Karamanlis’ betrayal of Cyprus: ‘Greece cannot help you. You’re on your own.’
Above is an interesting item from RIK news broadcast this week in the aftermath of the death of former president of Cyprus Glafkos Clerides in which the prominent jurist Polys Polyviou talks about the period between the first (20 July) and second (14 August) phases of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
The three-week ‘ceasefire’ was supposed to allow peace talks to proceed in Geneva between Britain, Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriot sides, while in fact Turkey used the hiatus to build up its forces on the island in preparation for a more decisive military operation, the first operation having failed to achieve its objectives. It was during the Geneva talks period that the Americans – even if we accept their claim that they were ignorant of the Greek junta’s coup against President Makarios and impotent to prevent the first Turkish invasion – provided encouragement and diplomatic cover to Ankara to complete the forcible partition of Cyprus.
At the Geneva talks, Glafkos Clerides was chief negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side and it’s worth drawing attention to Polyviou’s recollection of the interaction between Clerides and Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had assumed power in Greece following the fall of the junta.
Prior to going to Geneva, Clerides visited Athens for consultations with the Greek government.
Polyviou – who was part of the Cypriot team – says that in Athens, Clerides met with Karamanlis and minister of defence, Evangelos Averoff.
Karamanlis said to Clerides: ‘The situation is exceptionally difficult. Our armed forces are in a chaotic and deficient state. I can’t predict what will happen, but I’m 70-80 percent certain Greece cannot help Cyprus.’
Karamanlis’ advice to Clerides was to prolong the negotiations in Geneva in order to give Greece time to influence the positions of the major powers, which were favouring Turkey. Clerides responded to Karamanlis that, in his view, in Geneva the Turks were going to demand partition and that, in the event of the Greek Cypriots not agreeing to this, would resume hostilities to bring about their aim. Clerides asked Karamanlis what Greece proposed to do should Turkey resume military operations against Cyprus.
Karamanlis’ reply was: ‘Glafkos, I can’t tell you anymore than I’ve already told you.’
With the Greek Cypriots unwilling to accept the Turkish demands for partition and the Turks not prepared to further delay their military plans, Turkey broke off the Geneva talks. On 14 August, the Greek Cypriot delegation flew to Athens to seek the support of Karamanlis and the Greek government against what seemed imminent Turkish attack.
In a dramatic meeting, Polyviou recalls Karamanlis telling Clerides: ‘Greece cannot help you. You’re on your own.’
To which Clerides replied: ‘Mr President, in the name of God, can’t you offer us anything at all? I appreciate you cannot send land forces; but can’t you at least send a ship, something, anything, to divert the Turks?’
Karamanlis: ‘Glafkos, we cannot do anything.’
Clerides: ‘So what did [Greek foreign minister, Georgios] Mavros mean when he told us in Geneva, “in a choice between dishonour and war, we prefer war”? Why did he tell us this?’
Karamanlis: ‘I don’t know. I’m not Mavros.’
Attila 74: the evil fate of Sysklipos village
Invasion and occupation
Despite the ceasefire agreed on 22 July – two days after Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus – attacks continued on Greek villages just outside the Kyrenia-Nicosia bridgehead the Turks had established, and on the morning of 26 July, Sysklipos was shelled and raided by Turkish forces. Trying to avoid the Turkish assault, a chaotic evacuation ensued in which most of the villagers fled in cars, by bus or on foot. Some 35 villagers, however, mostly elderly and/or infirm, were unable or unwilling to abandon their homes.
Later in the day, a group of four Greek Cypriot commandos, led by second lieutenant Savvas Pavlides, was ordered to go to Sysklipos and raise a Greek flag over the village school. This was supposed to be in preparation for acting president of Cyprus Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash passing through Sysklipos to establish Greek and Turkish positions as part of the ceasefire agreement.
Pavlides recalls that on entering Sysklipos, he encountered a frightened old man desperate to escape the village but not knowing which route to take to avoid the Turks. Pavlides directed him to safety and then went further into Sysklipos, where he completed his mission with the Greek flag and observed that homes throughout the village had been broken into and looted. Pavlides then proceeded to the village spring where he came across another villager, whom he later identified as 78-year-old Christodoulos Kamenos, carrying two pales of water. The two men had the following conversation:
Pavlides: What are you doing here? What are you doing with those?
Kamenos: We have some animals in the yard and I need to give them water.
Pavlides: But haven’t you realised what’s happening all around you?
Kamenos: What can I do, my son? My wife is blind. We’re at home. All the old people in the village are still here.
Pavlides: Why don’t you leave?
Kamenos: We can’t walk. There are no cars. The Turks came through the village and looted the houses, and we don’t know what to do.
Turkish shelling resumed the same day and Pavlides and his men were forced to leave Sysklipos and return to their unit in the hills on the western outskirts of the village. The Turks re-entered Sysklipos and rounded up the 35 residents who had stayed behind, initially detaining them in a camp outside the village, before allowing them to return to the village, where the 35 decided, for their own security, to stay in groups of five and six in each other’s homes.
First wave of killings
Between 26 July and 3 August, Turkish forces occupying Sysklipos subjected the 35 trapped villagers to a campaign of mistreatment and murder. During this period, fearing the worst, up to 10 villagers escaped, hiding in fields during the day and travelling at night, to get to the government-controlled areas of the island.
One of those murdered in the first wave of killings was 52-year-old Maria Christodoulou. Three of her four children had left Sysklipos with relatives following the initial Turkish shelling and foray into the village, while her husband, Andreas, and one of her daughters remained with her. On resumption of the Turkish shelling and increasingly concerned about their daughter, Andreas and Maria decided that the girl had to be taken to safety, and since this could only be done on foot, it was agreed that she should be escorted by her father, while Maria, who was blind and couldn’t follow, would be left behind. Maria Christodoulou was murdered by the Turks on or around 2 August 1974 and her remains were exhumed in Sysklipos in 2011. She is the only missing person from Sysklipos whose remains have been recovered.
The massacre of the 14
The climax of the killing in Sysklipos seems to have occurred on 3 August at the home of Evgenios Sofokleous and his wife Elli. Sheltering with the couple were two of Evgenios Sofokleous’ children from his first marriage – 20-year-old Andreas Evgeniou and his 11-year-old sister – along with 11 other villagers, four of whom have been identified as 82-year-old Iraklis Hadjinikolaou; 60-year-old Charita Kanarini; 72-year-old Anastasia Kamenou; and her husband Christodoulos Kamenos – the 78-year-old man Savvas Pavlides had encountered at the village spring on 26 July.
This group of 15 had been at the Sofokleous’ house from 30 July, where they were regularly visited by two Turkish soldiers and a Turkish Cypriot mujahid. Each day, hoping to placate the Turks, Evgenios Sofokleous would offer them coffee and fruit. On 3 August, the Turkish Cypriot mujahid made a final visit to the 15. In the evening, another group of Turkish soldiers came to the house. They separated the men and the women into two rooms, and raped the women.
What happened next to the 15 is described in Erol Mütercimler’s book Cyprus, Island for Sale: Unknown Aspects of the Peace Operation, which was published in Turkey in 2009.
In it, Mütercimler quotes from the diary of Colonel Salih Güleryüz, commander of a special‐forces unit stationed near Sysklipos.
Güleryüz writes:
‘3 August 1974: we were informed that 14 Greek Cypriots residing at Sysklipos village were killed the previous night. This was done by an artillery junior officer, two commandos and two [Turkish Cypriot] fighters. Statements were taken from the soldiers late into the night. Early in the morning of the next day 4/8/1974, my schoolmate, the head of the ordnance corps, Corporal Mahmud Boyouslou, arrived. We went together to Sysklipos and found the house where the Greek Cypriot civilians had been killed. They were killed by fire from automatic weapons. Eight persons were on armchairs and chairs, covered in blood, with perforations in the chest and head. There were five other dead persons, men and women, on the ground. Near the entrance to the house, sitting on an armchair, there was another corpse, which had been beheaded.’The only survivor of the carnage, according to Güleryüz, was Evgenios Sofokleous’ 11-year old daughter. She was found dressed up in the coat of a Greek Cypriot soldier and was being forced to serve breakfast to Turkish soldiers occupying the village. Güleryüz says the girl had been raped.
Postscript
As already noted, of the 27 Greek Cypriots listed as missing from Sysklipos, only the remains of Maria Christodoulou have been recovered. Turkish Cypriot journalist Sevgul Uludag, who has investigated the fate of the missing from Sysklipos, says that a Turkish Cypriot informant has told her that there is a mass grave of Greek Cypriots in the neighbouring Turkish village of Krini, while other reports suggest a burial site in a field between Sysklipos and the occupied Greek village of Agios Ermolaos, but no excavation work has been done to ascertain the veracity of these claims.
Uludag also notes that the 11-year-old girl who was raped and witnessed the murders of her father, stepmother, brother and 11 others, was eventually handed over to UN peacekeepers and transferred to the free areas. She has never recovered from her ordeal and has spent a large part of her life in psychiatric hospitals. Meanwhile, Uludag says, one of the Turkish Cypriots involved in the Sysklipos killings, a certain K. from Kyrenia, is known to regularly recount his role in events, a role he is said to be very proud of.
Currently, Sysklipos is barely habitable. Greek refugees who’ve visited their village since restrictions on crossings were eased in 2003 report that most homes are in ruins, with only some 95 Turkish Cypriots (originally from Sarama and Meladeia in the Paphos district) living in Sysklipos, which they’ve renamed Akçiçek, meaning ‘white flower’. The village cemetery, which was intact until recently, has now been desecrated, presumably as a means to discourage refugees from visiting Sysklipos and dreaming of return.
* Thanks to Loukia Borrell (@LoukiaBorrell) for her help in the researching of this piece. Loukia Borrell’s family is from Sysklipos and her grandparents are missing persons Christodoulos Kamenos and Anastasia Kamenou, to whom her novel Raping Aphrodite is dedicated. Visit Raping Aphrodite’s Facebook page here.
Jack Straw: first-class passenger on the Turkey gravy train
In a post earlier this month, I further detailed how Jack Straw has appeared in a propaganda video put together by Turkey’s Ministry for EU affairs and Turkish state broadcaster TRT that seeks to attribute Turkey’s stalled EU accession to the obstructionist tactics deployed by the Greek Cypriots and who, Straw argues, should never have been allowed to join the EU in the first place.
And now I note that Straw has given an interview to Today’s Zaman, a pro-government English-language Turkish daily, in which the former foreign secretary reiterates his view that it was a ‘huge mistake’ to allow Cyprus to join the EU in 2004 and argues, with some vehemence, for the recognition of Turkey’s puppet state on the island, the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.
In the interview, Straw describes himself as ‘sad and very angry’ at Turkey’s faltering EU accession negotiations and squarely puts the blame for this on ‘petty politics by the Greek Cypriots’ who, Straw says, large EU countries, for the sake of Turkey, should now ‘get tough’ with, especially in light of ‘the true nature of the financial shambles of Greek Cyprus and its huge indebtedness to Russia and many other problems’.
Straw adds that if the Greek Cypriots continue to obstruct Turkey’s EU accession, then they must be forced to ‘understand what the consequences of their actions are’ and he proposes to do this by recognising the Turkish pseudo-state on Cyprus and formalising the island’s partition.
‘Part of the difficulty at the moment,’ Straw says, ‘is that you've got a de facto partition, anyway, as for the Greek Cypriots there is little or no incentive for them for a compromise because they've got all the benefits of a partition without any of the disadvantages. So in time we may have to get there [i.e. recognition of the ‘TRNC’], and it's not the end of the world; after all some of the former provinces of Yugoslavia were separated and partitioned.’
Straw then goes on to express his ‘anger’ at the plight of the Turkish Cypriots, who he agrees with his interviewer were ‘left out in the cold’ by the EU, despite voting in favour of the Annan plan in 2004.
Over the last decade, Straw concludes: ‘I have moved… from a position of relative neutrality between the position of the Greek Cypriot government and that of the Turkish Cypriots to one where I believe that a great injustice has been done to the Turkish Cypriot community, and this has nothing to do with the feelings for the Greek Cypriot population who I feel great affection for, but it is about their system.’
(You can read the whole interview here, in which Straw also describes former Greek prime minister Giorgos Papandreou as a ‘great man’ for persuading, in 2005, the Republic of Cyprus to agree to the launching of Turkey’s accession negotiations).
Straw’s motives
Since Cyprus is not the reason Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have ground to a halt – France is also blocking the opening of a number of chapters Turkey is obliged to complete before joining the EU, while Turkey itself has consistently failed to pass the necessary reforms to make it a viable EU candidate country – and since recognition of the ‘TRNC’ would not re-ignite Turkey’s EU process but end it altogether, with Cyprus losing any incentive to acquiesce to Turkey’s EU aspirations, then, unless Straw is a complete idiot, which is a possibility, it’s hard to attribute anything other than malice and selfish interest to Straw’s anti-Cyprus rants.
Regarding Straw’s selfish interests, it’s worth pointing out the following:
I checked the most recent Register of Members’ Financial Interests, which describes the interests of UK MPs that might influence their ‘actions, speeches or votes’, and although I couldn’t find any recent payments Straw has received from the Turkish government (the last registered payments from Turkey to Straw were in April 2011); he did earn, from February 2012 to February 2013, on top of his MP’s salary and cabinet minister pension, £3065 for articles written for UK national newspapers; £52,000 for speaking engagements to do with security and foreign affairs; £60,000 for security consultancy work; and £92,250 in advance for the publication of his political memoirs. Obviously, it remains in Straw’s financial interests to remain in the public eye, particularly through the espousal of controversial views and self-depiction as a security and foreign affairs guru.
However, if we are looking for more direct links that would explain Straw’s shameless pandering to the Turkish government, then it’s worth drawing attention to this article from the Lancashire Telegraph, a daily newspaper covering Straw’s parliamentary constituency of Blackburn, a town in north-west England, which, it’s relevant to point out, has a Muslim population of 25 percent, mostly originating from Pakistan.
The article is from 23 October 2012 and refers to an award Straw received from the Turkish government for his contributions to multiculturalism and British-Turkish friendship. Like Straw’s views on Cyprus, the sentiments expressed by Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul, are so outrageous as to be almost comical. Below is the article in full. (I don’t know why Straw’s trip to Ankara to pick up his prize, which must have involved flights and accommodation, presumably paid for by Straw’s Turkish hosts, was not mentioned in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests).
Blackburn MP Jack Straw is honoured by the Turkish government
Jack Straw has been given one of Turkey’s highest awards for being ‘a politician who approaches the Islamic world and Muslim societies with sincerity and friendship’.
He flew to Turkish capital Ankara to receive the country’s highest order available to individuals who are not heads of state.
The citation for the Order of the Republic or Turkey made by President Abdullah Gul highlights the Blackburn MP and former Foreign Secretary’s commitment to multiculturalism.
He praised Mr Straw for his role in issues such as the British military’s position in Iraq and Afghanistan, highly controversial issues in the Islamic world.
President Gul said he hoped the award would be a ‘strong symbol of the longstanding friendship’ between Britain and Turkey and its peoples.
Mr Straw said: ‘I am delighted and honoured to receive this award. Turkey is a vital country to Europe and the modern world.’
Giving Mr Straw the award, President Gul said: ‘I am especially honoured to present to my very close friend Jack, the Order of the Republic which is the highest order presented to persons other than heads of state.
‘In our generation, Jack Straw is one of those few politicians who embodies the qualities of a statesman.
‘He has valued multiculturalism throughout his political career and is a politicians who approaches the Islamic world and Muslim societies with sincerity and friendship.
‘The key to his popularity in his constituency of Blackburn lies in these very qualities.
‘Jack is a democrat with a conscience of the kind greatly and collectively needed in Europe in order to fight against racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.’
President Gul praised Mr Straw as being a ‘friend to Turkey and the Turkish people’ and highlighted his efforts to bring Turkey into the European Union and supporting the case of the Turkish Cypriots.
Jack Straw, the Annan plan and the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus
Apparently, Turkey’s Ministry for EU Affairs and Turkish state broadcaster TRT are preparing a propaganda video for release this summer that seeks to portray the EU’s acceptance of Cyprus as a member in 2004 as a mistake.
According to this report (in Greek), to back up Turkey’s narrative, the video will contain contributions from some leading European politicians from the 2004 EU accession era, including former chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder; former UK prime minister, Tony Blair; Blair’s foreign secretary, Jack Straw; and Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt (in other words, the usual Turkey apologists and lobbyists). The above clip has excerpts from interviews with Straw and Schröder.
What does Turkey want to achieve in this campaign to prove that the EU’s decision, almost 10 years ago, to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member was an error?
Obviously, it wants to undermine the Republic of Cyprus, dispute its membership of the EU and encourage other EU member states to override Cyprus’ objections when it comes to Turkey-EU and Turkish Cypriot-EU relations.
Also, by dwelling on the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan (which Turkey suggests Greek Cypriots were obliged to approve as part of a package that would see Cyprus enter the EU) Turkey wants to portray itself as blameless in the continuing partition of the island and depict the Greek Cypriots as the real obstacle to reunification. Such a scenario allows Turkey to carry on with its genuine Cyprus policy, which aims at the upgrading of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and the incorporation of that entity into an Annan-style confederal Cyprus. What Turkey wants is to have full control in northern Cyprus and, at the same time, through partnership at the federal level between a Turkish Cypriot constituent state (essentially, the ‘TRNC’) with the Greek Cypriot constituent state, a large say in matters pertaining to island as a whole. The delegitimisation and dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus is, therefore, fundamental to Turkey’s ambition of bringing the whole of Cyprus under its sway; an ambition it would have gone a long way to achieving with the Annan plan.
This view of the Annan plan as providing for the dismantling of the Republic of Cyprus in order to satisfy Turkey’s aspirations is supported by the comments Jack Straw makes in the video, who admits that after the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan, the UK government looked at ways that would have put a stop to the Republic of Cyprus joining the EU.
Now, although Cyprus passed all the technical and legal requirements for joining the EU with flying colours, being the first of the 10 members that joined in 2004 to complete compliance with the acquis communautaire; that to have tried to stop Cyprus joining in 2004 would have been legally and politically impossible – for example, EU states had agreed in 1995 that a resolution to the Cyprus problem was not a condition for the Republic of Cyprus joining the EU, and any last minute scuppering of Cyprus’ accession would have scuppered the accession of the other nine candidates as well; and we can, to a large extent, attribute Straw’s comments to his desire to say what his Turkish paymasters want to hear (I’ve written previously about how Jack Straw has, effectively, become a paid lobbyist for the Turkish government); it is still interesting that Straw admits how anxious the UK government and other allies of Turkey were to keep the Republic of Cyprus out of the EU in 2004. What such an anxiety reveals, unambiguously, is the inspiration and intentions behind the Annan plan, which had nothing to do with reunifying Cyprus and concerned instead the negation of the Republic of Cyprus and the denial to Greek Cypriots of the authority and legitimacy, emanating from their state, to impede Turkey joining the EU.
Tough Cypriots and incompetent Turks: or pinpointing the roles of the UK and USA in the downfall of Cyprus
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| The dynamic duo: Kissinger and Callaghan |
I’ll refer only briefly to Kazamias’ argument – which is that the evidence as to who brought about the downfall of the Republic of Cyprus does not point to a ‘conspiracy’, involving the UK, USA, Greece and Turkey, as described, most notably, by Christopher Hitchens in his Cyprus: Hostage to History. I’ve written before (here and here) about these efforts to disprove so-called Cyprus conspiracy theories, insisting they are not credible. For a start, no one suggests secret pre-invasion deals were done between Greece, Turkey, the USA and UK to partition Cyprus. Hitchens talks of ‘collusion’ not conspiracy and he characterises US and UK policy on the island as resulting not from meticulous and consistent plotting but carelessness, cynicism, arrogance and imperial caprice.
And, secondly, any attempt to diminish the role of the UK and USA or lessen the guilt of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the CIA in bringing about the partition of Cyprus demands an incredulously benign interpretation of American and British motives and machinations on the island and, as such, offers a wholly inaccurate portrayal of which actors and factors brought about partition and why.
In fact, if anything, the documentary evidence Kazamias presents corroborates Hitchens’ collusion, cynicism and caprice theory, which is that the UK and, particularly, the USA, knew about an impending coup against Makarios, knew that this would likely be followed by a Turkish invasion, knew that the Turkish invasion would take the form of a land grab; and that nothing was done to preserve legitimacy in Cyprus – and that this inaction cannot be taken to reflect indifference, incompetence or neutrality but amounted to approval, both explicit and tacit, and this was because, ultimately, the outcome – the removal of Makarios and the partition of Cyprus – suited both the Americans and the British and, in fact, were options for Cyprus they had been harbouring and promoting, in various ways and to varying degrees, in the decade (and more, in the British case) leading up to 1974.
So, putting aside Kazamias’ misinterpretation of the evidence and the interest he has in wanting to disprove a theory or version of events that does not exist, let’s look at some of the documents he presents us with in his paper:
To start with, Kazamias reveals a number of reports compiled by the British intelligence services and presented to the UK government on the eve of Turkey’s first invasion (20 July 1974) which discuss the preparedness and objectives of a Turkish military assault on Cyprus. Thus, on 19 July, the Joint Intelligence Committee is confident that given the imbalance in effectiveness and numbers between the Greek armed forces, the Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish military, any Turkish invasion of Cyprus would very quickly obtain its goals, which the British believed to be the seizure of the northern third of the island:
‘We cannot make any firm prediction as to how long it would take the Turks to achieve their military objectives, but we think that most would have been achieved within 24-48 hours of landing.’Kazamias then presents a document sent by Australian diplomats in London to Canberra on 21 July, i.e. a day after the first Turkish landings on Cyprus, reporting a meeting the Australians had had at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to gauge British reaction to the events unfolding on the island. The Australians say:
‘Commenting privately to us on the situation on 20 July a senior FCO official said that Britain secretly would not object if Turkish military forces occupied about 1/3 of the island before agreeing to a ceasefire. (Please protect). Such a position would need to be reached by 21 July if peace prospects were not to be endangered further. In the meantime, Britain continued to support publicly appeals for an immediate ceasefire.’Kazamias rightly draws attention to the three most important elements in the British statement:
1. Britain’s willingness to accept a Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus.
2. Britain’s concern that Turkey should complete its seizure within 48 hours of the invasion.
3. That Britain had no doubts as to precisely what Turkey’s intentions were and is certain of how much of Cyprus – one-third – Turkey wanted to take.
Kazamias then asserts that the Americans are equally sanguine about the Turkish invasion. The USA is aware and understanding of Turkey’s aim to dismember the island and, like Britain, is mainly concerned, once the Turks have landed, that they seize the third of Cyprus they want as quickly as possible and that Greece should be persuaded not to respond to Turkey’s assault with any escalation of the conflict. This is the exchange between Kissinger and CIA Director William Colby on 19 July – or 20 July in Cyprus – as news of the Turkish invasion broke:
K[issinger]: But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole island are they?
C[olby]: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.
K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.
C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka [sic] on up and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.
[…]
K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?
C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let’s negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.
K: OK.
What complicated matters for the UK and the USA, however, is the fact that Turkey’s 20 July invasion did not go to plan, with the Cypriot National Guard and the small contingent from Greece on the island resisting more successfully than anticipated while the Turkish armed forces performed much worse than the British and Americans expected.
Thus, by the time a US-brokered ceasefire came into force on 22 July, i.e. following the 48 hours the British seemed content to allow Turkey to complete its aim of conquering a third of Cyprus, the Turks had only managed to take control of the corridor linking Kyrenia to Nicosia, i.e. four percent of the island.
According to a report presented to the British Cabinet meeting on 22 July, ‘the Turks […] badly misjudged the potential extent of National Guard resistance… must be disappointed at the meagre success of their armed intervention… [and] there is no question now of a quick victory’.
Kazamias says that the Americans were even more unimpressed by Turkey’s military prowess. At a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) on 22 July, the following exchange is recorded, with Kissinger appearing to doubt whether Turkey would be ultimately victorious on the island:
Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?
Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They [the Turks] couldn’t even take Nicosia airport.
Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. Their air support was ineffective.
Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they [the Turks] really that strong on the island then?
Gen. Walters: Well, I don’t know.
It was at this stage, Kazamias suggests – correctly, in my opinion – with Turkey’s initial failure evident, with the ceasefire in place and, also, with the fall of both the junta in Athens and its puppet regime in Nicosia, that British and US policies towards the Cyprus crisis diverged. Britain, according to Kazamias, believed that Turkey had blown its chance to take a third of Cyprus and that now was the time for diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. In this context, Britain was even prepared to contemplate the use of its own forces on the island to prevent any further Turkish advance.
The Americans, on the other hand, did not regard the Turks’ failure as the end of the military option to bring about their optimal Cyprus policy aim [i.e. partition] and provided only nominal support to British endeavours in the Geneva talks between the UK, Greece, Turkey and the two communities in Cyprus, which had been in process since 25 July. Indeed, it is clear that the Americans shared the Turks’ view of the negotiations, which was that they were a useful cover that allowed the Turks to reinforce their Kyrenia bridgehead from which they would soon be able to launch another attack to achieve what they had failed to achieve on 20 July.
Thus, the Americans, by encouraging the Turks to reinforce their presence on Cyprus and begin a second assault to fulfill their territorial objectives, were not only making a mockery of Britain’s efforts to arrive at a diplomatic solution to the crisis: but they were also making it clear to the British that the USA would not favour any attempt by the British to deploy their military on Cyprus to warn off or thwart a Turkish advance – disapproval which the British meekly deferred to.
At the same time as playing the British for ‘dummies’ (as the UK foreign secretary, James Callaghan, was later to admit); the Americans also sought to convince the new civilian Greek government, headed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, despite the evidence on the ground, that Turkey was not planning further military action in Cyprus and that Greece should not escalate matters by responding to Turkey’s build-up on the island by sending reinforcements or with a build-up of its own. Again, these reassurances were enough for the credulous and pusillanimous Karamanlis.
The American plan of using the ceasefire it had brokered on 22 July to allow Turkey to strengthen its position on the island and mislead Greece into staying its hand is revealed in this exchange at the WSAG meeting on 21 July:
Secretary Kissinger: […] Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold – what is the state of play on the island now?
Mr. Colby: Well, it’s unclear, but they do have a foothold.
Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven’t done as well militarily as they have politically.
Mr. Colby: You’re right, they haven’t done very well militarily.
[…]
Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they would.
[…]
Secretary Kissinger: I’m trying to understand what the balance of forces would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a course.
Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area – more than they have now – and they have failed.
The discussion goes on:
Secretary Kissinger: […] Seems to me that [Turkish PM] Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are doing lousy militarily. […] What is going to be the balance of forces if we get a ceasefire?
Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some 40,000 troops.
Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would change the whole picture.
Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, anyway?
Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough.
Who are the men wanted for the killings of Tassos Isaac and Solomos Solomou?
The arrest and (inevitable) release by Kirghiz authorities of Erhan Arikli, wanted on an Interpol warrant for his involvement in the murder of Tassos Isaac, has reminded us not only of the savagery of the 1996 Green Line killings (which included the shooting of Solomos Solomou) but also the nature of the regime in occupied Cyprus, the thugs who created and sustain it.
Arikli’s biography tells us he was born in 1962 in Ardahan, a provincial city (formerly populated by Greeks and Armenians) in northeastern Turkey, close to the Georgian border. Along with his family, Arikli came to Cyprus aged 14 and settled in the occupied Greek village of Lapithos, in the Kyrenia district. At the time of the Isaac murder, Arikli was president in the occupied areas of the student wing of the fanatical pan-Turanian organisation, Turk-Bir. For the last 14 years, he has been living in Kirghizstan, travelling between that Turkic republic, Turkey and occupied Cyprus on a so-called ‘diplomatic passport’ issued by the ‘TRNC’. Arikli’s job in Kirghizstan has been to promote tourism and business opportunities in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus. His brother, Guven Arikli, is a senior member of the occupation regime, acting as director of ‘prime minister’ Irsen Kucuk’s office.Below are the names and details of the other suspects wanted by Cypriot authorities for the murders of Isaac and Solomou.
In relation to the Isaac lynching, as well as Erhan Arikli, Interpol warrants are outstanding for:
- Hasim Yilmaz, a Turkish settler, former member of Turkey’s secret service, now running a coffee shop in occupied Kyrenia;
- Mustafa Ergun, a Turkish settler and ‘police officer’ in the occupation regime;
- Polat Fikret Koreli, a Turkish Cypriot from Famagusta;
- Fikret Veli Koreli, a Turkish Cypriot bicycle workshop owner from Famagusta; and
- Mehmet Mustafa Arslan, a Turkish settler and leader of the ultranationalist Grey Wolves in the Turkish-occupied areas.
- Kenan Akin, at the time of the murder, ‘minister’ for agriculture in the occupation regime;
- Erdal Emanet, who was head of special services in the occupation regime’s ‘police’ force;
- Attila Sav, former chief of ‘police’ in the ‘TRNC’;
- Lt. Gen. Hasan Kundakci, then head of the Turkish Cypriot ‘armed forces’; and
- Maj. Gen. Mehmet Karli, former head of the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus.
Explaining Jack Straw’s Cyprus outbursts
We recall Blair’s wife, Cherie Booth, earned millions from the Turkish government when she (unsuccessfully) defended their position in the Meletios Apostolides’ case; while I came across these (unsurprising) entries in Jack Straw’s Register of Members' Financial Interests that might go some way to explaining his Cyprus outpourings:
‘15 April 2011, received fee of £2,000 for participating in a Government of Turkey conference on foreign policy in Istanbul on 24 March 2011. I was accompanied by my wife. Our travel to Ankara and Istanbul and accommodation and meals from 23-28 March 2011 were paid by the Government of Turkey; total cost £2,910. Time taken, including travel and preparation, three days. (Registered 3 May 2011).’
And a few years earlier:
‘22-26 June 2006, to Istanbul with my wife, as guests of the Turkish Government who provided us with hotel accommodation. (We paid for our own flights; see Category 5 above). (Registered 5 September 2006).’
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