge British reaction to the events unfolding on the island. The Australians say:

‘Commenting privately to us on the situation on 20 July a senior FCO official said that Britain secretly would not object if Turkish military forces occupied about 1/3 of the island before agreeing to a ceasefire. (Please protect). Such a position would need to be reached by 21 July if peace prospects were not to be endangered further. In the meantime, Britain continued to support publicly appeals for an immediate ceasefire.’

Kazamias rightly draws attention to the three most important elements in the British statement:

1. Britain’s willingness to accept a Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus.
2. Britain’s concern that Turkey should complete its seizure within 48 hours of the invasion.
3. That Britain had no doubts as to precisely what Turkey’s intentions were and is certain of how much of Cyprus – one-third – Turkey wanted to take.

Kazamias then asserts that the Americans are equally sanguine about the Turkish invasion. The USA is aware and understanding of Turkey’s aim to dismember the island and, like Britain, is mainly concerned, once the Turks have landed, that they seize the third of Cyprus they want as quickly as possible and that Greece should be persuaded not to respond to Turkey’s assault with any escalation of the conflict. This is the exchange between Kissinger and CIA Director William Colby on 19 July – or 20 July in Cyprus – as news of the Turkish invasion broke:

K[issinger]: But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole island are they?
C[olby]: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.
K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.
C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka [sic] on up and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.
[…]
K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?
C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let’s negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.
K: OK.

What complicated matters for the UK and the USA, however, is the fact that Turkey’s 20 July invasion did not go to plan, with the Cypriot National Guard and the small contingent from Greece on the island resisting more successfully than anticipated while the Turkish armed forces performed much worse than the British and Americans expected.

Thus, by the time a US-brokered ceasefire came into force on 22 July, i.e. following the 48 hours the British seemed content to allow Turkey to complete its aim of conquering a third of Cyprus, the Turks had only managed to take control of the corridor linking Kyrenia to Nicosia, i.e. four percent of the island.

According to a report presented to the British Cabinet meeting on 22 July, ‘the Turks […] badly misjudged the potential extent of National Guard resistance… must be disappointed at the meagre success of their armed intervention… [and] there is no question now of a quick victory’.

Kazamias says that the Americans were even more unimpressed by Turkey’s military prowess. At a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) on 22 July, the following exchange is recorded, with Kissinger appearing to doubt whether Turkey would be ultimately victorious on the island:

Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?
Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They [the Turks] couldn’t even take Nicosia airport.
Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. Their air support was ineffective.
Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they [the Turks] really that strong on the island then?
Gen. Walters: Well, I don’t know.

It was at this stage, Kazamias suggests – correctly, in my opinion – with Turkey’s initial failure evident, with the ceasefire in place and, also, with the fall of both the junta in Athens and its puppet regime in Nicosia, that British and US policies towards the Cyprus crisis diverged. Britain, according to Kazamias, believed that Turkey had blown its chance to take a third of Cyprus and that now was the time for diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. In this context, Britain was even prepared to contemplate the use of its own forces on the island to prevent any further Turkish advance.

The Americans, on the other hand, did not regard the Turks’ failure as the end of the military option to bring about their optimal Cyprus policy aim [i.e. partition] and provided only nominal support to British endeavours in the Geneva talks between the UK, Greece, Turkey and the two communities in Cyprus, which had been in process since 25 July. Indeed, it is clear that the Americans shared the Turks’ view of the negotiations, which was that they were a useful cover that allowed the Turks to reinforce their Kyrenia bridgehead from which they would soon be able to launch another attack to achieve what they had failed to achieve on 20 July.

Thus, the Americans, by encouraging the Turks to reinforce their presence on Cyprus and begin a second assault to fulfill their territorial objectives, were not only making a mockery of Britain’s efforts to arrive at a diplomatic solution to the crisis: but they were also making it clear to the British that the USA would not favour any attempt by the British to deploy their military on Cyprus to warn off or thwart a Turkish advance – disapproval which the British meekly deferred to.

At the same time as playing the British for ‘dummies’ (as the UK foreign secretary, James Callaghan, was later to admit); the Americans also sought to convince the new civilian Greek government, headed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, despite the evidence on the ground, that Turkey was not planning further military action in Cyprus and that Greece should not escalate matters by responding to Turkey’s build-up on the island by sending reinforcements or with a build-up of its own. Again, these reassurances were enough for the credulous and pusillanimous Karamanlis.

The American plan of using the ceasefire it had brokered on 22 July to allow Turkey to strengthen its position on the island and mislead Greece into staying its hand is revealed in this exchange at the WSAG meeting on 21 July:

Secretary Kissinger: […] Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold – what is the state of play on the island now?
Mr. Colby: Well, it’s unclear, but they do have a foothold.
Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven’t done as well militarily as they have politically.
Mr. Colby: You’re right, they haven’t done very well militarily.
[…]
Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they would.
[…]
Secretary Kissinger: I’m trying to understand what the balance of forces would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a course.
Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area – more than they have now – and they have failed.

The discussion goes on:

Secretary Kissinger: […] Seems to me that [Turkish PM] Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are doing lousy militarily. […] What is going to be the balance of forces if we get a ceasefire?
Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some 40,000 troops.
Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would change the whole picture.
Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, anyway?
Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough.