Let's make the assumption that this rift between Israel and Turkey is long-term and points to a significant realignment of partnerships and strategies in the eastern Mediterranean, in which Greece and Cyprus, without abandoning good relations with the Arabs, find common interest with the Jewish State, at least in their opposition to neo-Ottomanism.
Let's also recognise that such an assumption would mean that Turkey would find itself increasingly drawn to countries such as Iran and Syria – and away from the West – and that Turkish society and politics would become even more dominated by a virulent combination of radical Islam and ferocious nationalism. The dangers of having such a neighbour on Greece's doorstep are obvious; but no more dangerous than today – where Greece is, largely as a result of strategic ineptitude, isolated and deluding itself that there exists the possibility of Turkish-Greek 'friendship'.
For Cyprus, the emergence of a Turkey like the one I've described would mean that a 'solution' to the Cyprus problem would become impossible – Turkey has only considered doing a deal on the island because Cyprus is an obstacle to its goal of entering the EU – and the occupation of the northern part of the island would continue ad infinitum.
In such circumstances – with Turkey drifting away from Europe and no end in sight to the occupation – it could be argued that what Cyprus needs is a 'solution' as quickly as possible, before Turkey's new place in the world takes shape. The point being that since any 'solution' is bound to be unsatisfactory to Greek Cypriots and hence only interim, Greek Cypriots would at least, thereafter, be in a good position – unlike in the 1960s – to use the new strategic environment to reverse the 'solution' and pursue their goal of properly re-unifying and re-hellenising the island.